Sūtra 3.2.3 (Mind is one)

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration, Word-for-word and English translation of Vaiśeṣika sūtra 3.2.3:

प्रयत्नायौगपद्याज्ज्ञानायौगपद्याच्चैकम् ॥ ३.२.३ ॥

prayatnāyaugapadyājjñānāyaugapadyāccaikam || 3.2.3 ||

prayatnāyaugapadyāt—from the non-simultaneity of volitions; jñānāyaugapadyāt—from the non-simultaneity of cognitions; ca—and; ekam—one.

3. From the non-simultaneity of volitions, and from the nonsimultaneity of cognitions, (it follows that there is only) one (Mind) (in each organism).

Commentary: The Upaskāra of Śaṅkara Miśra:

(English rendering of Śaṅkara Miśra’s commentary called Upaskāra from the 15th century)

Then the doubt arises whether there be one Mind, or more than one Mind, existing in each individual body. He states the means of decision:

[Read sūtra 3.2.3 above]

“Mind in each organism” is the complement of the Sūtra.

If there were many Minds in a single organism, then cognitions and volitions would be simultaneous. It is not a valid conclusion that many volitions are produced at one and the same time, because simultaneous actions are observed in the fingers of the hands and the toes of the feet of a dancing girl; for, that being explained or possible by the swift movement alone of the Mind, simultaneity of necessary or corresponding particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state, is not obtained. Hereby (i.e., by the necessary particular attributes of the Soul in their indestructible state), the theory that in one and the same body there are five Minds, and that on the conjunction of two, three, four or five of them with their respective senses, two, three, four or five cognitions are simultaneously produced, is refuted, as it would entail a superfluity of suppositon [supposition]; while the sense of simultaneity is upheld (as an illusion). The implication of the simultaneity of two cognitions, e. the cognitions “bitter treacle,” produced by the connection of the Mind with the sense-organ of Touch, under the limitation of the sense-organ of Taste, also does not exist in view of the property (i.e., of rapid transition) of the instrument or internal sense, (i.e., Mind). Action also in the two parts of a lizard, snake, etc., cut into two or three pieces, arises from the impact of the chopper, etc., or the rapid transition of the Mind, or the invisible operation of another (and barren) Mind which has just slipped off from a liberated Soul.

The view that Mind is really a whole made up of parts, like a leech and that by its contraction and expansion, like those of a leech, simultaneity and non-simultaneity of cognitions are respectively produced is opposed by the fault of redundancy in the supposition of its parts. This is the direction.—3.