Chapter 8 - The Attitude of an Assailable Enemy

[Sanskrit text for this chapter is available]

Summary: The Attitude of an Assailable Enemy; and Friends that Deserve Help.

When an assailable enemy who is in danger of being attacked is desirous of taking upon himself the condition which led one king to be combined with another against himself, or of splitting them from each other, he may propose peace to one of the kings on the condition of himself paying twice the amount of profit accruing from the combination. The agreement having been made, he may describe to that king the loss of men and money, the hardship of sojourning abroad, the commission of sinful deeds, and the misery and other personal troubles to which that king would have been subjected. When the king is convinced of the truth, the amount promised may be paid; or having made that king to incur enmity with other kings, the agreement itself may be broken off.

When a king is inclined to cause to another loss of men and money in the ill-considered undertakings of the latter, or to frustrate the latter in the attempt of achieving large profit from well-begun undertakings; or when he means to strike another at his (another’s) own place or while marching; or when he intends to exact subsidy again in combination with the latter’s assailable enemy; or when he is in need of money and does not like to trust to his ally, he may, for the time being, be satisfied with a small amount of profit.

When a king has in view the necessity of helping a friend or of destroying an enemy, or the possibility of acquiring much wealth (in return for the present help), or when he intends to utilise in future the services of the one now obliged by him, he may reject the offer of large profit at the present in preference of a small gain in future.

When a king means to help another from the clutches of traitors or enemies or of a superior king threatening the very existence of the latter, and intends thereby to set an example of rendering similar help to himself in future, he should receive no profit either at the present or in the future.

When a king means to harass the people of an enemy or to break the agreement of peace between a friend and a foe, or when he suspects of another’s attack upon himself, and when, owing to any of these causes, he wants to break peace with his ally, he may demand from the latter an enhanced amount of profit long before it is due. The latter under these circumstances may demand for a procedure (karma) either at the present or in the future. The same procedure explains the cases treated of before.

The conqueror and his enemy helping their respective friends differ according as their friends are such or are not such as undertake possible, praiseworthy or productive works and as are resolute in their undertakings and are provided with loyal and devoted subjects.

Whoever undertakes tolerable work is a beginner of possible work; whoever undertakes an unblemished work is a beginner of praiseworthy work; whoever undertakes a work of large profits is a beginner of a productive work; whoever takes no rest before the completion of the work undertaken is a resolute worker; and whoever has loyal and devoted subjects is in a position to command help and to bring to a successful termination any work without losing anything in the form of favour. When such friends are gratified by the enemy or the conqueror, they can be of immense help to him; friends of reverse character should never be helped.

Of the two, the conqueror and his enemy, both of whom may happen to have a friend in the same person, he who helps a true or a truer friend over-reaches the other; for by helping a true friend he enriches himself, while the other not only incurs loss of men and money and the hardships of sojourning abroad, but also showers benefits on an enemy who hates the benefactor all the more for his gratification.

Whoever of the two, the conqueror and his enemy, who may happen to have a friend in the same Madhyama king, helps a Madhyama king of true or truer friendship, over-reaches the other; for, by helping a true friend, he enriches himself, while the other incurs loss of men and money and the difficulties of sojourning abroad. When a Madhyama king thus helped is devoid of good qualities, then the enemy over-reaches the conqueror, for such a Madhyama king, spending his energies on useless undertakings and receiving help with no idea of returning it, withdraws himself away.

The same thing holds good with a neutral king under similar circumstances.

In case of helping with a portion of the army one of the two, a Madhyama or a neutral king, whoever happens to help one who is brave, skilful in handling weapons, and possessed of endurance and friendly feelings will himself be deceived, while his enemy, helping one of reverse character, will over-reach him.

When a king achieves this or that object with the assistance of a friend who is to receive the help of his army in return later on_} then he may send out his various kinds of army—such as hereditary army, hired army, army formed of corporations of people, his friend’s army and the army composed of wild tribes—either that kind of army which has experience of all sorts of grounds and of seasons or the army of enemies or of wild tribes, which is far removed in space and time.

When a king thinks that, “Though successful, my ally may cause my army to move in an enemy’s territory or in wild tracts, and during unfavourable seasons, and thereby he may render it useless to me,” then under the excuse of having to employ his army otherwise, he may help his ally in any other way; but when he is obliged to lend his army, he may send that kind of his army, which is used to the weather of the time of operation, under the condition of employing it till the completion of the work, and of protecting it from dangers. When the ally has finished his work, he should, under some excuse, try to get back his army; or he may send to his ally that army which is composed of traitors, enemies, and wild tribes; or having made peace with ally’s assailable enemy, he may deceive the ally.

* When the profit accruing to kings under an agreement, whether they be of equal, inferior, or superior power, is equal to all, that agreement is termed peace (sandhi); when unequal, it is termed defeat (vikrama). Such is the nature of peace and war.

[Thus ends Chapter VIII, “The Attitude of an Assailable Enemy; and Friends that Deserve Help,” in Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. End of the hundred and sixth chapter from the beginning.]