Chapter 7 - Peace and War by Adopting the Double Policy

[Sanskrit text for this chapter is available]

The conqueror may take in the aid of the second member (i.e. the immediate enemy) thus:

Having combined with a neighbouring king, the conqueror may march against another neighbouring king. Or if he thinks that “(my enemy) will neither capture my rear nor make an alliance with my assailable enemy against whom I am going to march; I shall have double the strength with him, i.e. the enemy suing peace; (my ally) will not only facilitate the collection of my revenue and supplies and put down the internal enemies who are causing me immense trouble, but also punish wild tribes and their followers entrenched in their strongholds, reduce my assailable enemy to a precarious condition or compel him to accept the proffered peace, and having received as much profit as he desires, he will endeavour to endear my other enemies to me,” then the conqueror may proclaim war against one and make peace with another, and endeavour to get an army for money or money for the supply of an army from among his neighbouring kings.

When the kings of superior, equal or inferior power make peace with the conqueror and agree to pay a greater, or equal, or less amount of profit in proportion to the army supplied, it is termed even peace; that which is of the reverse character is styled uneven peace; and when the profit is proportionally very high, it is termed deception (atisandhi).

When a king of superior power is involved in troubles, or is come to grief or is afflicted with misfortune, his enemy, though of inferior power, may request of him the help of his army in return for a share in the profit proportional to the strength of the army supplied. If the king to whom peace is offered on such terms is powerful enough to retaliate, he may declare war; otherwise he may accept the terms.

In view of marching for the purpose of exacting some expected revenue to be utilised in recouping his own strength and resources, an inferior king may request of a superior the help of the latter’s army for the purpose of guarding the base and the rear of his territory in return for the payment of a greater share in the profit than the strength of the army supplied deserves. The king to whom such a proposal is made may accept the proposal, if the proposer is of good intentions; otherwise he may declare war.

When a king of inferior power or one who is provided with the aid of forts and friends has to make a short march in order to capture an enemy without waging war or to receive some expected profit, he may request a third king of superior power, involved under various troubles and misfortunes, the help of the latter’s army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the strength of the army supplied deserves. If the king to whom this proposal is made is powerful enough to, retaliate, he may declare war; otherwise he may accept the proposal.

When the king of superior power and free from all troubles Is desirous of causing to his enemy loss of men and money in the latter’s ill-considered undertaking, or of sending his own treacherous army abroad, or bringing his enemy under the clutches of an mimical army, or of causing trouble to a reducible and tottering enemy by setting an inferior king against that enemy, or is desirous of having peace for the sake of itself and is possessed of good intentions, he may accept a less share in the profit (promised for the army supplied to another), and endeavour to make wealth by combining with an ally if the latter is equally of good intentions; otherwise he may declare war (against that ally).

A Icing may deceive or help his equal as follows:

When a king proposes peace to another king of equal power on the condition of receiving the help of the latter’s army strong-enough to oppose an enemy’s army, or to guard the front, centre, and rear of his territory, or to help his friend, or to protect any other wild tracts of his territory, in return for the payment of a share in the profit proportionally equal to the strength of the army supplied, the latter may accept the terms if the proposer is of good intentions; otherwise he may declare war.

When a king of equal power, capable of receiving the help of an army from another quarter requests of another king in troubles due to the diminished strength of the elements of sovereignty, and with many enemies, the help of the latter’s army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the strength of the army supplied deserves, the latter, if powerful, may declare war; or accept the terms otherwise.

When a king who is under troubles, who has his works at the mercy of his neighbouring kings, and who has yet to make an army, requests of another king of equal power the help of the latter’s army in return for the payment of a share in the profit greater than the strength of the army supplied deserves, the latter may accept the terms if the proposer is of good intentions; otherwise war may be declared.

When, with desire of putting down a king in troubles due to the diminished strength of the elements of sovereignty, or with the desire of destroying his well-begun work of immense and unfailing profit, or with the intention of striking him in his own place or on the occasion of marching, one, though frequently getting immense (subsidy) from an assailable enemy of equal, inferior, or superior power, sends demands to him again and again, then he may comply with the demands of the former if he is desirous of maintaining his own power by destroying with the army of the former an impregnable fortress of an enemy, or a friend of that enemy, or laying waste the wild tracts of that enemy, or if he is desirous of exposing the army of the ally to wear and tear even in good roads and good seasons, or if he is desirous of strengthening his own army with that of his ally, and thereby putting down the ally, or winning over the army of the ally.

When a king is desirous of keeping under his power another king of superior or inferior power as an assailable enemy and of destroying the latter after routing out another enemy with the help of the latter, or when he is desirous of getting back whatever he has paid (as subsidy), he may send a proposal of peace to another on the condition of paying more than the cost of the army supplied. If the king to whom this proposal is made is powerful enough to retaliate he may declare war; or if otherwise, he may accept the terms; or he may keep quiet allied with the assailable enemy; or he may supply the proposer of peace with his army full of traitors, enemies and wild tribes.

When a king of superior power falls into troubles owing to the weakness of the elements of his sovereignty, and requests of an inferior king the help of the latter’s army in return for the payment of a share in the profit proportionally equal to the strength of the army supplied, the latter, if powerful enough to retaliate, may declare war; if otherwise, accept the terms.

A king of superior power may request of an inferior the help of the latter’s army in return for the payment of a share in the profit less than the cost of the army supplied; and the latter, if powerful enough to retaliate, may declare war, or accept the terms otherwise.

* The king who is sued for peace and also the king who offers peace should both consider the motive with which the proposal o [of?] peace is made, and adopt that course of action which on consideration seems to be productive of good results.

[Thus ends Chapter VII, “Peace and War by Adopting the Double Policy,” in Book VII, “The End of the Six-fold Policy” of the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. End of the hundred and fifth chapter from the beginning.]