Brahma-Sūtra 2.2.32

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.2.32 by Roma Bose:

“And because of the inconsistency (of the doctrine of a universal void) in every way.”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

The doctrine of void, too, is erroneous, because it is inconsistent “in every way”, being opposed to the evidence of direct perception and the rest.

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

Now the doctrine of universal void, as held by the Mādhyamikas, is being disposed of.

(The view is as follows:) All the objects mentioned in the sacred works composed by the omniscient one (viz. the Buddha), are simply for the sake of suiting the intellectual capacities of his disciples; but are not really existent, owing to the impossibility of the origin and destruction (of things). The origin of entity from non-entity is inappropriate. (And if an entity arises from another entity, the question is:) Is the entity which arises from another entity dissimilar to the latter or similar? If the first, then there will be the origin of everything everywhere. If the second, then fruitlessness would result like the grinding of what has already been ground.^[1] Owing to such inexplicability of origin, destruction, too, is inexplicable. Hence, the doctrine of void is to be accepted. Thus, salvation consists in attaining a state of void,—such is the view of the Buddha. And this is perfectly reasonable, since void is not proved by anything else, (but is self-proved). The conventional distinctions of perceiver and the object perceived and so on are mere errors.

With regard to it we reply: The doctrine of universal void does not stand to reason. Why? Because if the maintainer of the doctrine of universal void be unreal, then there will result the reality of all; if real, then there will result the abandonment of the initial proposition. “And on account of the inconsistency, in every way,” of the doctrine of universal void, the view that everything is void is unreasonable,—because the entire world is perceived to be true both by the disputant and the respondent, because there is no proof of void, and because it is in conflict with the Buddha’s doctrine, establishing the existence of momentary objects. The sense is that the view of the Mādhyamikas who maintain that everything is void, who are unacquainted with the process of origination and destruction, and who are just like an owl not perceiving the sun by reason of defective eyesight, is erroneous in every way. It is established, thus, that there is not even an odour of contradiction in the view of Scripture.

Here ends the section entitled “Inconsistency in every way” (5).

Comparative views of Śaṅkara:

Interpretation different. He takes it as a refutation of the Buddhist doctrine in general, not particularly of the doctrine of universal void. He points out at the end of sūtra 31 that the third school of Buddhism, viz. the doctrine of universal void, is set aside by all evidence, and as such requires no special and separate refutation.^[2]

Comparative views of Bhāskara:

This sūtra too is not found in his commentary. He points out at the end of sūtra 29 (sūtra 30 according to Nimbārka) that the doctrine of universal void is refuted through the refutation of the doctrine of the sole reality of cognitions.^[3]

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

I.e. on the first alternative a gold ring may arise from clay; on the second, there is no sense in producing something already existent, gold (ring) from gold.

[2]:

Vide Brahma-sūtras (Śaṅkara’s commentary) 2.2.31, p. 558.

[3]:

Brahma-sūtras (Bhāskara’s Commentary) 2.2.29 (written as 2.2.30 in conformity with Śaṅkara’s number), p. 125.