The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2897 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2897.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वेदार्थेऽन्यप्रमाणैर्या सर्वकालमसङ्गतिः ।
तयैवास्य प्रमाणत्वमनुवादत्वमन्यथा ॥ २८९७ ॥

vedārthe'nyapramāṇairyā sarvakālamasaṅgatiḥ |
tayaivāsya pramāṇatvamanuvādatvamanyathā || 2897 ||

“The fact that other means of cognition never have any bearing upon what is said in the Veda establishes its validity.—otherwise, it would be merely reiterative.”—(2897)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Then again, is it meant that the Veda operates upon things apprehended by other Means of Cognition? Or is it not so meant? These are the two alternatives possible.—If it is the second view that is accepted—that the Veda is not operative on things apprehended by other Means,—then that fact alone proves the self-sufficient validity of the Veda.—This is what is pointed out in the following:—[see verse 2897 above]

What is said in the Veda’;—e.g. that ‘Heaven follows from the performance of the Agnihotra’, and so forth.

Other means of cognition’;—‘Means of Cognition other than the Veda’ are Sense-perception and the rest;—the ‘bearing’ of these consists in their having these same for their objective;—and this ‘bearing’ is absent.

The fact’—i.e. the fact that they have no bearing.

Asya’—of the Veda.

If the other alternative view is accepted,—that the Veda envisages only those things that are apprehended by the other Means of Cognition,—then, one cognition (that produced by the Veda or that produced by other Means) would be apprehending what has been already apprehended by other Means; consequently the later of the two would become invalid. This is what is pointed out by the words ‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’;—‘otherwise’,—i.e. if it is held that the Veda as a means of Cognition is operative on what is also apprehended by other Means of Cognition, then,—as it would be envisaging only what has been already apprehended by other means, it would be as invalid as Remembrance.

Thus what is itself a valid Cognition cannot need the corroboration of other cognitions; hence it becomes established that all Cognitions are self-sufficient in their validity.—(2897)

The same idea is further elucidated—[see verse 2898 next]

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