Verse 2811

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

एवं च पौरुषेयत्वे वेदानामुपपादिते ।
स्वतःप्रामाण्यमप्येषां प्रतिक्षिप्तमयत्नतः ॥ २८११ ॥

evaṃ ca pauruṣeyatve vedānāmupapādite |
svataḥprāmāṇyamapyeṣāṃ pratikṣiptamayatnataḥ || 2811 ||

Thus then, it being established that the Vedas are the work of a personality, the self-sufficiency of their authority and validity also becomes overthrown without effort.—(2811)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

With the following Text, the author proceeds to further support the idea of his doctrine being ‘free from all self-sufficient Revelation’ (declared in the Introductory Texts):—[see verse 2811 above]

With a view to establish the authority (and reliability) of the Revealed Word, the followers of Jaimini have declared that of all Pramāṇas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) the validity is self-sufficient, inherent,—and its only invalidity is due to other causes, extrinsic. They argue that if their validity were extrinsic (due to other causes), there would be an infinite regress; which would strike at the root of all notions of the valid and invalid cognitions.

On this question, there are four views possible:—(1) Sometimes both validity and invalidity are inherent;—(2) sometimes both are extrinsic;—(3) Validity is extrinsic and Invalidity is inherent;—(4) Validity is inherent and Invalidity is extrinsic.

(1) The first view is not tenable; because would both Validity and Invalidity belong to the same individual cognition? Or to different ones (Validity to one and Invalidity to another)? It is not possible for two mutually contradictory and exclusive characters as Validity and Invalidity to belong to one and the same individual.—Nor can they belong to different individuals; as there is nothing to determine which would belong to what; and hence there could be no certainty regarding it; which would mean that there would be no distinction between Valid and Invalid Cognitions which would not be confused. Because both being equally independent, there could be no certainty as to any particular Cognition being valid only. Because, as regards Annulment also, all difference between the two would become obliterated; and there is no other means admitted that could definitely determine the one or the other. Thus any distinction as to one being valid and the other invalid would be impossible.

(2) Nor can the second view be right; because the Cognition that had no character previously would have to be regarded as character-less. Further, Validity and Invalidity being mutually exclusive, if both of these were absent,—no other character could be recognised as belonging to it; and thus it would become truly ‘inexplicable’, ‘indeterminate—This has been thus declared (by Kumārila in Ślokavārtika—Codanā-Sūtra 35 and 37)—‘Both (Validity and Invalidity) cannot be intrinsic, as the two are mutually contradictory; nor can both be extrinsic; as in this case, the Cognition would have to be regarded as featureless (35)... If it be argued that the two characters might not be incompatible, as belonging to different Cognitions,—even so, as it is not dependent upon anything else, it cannot be determined which character belongs to which cognition.’

(3) Nor can the third view be right; [that Validity is inherent and Invalidity, is extrinsic];—as this involves an infinite regress. For instance, what is by itself intrinsically invalid, can never be expected to bring about validity; because it is itself invalid; nor could it be expected to proceed from what is valid; because it stands on the same footing as the other;—if it be expected that validity would come from outside,—then there would be an infinite regress. For the purpose of determining the validity of a single Cognition, one would have to follow up a series of such Means,—and the entire life of man would become used up.

For these reasons, there being no other alternative available, the validity of all Pramāṇas (Cognitions and Means of Cognition) must be regarded as inherent in them, and the invalidity as extrinsic.—This argument may be formulated as follows:—When certain things are restricted to a certain thing,—they do not need anything else, so far as that thing is concerned,—e.g. Ākāśa and Incorporeality;—the Pramāṇas in question are restricted to the character of being valid;—hence there is apprehension of something contrary to the wider character.—The Reason adduced here is not ‘Inconclusive’; a character which is impossible by itself cannot be thrust upon it by something else; e.g. corporeality cannot be thrust upon Ākāśa.—This has been thus asserted—‘The Potency that is non-existent by itself can never be created by anything else.’ [Ślokavārtika—Codanā-Sūtra 47].—(2811)

With the following Text, the Author proceeds to point out objections against the above view (of the Mīmāṃsaka), by showing the insignificant character of his proposition:—[see verse 2812 next]