Verse 2332-2334

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सपक्षोऽपि विकल्पोऽत्र श्रुत्यर्थे साध्यहीनता ।
व्यक्तिलक्षणपक्षेऽपि जात्यन्यानन्यकल्पना ॥ २३३२ ॥
अन्यत्वे धर्म्यसिद्धेर्नोऽनन्यत्वेपि परान्प्रति ।
अविशेषेऽपि नानित्यं न नित्यं वस्तु तन्मम ॥ २३३३ ॥
अंशो ह्येतस्य जात्याख्यो नित्यो ध्वंसीतरो मतः ।
शबलाकारमेकं हि वस्तु प्राक्प्रतिपादितम् ॥ २३३४ ॥

sapakṣo'pi vikalpo'tra śrutyarthe sādhyahīnatā |
vyaktilakṣaṇapakṣe'pi jātyanyānanyakalpanā || 2332 ||
anyatve dharmyasiddherno'nanyatvepi parānprati |
aviśeṣe'pi nānityaṃ na nityaṃ vastu tanmama || 2333 ||
aṃśo hyetasya jātyākhyo nityo dhvaṃsītaro mataḥ |
śabalākāramekaṃ hi vastu prākpratipāditam || 2334 ||

“The exact nature of the (opponent’s) corroborative instance also has got to be examined:—If it is meant to be taken in its direct denotation (i.e. the universal), then, it is devoid of the probandum.—If it is taken in the indirect denotation, as indicating the individual,—then the question arises as to its being the same as, or different from, the universal. If it is different (from the universal), then the ‘object’ becomes one that cannot be admitted by us; while if it is not different (from the universal), then the object is one that cannot be admitted by others.—If it is something indefinite (vague),—then such a thing cannot be either entirely eternal or entirely non-eternal, for us. Because that element in it which is called the ‘universal’ is eternal, while the other element is perishable; and it has been explained before that every object has a mixed character”.—[vide ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 350-352],—(2332-2334)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Having thus pointed out the defects in the Probans (of the Opponent), the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out those in the Corroborative Instance:—[see verses 2332-2334 above]

The term ‘Sapakṣa’ (which is that wherein the Probandum is known by all to be present) here stands for the Corroborative Instance (in the reasoning of the Opponent, where the Jar has been cited as an instance of what is perceived as appearing after effort and is non-eternal).

The question, as regards the Instance that has been cited (the ‘Jar’) is—is the word meant to be taken in its direct denotative sense (which is the Universal)?—Or in the sense of the Individual Jar?

If it is meant to be taken in the direct sense, then it is defective, in so far as it is devoid of the Probandum (Non-eternality). ‘Śruti’ here stands for the Word;—the ‘artha’ is what is directly denoted by it;—and what is so denoted is the Universal ‘Jar’;—and the Universal is admitted by all parties to be eternal;—hence there cannot be presence, in it, of non-eternality, which forms the Probandum.

In some places, the reading is ‘jātyarthaḥ’ in place of ‘śrutyarthaḥ’; under which ‘jāti’ is to be taken as in apposition to ‘artha’. The meaning however remains the same as before.

If the second alternative is meant—that the word ‘Jar’ stands for the Individual Jar,—then also, it has to be considered whether the Individual that is intended to be the corroborative Instance is the same as, or different from, the Universal; that is, whether the Individual is something different from the Universal? Or non-different from it?

If it is different, then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Mīmāṃsaka; because the Mīmāṃsaka does not hold the Universal to be something absolutely different from the Individual, as the Vaiśeṣikas and others do; as has been asserted in the words—‘or us the Universal is nothing different from the Individual’.

If, on the other hand, the Individual is meant to be non-different (from the Universal),—then the object cited as the Instance is one that cannot be admitted by the Buddhist and others.’ These ‘others’ do not regard the Universal as non-different from the Individual.

If the Jar is meant to be the Instance, in the indefinite form, free from all conceptual contents like difference and non-difference,—even then, according to us, the Instance comes to be one devoid of the Probandum. This is what is asserted in the words—‘If it is something indefinite, etc. etc.’—‘Tat’ stands for the Jar.

Question:—How so?

Answer:—‘That element, etc. etc.’—Of the entity called ‘Jar’, that factor which is called the ‘Universal’ is eternal, while the other factor which is called the ‘Individual’ is perishable.

Question:—How can one and the same thing have two mutually contradictory characters?

Answer:—‘Mixed, character, etc. etc.—(2332-2334)