The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2335 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2335.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अनित्यता विकल्प्यैवं नाशश्चेत्साध्यहीनता ।
ममान्यस्यां तु भवतामित्येषा दूषणोक्तिदिक् ॥ २३३५ ॥

anityatā vikalpyaivaṃ nāśaścetsādhyahīnatā |
mamānyasyāṃ tu bhavatāmityeṣā dūṣaṇoktidik || 2335 ||

“In the same manner, the exact nature of ‘non-eternality’ (your probandum) also has got to be considered. if what is meant is absolute destruction,—then the instance is devoid of this probandum, for us. If it is otherwise, then the instance is devoid of the probandum, for you.—Thus briefly has the way been shown for finding defects in your argument”.—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 353].—(2335)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Mīmāṃsaka proceeds again to point out the defects in the Corroborative Instance, through the various alternatives that are possible in regard to the Probandum:—[see verse 2335 above]

If what is meant by your Probandum, ‘non-eternality’—is absolute Destruction,—then for us, Mīmāṃsakas, the Instance is devoid of the Probandum; because we do not admit of any absolute Destruction of things; as they always remain in the form of Potencies.

Though the word used in the Text is the common word, ‘nāśa’, yet from the Context, its meaning appears to be restricted to utter, absolute destruction. If it were not so, why should the writer have urged the argument that the Instance is devoid of the Probandum?

Question:—The question as to what is meant by ‘non-eternality’ has been already discussed before under Text 2315; why is it discussed over again?

Answer:—True; but it was discussed there for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the ‘Subject’, while on the present occasion it is discussed for the purpose of pointing out the defects in the Corroborative Instance. This is the difference.

If, on the other hand, ‘non-eternality’ that is meant is not in the form of ‘absolute Destruction’,—but in the form of ‘appearance and disappearance’,—then the answer is—‘If it is otherwise’,—i.e. if ‘non-eternality’ is something other than ‘Absolute Destruction’.

For you’—‘there is absence of Probandum’—this has to be construed here also i.e. in the Instance.—As you, Buddhists do not admit of ‘Destruction with a residue’—as the Saṅkhyas do. Hence under your view, the Instance cited would be devoid of the Probandum.

This is the way in which the arguments in support of the non-eternality of Words have to be refuted,—which has been expounded for the learned; other arguments may also be put forward by intelligent people themselves.—(2335)

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