Verse 2106

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

वेदवाक्यार्थमिथ्यात्वं यो वदत्यनुमानतः ।
तस्य वैदिकविज्ञानबलात्पक्षो निवर्त्तते ॥ २१०६ ॥

vedavākyārthamithyātvaṃ yo vadatyanumānataḥ |
tasya vaidikavijñānabalātpakṣo nivarttate || 2106 ||

“One who asserts the falsity of the Vedic words on the basis of inference, has his proposition annulled by the force of the cognition derived from the Veda.”—(2106)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

“Having thus shown that the five Means of Right Cognition are not effective in the matter, it is regarded as proved that there is no Author of the

Veda; and consequently there can be no ‘inadmissibility’ in the Reason adduced by the Mīmāṃsaka— because the Veda is free from the contact of defects that bring about falsity’,—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’; because it is present wherever the Probandum is present; and being not present where the Probandum is not present, it cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive. Thus it becomes established that the Veda is authoritative and reliable.”

Now the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to point out in detail the defects in the two arguments put forward by his Opponent in support of the view that the Veda is not authoritative and reliable.

These two arguments are as follows:—(A) What is perceptible by the senses, and (R) what is produced by effort, must be non-eternal,—e.g. the Jar;—and Sound is both (perceptible and produced by effort); these are Reasons based upon the nature of things, which prove the non-eternaliiy of sound in general; and this being proved, the non-eternality of the Veda necessarily follows; and from this it also follows, by implication, that like the assertions of human beings, the words of the Veda also may be false.—Such is the sense of what is argued by the Buddhists and others.

Against these arguments, the Mīmāṃsaka sets forth in detail the argument that the proposition of the Opponents is annulled by the Verbal and other Means of Right Cognition.

First of all, the following Text shows that the Proposition that the Vedic Words are false is annulled by Verbal Cognition itself:—[see verse 2106 above]

‘Vaidika’ is derived from, the Veda; i.e. such cognitions or notions as Heaven follows from the performance of the ‘Agnihotra’;—by the force of such notions, his Proposition becomes annulled, as it is set aside by it. This has been thus asserted—“As a matter of fact, the notion derived from the Injunction is not of a doubtful character,—in any such form as ‘this may or may not be so’; nor at any other time or place, or in any other circumstances, or in any other person does there appear any notion to the contrary, that ‘it is false’. As regards the idea that—‘the notion derived from the Vedic Injunction must be false because we have found another statement made in the Veda to be false’,—this is only an Inference, and as such, becomes sublated by the aforesaid direct cognition to the contrary,” (Śabara-bhāṣya-Transation, page 13.—(2106)

Says the other party:—The two—Verbal Cognition and Inference—being of equal strength (validity), how can one be annulled by the other? If even when they are of equal strength, there can be sublation, then why should not the Inference sublate the Verbal Cognition?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 2107-2108 next]