The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1392-1393 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1392-1393.

Verse 1392-1393

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सर्वभावैक्यवादेऽपि विकारात्मादिभेदतः ।
केनचिद्विशदात्मत्वमात्मना संप्रकाश्यते ॥ १३९२ ॥
सर्वभावगतं येऽपि निःस्वभावत्वमाश्रिताः ।
तेऽपि तत्त्वत इत्यादि विशेषणमुपाश्रिताः ॥ १३९३ ॥

sarvabhāvaikyavāde'pi vikārātmādibhedataḥ |
kenacidviśadātmatvamātmanā saṃprakāśyate || 1392 ||
sarvabhāvagataṃ ye'pi niḥsvabhāvatvamāśritāḥ |
te'pi tattvata ityādi viśeṣaṇamupāśritāḥ || 1393 ||

Even under the doctrine that “all things are one”,—on account of the diversity in the nature of the modifications, what is manifested is always in some definitely clear form. Even those who regard all things as ‘featureless’ (devoid of character), always have recourse to such qualifying terms as ‘truly’ and the like.—(1392-1393)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It might be argued that—“the said fact is not admitted by the Sāṃkhya and others; hence it is sought to be proved”.

The answer to that is as follows:—[see verses 1392-1393 above]

‘The doctrine of all things being one’ is the one that is held by the Sāṅkhyas; for those who take their stand upon this doctrine, what is manifested—apprehended—is always in some definite form.

Question:—“How so?”

Answer:—‘On account of, etc. etc,’;—‘nature of the Modifications’,—i.e. in the form of Modifications.

The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the ‘unmixed (Pure) Primordial Matter, consisting of Pleasure, Pain, etc.’ and ‘the Spirits as distinguished from one another, and from Primordial Matter’.

Even those’—i.e. the Mādhyamikas, Idealists.—These also, in asserting the ‘featurelessness’ of all things, always add the qualifying term ‘truly’, and they do not assert them to be absolutely so; because they do admit of their being produced at least in the Ideation.

Truly’—i.e, strictly logically.

The term ‘ādi’ includes such qualifying terms as ‘in reality’ and the like.

In fact it must be admitted by all men that the fact that a thing is somehow existent is quite certainly recognised.—(1392-1393)

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: