Verse 683

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

समुच्चयादिभिन्नं तु द्रव्यमेव तथोच्यते ।
स्वरूपादेव भेदश्च व्याहतः साधितो भवेत् ॥ ६८३ ॥

samuccayādibhinnaṃ tu dravyameva tathocyate |
svarūpādeva bhedaśca vyāhataḥ sādhito bhavet || 683 ||

If it is substance itself, as diversified through ‘group’, etc., that is spoken of as such,—then what the argument would prove would be the difference of substance from itself—thus involving self-contradiction.—(683)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text shows how Number and the rest are devoid of substratum:—[see verse 683 above]

‘Is spoken of as such’;—i.e. as ‘one’, ‘two’ and so forth.

It might be argued that—“what is to be proved is the difference of Number, etc. which are only forms of Substance.”

The answer to this is—‘What the argument would prove, etc.’;—i.e. no entity can be different from its own form; as it would become devoid of its own character.—‘Self-contradiction’,—i.e. contradiction of one another; because ‘Difference’ and ‘Non-difference’, being of the nature of exclusion and inclusion, cannot co-exist in any single object.

Thus have all qualities ending with ‘Posteriority’ been rejected. The rest of the qualities (postulated by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika)—beginning with Cognition and ending with effort—have been held to subsist in the Soul. They should therefore be taken as discarded by the rejection of the Soul itself.

As a matter of fact however, the Soul cannot be the substratum of these qualities. Because the Soul could be the substratum of these, either as being the cause of their production, or as being the cause of their subsistence. It cannot be the cause of their production, because, the Cause (Soul) being always there in its perfect form, Pleasure and other effects would be produced always; nor can there be any dependence upon auxiliaries for a Cause in which no peculiar properties can be produced by anything else; as has been reiterated hundreds of times.—Nor again can an eternal Substance have the capacity of producing effects; as such production could only be either successive or simultaneous, and it has been explained that in the case of an eternal substance there is incongruity both in successive and simultaneous activity.—Nor again can the Soul be the cause of the subsistence (of the Qualities in question); because ‘subsistence’ has no other form than that of the ‘Subsistent’ itself; so that if the Soul were said to be the cause of subsistence, it would mean that it is the cause of the subsistent thing itself; and this idea has just been rejected. Then again, the subsistent thing being a well-established entity, it can have no cause at all; as there would be nothing therein that could be done by the Cause.—Even if the subsistence were something different from the subsistent thing, there could be nothing done by the cause in the latter, as it will have brought about only the subsistence, which ex-hypothesi is something different. And thus not producing anything in the subsistent thing, how could the Soul be its substratum?—Nor will it be right to urge that—“inasmuch as the Soul will have produced the subsistence related to the subsistent thing, it would be a helper of the latter; because the said relationship is not yet proved.—As a matter of fact, the Soul cannot be regarded as the cause of the subsistence; because an eternal thing can have no such causal potency,—as has been explained before.

Further, the entity (in the shape of subsistence) that is established (by the Soul)—would it be of permanent nature? or evanescent? If the latter, then how can it be established by something else? It would lose its character. If, on the other hand, it is permanent, then also its establisher (Cause) would be futile; as by its very nature, the subsistence would be there always.

Further, as regards corporeal things, it is possible to assume for them, a substratum which prevents their falling downwards; for the things in question however, which are incorporeal,—such as Pleasure and the rest,—there can be no falling downward; then what would the ‘substratum’ do for them?

Lastly, for what cannot be spoken of either as existent or as non-existent, there can be no subsisting at all.

In this manner Pleasure and other Qualities may be shown mutatis mutandis to be incapable of being regarded as subsistent; from which it follows that there can be no such thing as ‘Quality’,

Then again, Buddhi has beén accepted by the other party as being of the nature of Jñāna, Cognition,—as declared in the following Sutra—“Buddhi, Upalabdhi, Jñāna, are synonyms” (Nyāyasūtra 1.1.15). Even though Buddhi is of this nature, yet the other party have not admitted any such form of it as is apprehended by itself; in fact they regard it as apprehended by another Buddhi. Thus, not having a self-sufficient existence, like Colour and other things,—it cannot rightly be regarded even as Buddhi, This is going to be explained later on.—(683)

Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Hatred and Effort,—are Qualities that have been held to be distinct from Cognition (Buddhi). These we are going to reject in course of the examination of the Means of Right Cognition (Chapters 17, 18 and 19).

As regards the Qualities of Gravity, Fluidity and Viscidity,—these are to be rejected in the same way as Colour and the rest.

In view of this, the Author proceeds next to reject the Quality of Momentum (Saṃskāra):——[see verses 684-685 next]