Verse 672-674

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

न पराभिमताद्योगाज्जायते युक्तवस्तुधीः ।
युक्तबुद्धितया यद्वत्प्रासादादिषु युक्तधीः ॥ ६७२ ॥
अनेकवस्तुसद्भावे जायमानतयाऽथवा ।
विभक्तानेकतन्त्वादिविषया इव बूद्धयः ॥ ६७३ ॥
विभागेऽपि यथायोगं वाच्यमेतत्प्रमाद्वयम् ।
एकस्यानेकवृत्तिश्च न युक्तेति प्रबाधकम् ॥ ६७४ ॥

na parābhimatādyogājjāyate yuktavastudhīḥ |
yuktabuddhitayā yadvatprāsādādiṣu yuktadhīḥ || 672 ||
anekavastusadbhāve jāyamānatayā'thavā |
vibhaktānekatantvādiviṣayā iva būddhayaḥ || 673 ||
vibhāge'pi yathāyogaṃ vācyametatpramādvayam |
ekasyānekavṛttiśca na yukteti prabādhakam || 674 ||

The notion of things being ‘conjunct’ cannot be due to the conjunction postulated by the other party,—(a) because it is the notion op ‘being conjunct’,—like the notion op ‘being conjunct’ in connection with the mansion and such things;—or (b) because it appears only when there is more than one thing,—like the cognitions op several differentiated yarns.—The same two arguments may be urged mutatis mutandis, against disjunction also.—And the reason annulling (both these conceptions op conjunction and disjunction) consists in the pact that it cannot be right for one thing to subsist in more things than one.—(672-674)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged (by the Opponent)—“If we have not been able to produce proofs in support of Conjunction,—what is your proof in annulment of it?”

The answer is provided by the following—[see verses 672-674 above]

The arguments may be formulated as follows:—The notion of ‘being conjunct’ is based upon the mere Object, which has nothing to do with the ‘Conjunction’ postulated by you,—just like the same notion in such expressions as ‘the conjunct houses’,—and the notion of ‘Caitra with the Earring’ is the notion of ‘being conjunct’; hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the thing itself).—Or, that which appears on the coming together of several things follows from the things themselves entirely devoid of the ‘Conjunction’ postulated by you,—as the notion of several yarns lying apart from one another;—the notion of ‘being conjunct’ is a notion of this kind;—hence this is a natural reason (for regarding it as due to the nature of the things themselves).

‘Yuktadhīḥ’,—i.e. the notion of two things being conjunct.

These same two arguments may be put forward also for denying ‘Disjunction’:—(a) Because it is the notion of ‘being disjunct’,—or (b) because its appearance is dependent upon the absence of several things,—the notion of ‘being disjunct’, in the case of two rams and such things, must be due to the particular things themselves, irrespectively of the ‘Disjunction’ postulated by the other party,—just like the notion of ‘being disjunct’ that appears in relation to two Rams living far apart, or that which appears in relation to the Himalaya and the Vindhya Mountains.

Question:—“What is the reason that annuls the conclusion contrary to the Probandum in the above reasonings,—which would preclude the presence of the Reason in something where the Probandum is known to be absent?”

Answer:—‘The reason annulling, etc. etc.’—That is, the fact that the subsistence of one thing in several things cannot be right, has been shown in detail in the Chapter on the ‘Composite Whole’, under Text 607 (above); hence it is not set forth here.—(672-674)