Verse 675-676

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

परापराभिधानादिनिमित्तं यच्च कल्प्यते ।
परत्वमपरत्वं च दिक्कालावधिकं न तत् ॥ ६७५ ॥
यथा नीलादिरूपाणि क्रमभावव्यवस्थितेः ।
अन्योपाधिविवेकेऽपि तथोऽच्यन्ते तथाऽपरे ॥ ६७६ ॥

parāparābhidhānādinimittaṃ yacca kalpyate |
paratvamaparatvaṃ ca dikkālāvadhikaṃ na tat || 675 ||
yathā nīlādirūpāṇi kramabhāvavyavasthiteḥ |
anyopādhiviveke'pi tatho'cyante tathā'pare || 676 ||

The name (and idea) of ‘priority’ and ‘posteriority’ have been assumed as the basis of the notions of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’,—as these notions cannot be determined in reference to space and time.—But just as the blue and other colours, which come into existence in succession (one after the other), come to be spoken of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’, without reference to distinctions due to any other conditions,—so would the said notions be in regard to other things also.—(675-676)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The author proceeds to set forth objections against the Qualities of ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’:—[see verses 675-676 above]

[The position of the Nyāya-vaiśeṣika is as follows]—“That from which arise the notions ‘this is before’ and ‘this is after’ are the Qualities named ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’, which are the basis of the said notions of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ respectively.—The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include the idea also of ‘fore’ and ‘aft The argument may be formulated as follows:—The idea of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ must be based upon something other than the Jar and other things, because it is different in character from the idea of these latter,—like the idea of Pleasure, etc.—For instance, when two objects are standing towards the same direction’, there appears the notion ‘this is fore and that is aft’; this notion cannot be due to Space (Direction);—nor can it be due to Time; because even when two persons, one old and the other young, are present at the same time, but in uncertain directions, there appears the distinct notion of ‘fore’ and ‘aft’ (Senior and Junior); so that this distinction is there even though there is no difference in Time. Apart from these two—Space and Time,—there is nothing else which could be regarded as the basis of the notions in question. Hence it becomes established that what form the basis of these notions are the Qualities of ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority—‘These notions cannot be determined in reference to Space and Time’;—that is to say, it cannot be held to be in reference to near and far objects in contact with points in Space and Time.—The terms ‘Space’ and ‘Time’ are used here figuratively, in the sense of objects in contact with points of Space and Time. So that what is meant is that Priority and Posteriority,—both kinds—have been explained by other people as being due to Space and Time. The manner in which these are said to be produced by Space is as follows:—When two objects are standing in the same direction,—then, in reference to the point near any one observer, taken as the standard-point, there appears, in regard to the object wherein Posteriority subsists, the notion of its being ‘far off’;—and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of the further point in Space, the Quality of Posteriority becomes produced;—and taking a point further removed from the observer as the standard-point, there arises the idea of the object being ‘near’, in reference to the object wherein Priority subsists; and from the contact of this with another point in Space, the Quality of Priority becomes produced.—The manner in which these Qualities are produced in reference to Time is as follows:—Between an old and a young man standing at the present time, in varying directions,—with regard to that person whose contacts with sunrise and sunset are deduced to have been larger in number,—from his wrinkles, grey hairs, growing beard and so forth,—there arises the idea of his being ‘old’ (Prior) in reference to the standard-point provided by the other man; and on the basis of this idea, from the contact of another point of Time, the Quality of ‘Priority’ becomes produced;—and from the standard-point provided by the older man, the idea of the other man having had lesser contacts with sunrise and sunset is deduced from the fact of his being beardless and so forth,—from which arises the idea of ‘nearness’ (proximity) in regard to the younger man; and through this idea, out of the contact of another point of Time, the quality of ‘Posteriority’ becomes produced.”

The Text proceeds to show that the above Reasoning in support of Priority and Posteriority is ‘Inconclusive’, on account of the Reason being present in the contrary of the Probandum also—‘Just as the Blue, etc. etc.’—‘Bhāva’ is existence, and the ‘vyavasthiti’ qualified by this is coming into existence; when tins is ‘krameṇa’, in succession, [it serves as the reason for what is going to be said]. That is to say, in the case of Blue, etc., on account of their coming into existence in succession (one after the other), the whole phenomenon is regulated by the conditions of Time, not by the conditions of any Quality,—and hence we have such notions of Priority and Posteriority as ‘this is the prior or earlier Blue’ and ‘that the posterior or later Blue’,—even in the absence of any such Qualities as Priority and Posteriority; because no Quality can subsist in a Quality;—why cannot the same be accepted in the case of the Jar and other things also?

What is meant by this is as follows:—If what is meant by the Opponent is to prove the mere fact of being dependent on something else, then the Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’, as it is present in the contrary of the Probandum also.—If what is meant to be proved is the fact that the notion in question is based upon the particular Quality brought about by the eternal substances of Time and Space,—then there can be no Corroborative Instance.—The conclusion is also annulled by Inference; for instance, it is possible to set up the following inference—The notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’ is based upon a certain regularity in the successive appearance of things without any such quality as has been postulated by the other party,—because it is the notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’,—like the notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’ in regard to Colour and such things;—the notion in question in regard to Jar, etc. also is such a notion of ‘Fore’ and ‘Aft’;—hence it is a natural reason (for regarding it as being based upon the said regularity, etc.).

It might be argued by the Opponent that—“In the case of the Blue, etc., the notion of Priority of Posteriority is figurative, based upon the notion subsisting in the same object as the Blue, etc.; and hence the Reason is not open to the fallacy of ‘Inconclusiveness’; and inasmuch as, in the case of the Blue, etc. also, the qualities of Priority, etc. are admitted to form the basis of the said notion, the Corroborative Instance cited is not devoid of the Probandum.”

But this cannot be so; it has been already answered by the statement that as the notion is not found to be fallible, it cannot be regarded as ‘figurative’; and further, as the two qualities are not perceived even in their own substratum, it is not right to accept any notion as based upon it; how t hen could it ever be based upon it in the case of Blue and the rest?—What too could be assumed to be the basis in the case of such things as Pleasure and the like? As there is no co-subsistence in the same substratum.

Further, as Time and Space have already been rejected above, they cannot be regarded as existent; the ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’ based upon these should also be regarded as non-existent; how then could the notion be believed to be based upon those? Consequently any such idea cannot save the Reason from being ‘Inconclusive’.—According to you again, Time and Space have no parts, from contact with which, as associated with ‘unitary conception’, the notion of ‘Priority’ and ‘Posteriority’ could be produced; the reason for this lying in their being essentially one and without parts. Nor can it be right to seek explanation for a state of things in a merely imaginary ‘part’ conceived figuratively; as all such assumptions are restricted within well-defined limits by the real state of things; and what is merely ‘figurative’ is essentially unreal and false. Hence our Reason is not Inconclusive.

As for the Reason adduced by the Opponent, it may be pointed out that it is ‘Unproven’, ‘not admissible’,—(675-676)