Verse 647

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

महद्दीर्घादिभेदेन परिमाणं यदुच्यते ।
तदप्यर्थे तथा रूपभेदादेव न किं मतम् ॥ ६४७ ॥

mahaddīrghādibhedena parimāṇaṃ yaducyate |
tadapyarthe tathā rūpabhedādeva na kiṃ matam || 647 ||

‘Dimension’ has been classed as ‘large ‘long’ and the like;—why cannot it be regarded as due to diversity of forms in the thing itself?—(647)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Text proceeds to deny ‘Dimension’:—[see verse 647 above]

The theory of the other Party is as follows:—

“Dimension is the basis of all notions of size; it is of four kinds—(1) Large, (2) Small, (3) Long, (4) Short.—The ‘Large’ Dimension again is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal;—the eternal, as also the Largest, Dimension subsists in Ākāśa, Time, Space and Soul; the ‘non-eternal’ Dimension subsists in the Triad and other substances.—Similarly the ‘Small’ Dimension also is of two kinds—eternal and non-eternal;—the eternal and also the smallest, Dimension, subsists in the Atom and the Mind,—in the shape of the ‘atomic globule’; and the non-eternal Dimension subsists in the Diad only; it is also used in connection with such things as the Pearl, the Āmalaka-Fruit, the Bilva-fruit and the like, which are really ‘large’,—but only figuratively, on account of the absence of much ‘largeness’ in their ‘large dimension’; e.g. the ‘Large Dimension’ of the Pearl is not of the same degree as that of the Āmalaka; and so on in regard to all things.—Question:—‘What is the difference between the Largeness and Length as subsisting in the Triad and the Smallness and Shortness subsisting in the Diad?’—Answer:—As regards Largeness and Length, there is mutual distinction; for instance, we come across such varied expressions as ‘from among the Largengs, bring the Longer one’, ‘from among the Longngs, bring the larger one’, As regards the distinction between ‘smallness’ and ‘shortness’, it is perceptible only to Mystics who alone see them.”

In this scheme the ‘Large’ and the rest are held to be something different from Colour and the rest,—on the ground that they are apprehended by Cognitions other than cognitions of these latter, like Pleasure, etc.—In this Reasoning, if the Reason adduced is meant to consist in the fact that “Largeness, etc. are the objects of Sense-perception different from the Sense-perception of Colour and such things”,—then, such a Reason is one that is ‘unproven’, not admitted; because as a matter of fact any such thing as the ‘Large and other Dimension’ is never found to appear in any Sense-perception, apart from the Colour and other things as they exist.—If then, it be held that the notion of ‘small’, ‘large’ and the like is a cognition that is entirely different from the cognition of Colour, etc.,—then the Reason becomes ‘fallible’, ‘Inconclusive’; as there is nothing to invalidate a contrary conclusion. As a matter of fact there is nothing that really forms the object of the notion in question; as what is held to be such is a mere verbal figment. All that happens is that when the same Colour is seen turning towards the same direction,—and it is desired to bring out the difference between that Colour and other Colours,—there appears the notion, based upon preconceived convention, that it is ‘large’, And this does not justify the conviction that it is something altogether different. Consequently there is nothing apart from Colour, etc.’, that could be regarded as the object of that notion; and hence the Reason is one that is ‘unproven’,

The Proposition (or Conclusion) also is contrary to Perception; inasmuch as the ‘large’ and other dimensions, which are meant to be perceptible, are never perceived apart from Colour and other things.

Thus then, why cannot the ‘Dimension’ of things be regarded as of the same nature as Colour and the rest, but based on this difference, turning towards a direction different from that towards which other things turn? In so doing, the assumption of -unseen and unreasonable things is avoided.—This is what is implied by the particle ‘eva’ in the Text.—Thus when several Colour, etc. are seen or touched, as turning towards the same direction, people come to speak of it as ‘long’; and when the Colour, etc. seen or touched are fewer as compared to the former, they speak of it as ‘short’, The same explanation may be applied to the notion of ‘Large’, etc. also.

As in the case of the denial of Colour and other qualities, so here also, the denial of the ‘Large’ and other dimensions may be set forth, on the basis of the alternatives—is it one or many?—(647)

Further, inasmuch as the Reason adduced is found even where the Probandum (character to be proved) is absent, its ‘inconclusiveness’ becomes all the more pronounced. This is shown in the following—[see verses 648-649 next]