The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 646 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 646.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

बुद्ध्यपेक्षा च सङ्ख्याया निष्पत्तिर्यदि वर्ण्यते ।
सङ्केताभोगमात्रेण तद्बुद्धिः किं न संमता ॥ ६४६ ॥

buddhyapekṣā ca saṅkhyāyā niṣpattiryadi varṇyate |
saṅketābhogamātreṇa tadbuddhiḥ kiṃ na saṃmatā || 646 ||

If the accomplishment of the number be explained as dependent upon cognitions,—then, why cannot the notion be accepted as due to mere convention?—(646)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Further, you have explained that the number ‘Two’ which subsists in more than one substance is brought about by several ‘unities’ associated with the several Cognitions. But as a matter of fact, there can be no basis for such an assertion.—This is what is shown in the following—[see verse 646 above]

The term ‘mere’ is meant to exclude such notions as ‘one’, ‘two’ and the rest, the genus constituted by these, and the relationship of these.

Why cannot the notion, etc., etc.’;—i.e. the notion of ‘two’, ‘three ‘four’ and so forth, that appear in connection with the numbered things,—why cannot this be accepted as brought about by mere Convention?—The advantage in this would be that it would not involve the assuming of the causality of anything whose potency is not perceived; for if such causality were assumed, then there would be an infinite number of such ‘Causes It is far more reasonable therefore to postulate the ‘unitary conception’ itself as the requisite cause,—on the strength of positive and negative concomitance. Otherwise, it might be assumed that ‘deities, getting at the Harītakī, bring about the movement of the bowels’ [not the Harītakī itself],—As a matter of fact too, ‘duality’ and the rest, which have been held to be perceptible apart from things excluded from the ‘aggregate’ and such entities, are never perceived; nor are they compatible; because the existence of ‘one’ in ‘many’ has been denied, and ‘genus’ and ‘subsistence’ are going to be denied.—(646)

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