International Affairs: A Survey

The past months witnessed the emergence of contradictory trends in international relations. The Brezhnev-Nixon summit and the European Security Conference in Helsinki underscore the point that the process of ending the cold war in the West is drawing to a completion. In fact the super-power summit is said to mark the formal end of the cold war. But, paradoxically enough, in Asia Iran’s new massive armaments programme has created a situation in which cold war attitudes are bound to get sharpened and South-Asian politics, in particular, are apt to get more intractable.

The Super-power Summit

The reiteration of Russo-American friendship at the Brezhnev-Nixon summit is in itself nothing spectacular for the two super-powers have been according top priority to their detente over other diplomatic objectives. It was true that the abruptness of Nixon’s China visit did cast some doubts about the credibility of these priorities and the Russians even feared that the Americans are neglecting the detente with themselves. But the Nixon visit to the Soviet Union soon restored the old balance. The present summit, the second in less than two years, only further reinforces the super-powers anxiety to establish a suitable framework of reduced tensions in which to pursue their super-powers’ roles.

The Summit confirmed the determination of the super-powers to end their confrontation. The most important of the agreements signed, as only to be expected, relates to this aspect. Significant among those was the agreement under which the parties undertook to do everything possible to avoid nuclear war not only between their two countries but also with third nations. They also agreed on principles designed to limit nuclear weapons by the end of 1974 and, meanwhile, to a further installment of limitation on strategic arms. The conference achieved even more fruitful agreements over economic and scientific co-operation between the two countries. More important than these formal achievements are the informality and bon homie exhibited by the normally stern and humourless Brezhnev. The Russian Communist Party Secretary went out of his way not to take diplomatic advantage of President Nixon’s troubles over the Watergate scandal. The cordiality and the mutual confidence exhibited bythe two leaders more than amply highlight their determination to eliminate tensions.

Conflicting Motivations for detente

This determination, however, does not signify an unconditional and identical committal to the emergence of new world order. Each of the two super-powers has its own less than noble reasons in strengthening the detente. The Russians on their part are anxious to convince the Americans of their bona fides so that the cold war could be ended in Europe with the withdrawal of American troops. In that eventuality they also hope to make their influence felt in Western Europe, where since the solidification of the cold war in the shape of the NATO and the Warsaw Pacts, Russian influence was shut off. Moscow seeks this accommodation with the U. S. and the West not only to gain closer economic contacts, but more importantly, to be free to concentrate on their confrontation against their Eastern rival, China. Precisely for this reason the Chinese are doing their best to throw a spanner in the works by trying to scare the Western Europeans away from a detente with Moscow. Another important objective of Russian policy is “to keep the structure of world politics essentially in their existing bi-polar mould.” The Americans seek the detente for quite different reasons. The economics that flow from a reduced arms race are all the more crucial to the U.S. plagued as it is with economic crisis. It is anxious to pull out of Western Europe and to accomplish this wide ranging and reliable arms control agreements with Russia are a must. They also hope that ending the East-West confrontation in Europe would lead to loosening of the Russian stranglehold over Eastern Europe, to the advantage of the West. The U. S. has the ultimate advantage of still being militarily the superior of the two super-powers. It is this factor that makes the U. S. feel confident in seeking firmer detente with the Russians.

The Europeans both suspect and welcome the super-power summit. They fear that the super-powers might come to a settlement at the expense of European interests. There is also the resentment, as repeatedly voiced by France, that the super-powers are out to deny the other powers their legitimate say in shaping the future world order. There is also the European fear that though President Nixon gives top priority in his diplomacy to the emergence of a strong Europe as is evident from his designating 1973 as the Year of Europe, his anxiety to cut his costs in Europe might make him pay scant attention to the viability of Western Europe’s defence in the future. In view of Nixon’s “haste” in making it up with the Soviet Union the question is asked how valuable is the American assurance that it stands by them? Europe has also misgivings about Russia observing all the arms control agreements it signed with the U.S., which Nixon is citing as guarantee for West Europe. However, the Western European nations also seek settlement with Russia on a permanent basis. This is because East-West tensions put a heavy strain on their resources (both financial and emotional) and deter the emergence of an order based on economic co-operation. Fortunately a very significant event occurred in this direction too during the last months in the shape of the European Conference on Security and Co-operation.

The European Conference on Security and Co-operation

If the Brezhnev-Nixon summit highlights the dynamics of the Russo-American detente, the significance of the European Security Conference event lies in the same direction. Here too Russia’s anxiety for a settlement with Western Europe has been quite apparent for some years. The conference is the result of a long felt need for a dialogue between the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. Even though the threat of a nuclear war in Europe has vanished and the old cold war confrontations now remain at worst as memories of nightmares, countries on both the sides of the “iron curtain” feel still threatened, what with the formidable concentration of conventional and nuclear arsenal kept pointed at each other. As long as East and West Germany remained implacably hostile and Bonn and Moscow refused to trust each other, the German problem remained a major trouble spot of the world. But with the easing of tensions here and with the West German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik (Eastern Policy) Germany secured the best of relations not only with Russia but with East Germany and other neighbouring Eastern European nations too. Yet, while the major cause for East-West confrontation in Europe has lost its hold, the very presence of troop concentrations on either side of the curtain contributes to tensions which both sides are keen to remove. Hence for quite sometime the convening of a European Conference to evolve a formula for balanced and mutual troops reductions has been talked about. The success of many disarmament negotiations between America and Russia and phenomenal progress on other fronts of East-West relations made this Security Conference a reality. The conference that finally met in Helsinki (Finland) after careful preparatory meetings since November is called the European Conference on Security and Co-operation emphasising not only the security aspects of East-West relations but the need to develop a broader base for mutual acceptance of European nations.

Outcomes

The achievements of the conference are meagre in terms of tangible and tacit agreements. It should, however, be remembered that the very coming together or the NATO and Warsaw Pact countries to discuss the creation of not only an all-European security system but to prepare a blueprint for a new European order based on closer economic and cultural contacts, is itself a considerable achievement. The Russians offered a declaration on “the foundations of security and the principles of relations among States in Europe.” But they were rather equivocal on the point whether this implies a guarantee of the territorial inviolability of Eastern Europe States. It is well known that under the Brezhnev Doctrine, the Russians claimed that Communist States could collectively intervene in the internal affairs of any Communist State to “save” it from counter revolution. This theory was propounded to justify the Warsaw Pact States’ invasion of Czechoslovakia in August, 1968. Since then Communist States like Rumania have been insisting on the Soviet Union’s giving up this claim. At Helsinki too the Rumanian delegate reiterated this demand. Even if the Russians are loath to formally renounce their special hold over Eastern European States, it is a safe guess that they (the Russians) are no longer sure about the tenability of such special claims. Since they are more anxious to prove their bona fides vis-a-vis Western Europeans they could not really be hoping for Western acquiescence to the Brezhnev Doctrine. Thus whether the Russians formally renounce the Brezhnev Doctrine or not they are very likely to relax their existing hold over Eastern Europe.

This is not to say that Moscow would consent to lose Eastern Europe as her sphere of influence. In one sense “the Soviet Union sees this conference as a means of winning the Western seal of approval over Communist dominions. There is thus a paradox inherent in the Russian attitude. The West on its part though anxiously looking forward to a dispensation wherein the Eastern part would be liberated from Russian fold, is not quite prepared to challenge the status quo. In fact while the Russians’ minimum demand is that existing social system and political realities (the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe, that is) should be recognised, the Western leaders are keen on assuring that they have no desire to bring down the social systems or Communist regimes.

Yet because of distrust at the conference the Russians expressed reservations on proposals relating to free exchange of information and lifting of restrictions in various forms of international intercourse. Moscow and her allies sense the danger inherent in being over-enthusiastic about these and are therefore cautious. Gromyko thus came out in favour of a “suitably organised international intercourse’ (emphasis added).

If Eastern Europe has reservations, (on free flow of information and exchange of peoples) their readiness to improve economic relations ant come to a quick agreement over reducing their respective force is unequivocal. A desire to benefit from closer economic contacts and trade with the West has been one of the strong motivations for Russia canvassing the conference itself. West German technology and know-how are almost indispensable to Russia.

On the issue of arms reduction no tangible agreement was signed but here again what is most visible is the Russian attempt to meet Western reservations and the efforts at confidence building. Mr. Gromyko promised to allow “observers from other states to attend military manoeuvres under mutually acceptable conditions. This is the first time in the long post-war history of disarmament negotiations that the Russians have admitted the possibility of on-site inspection.” The West on its part is equally ready to come to terms and cut their defence costs. Thus having emphasised on the fundamental importance of East-West relations at grass roots level, the conference adjourned to meet again on September 18th at Geneva where real negotiations are to begin. Doubtless progress there would not be spectacular, for misgivings on many counts are still endemic but it is certain that the existing European detente is going to be consolidated. East-West negotiations are going on simultaneously (over other issues too). There are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the talks on mutual reduction of forces in Europe are going on at Vienna. Firm agreements on these are likely to precede those at the European Security Conference.

A new problem in Asia

If she wind of change in Europe (once the cockpit of world power-conflict) has been reassuring and refreshing, the Asian continent, particularly South Asia, has come under a spell of foul political weather since the last few months. It was thought that the two-year-old Sino-American detente ensured the end of cold war rivalries in this part of the world too. The emergence of Bangla-desh and the concomitant reduction of Pakistan along with China’s adoption of a softer attitude in her diplomatic relations with others, raised further hopes for a peaceful Asia. In such a state of affairs came the news of the massive arms programme of Iran. The magnitude of this programme is simply staggering.

Iran is acquiring around 400 phantoms and transport planes costing from 2.5 to 5 million dollars a piece, 400 helicopters at an estimated expenditure of 500 million dollars, 800 Chieftain tanks costing 480 minion dollars and its Navy is being doubled in size and already includes the world’s largest Hovercraft fleet. Another billion dollars are to be spent on new bases and this expansion is going to involve an investment of 2-3 billion dollars a year to go on for quite a few years. Nothing short of a new military phenomenon would be emerging in the Middle East with close access to South Asia also. Their new military growth point, as it were, cannot but disturb the power balance in the region.

The ostensible purpose of this military programme is candidly explained by the Shah and his reasons for converting Iran into a major power in the area could be summarised thus: (1) The need to control the Persian Gulf to safeguard the flow of oil from different parts of the country; (2) The defence of Iran from insurrectionary forces within and outside; (3) The protection of Iran from allegedly aggressive neighbours like Iraq and (4) To make Iran strong enough to help its friends like Pakistan from being threatened by others. Normally these objectives cannot but be regarded as quite unobjectionable and even honourable. And Iran has certain genuine problems like foreign inspired insurrectionary movements against which it is entitled to defend itself. However there are other implications to the programme which cause concern to others. The Shah is known to be rather ambitious with designs of playing hegemonic roles in the region and to make matters worse there is evidence of the hand of the super-powers, the U. S. and China behind the Shah’s aspirations. Pakistan is obviously delighted about the new trend.

The fact that Iran is one of the allies of the U. S. is only one of the reasons that make the latter the major beneficiary of the new development. Iran’s new overlordship over the Persian Gulf when linked up with the American bases in Southern Indian Ocean area, affords the U. S. a decisive opportunity to outwit the Soviet Union in this area. Already Central Russia is vulnerable to submarine based American missiles stationed in these American bases. Iranian arms, therefore, introduce a factor directly intensifying the jockeying for power that is going on between the U. S. and USSR. The Russo-American detente seems to be a misnomer in so far as easing cut-throat competition for strategic advantages is concerned. In fact, the Americans in arming Iran and in augmenting the Pakistani potential are reviving cold war attitudes. The best illustration for this is the recent meeting of CENTO where it was noted that the existence of the Indo-Soviet Pact, and Russo-Iraq Pact warrant the CENTO’s adopting of a more vigilant posture. It is well-known that the relevance and respectability of treaties like the CENTO and SEATO has been on the decline for nearly a decade now and Pakistan had practically withdrawn from these. But now it has decided to activise its membership in a reactivated CENTO. It is undoubtedly Iran that has now become the fulcrum of this grouping with the American ing. The curious fact is that China, partly against whom the CENTO was created, should now welcome the recrudescence of the CENTO in the shape of a massively armed Iran.

The Chinese Foreign Minister was in Iran recently and welcomed the new role that the Shah is donning. No doubt the Chinese welcome the new friends because these seek to contain the Soviet Union too, at the same time aiming at neutralising (or threatening the Indian power in the region. Thus nothing short of a revival of the ominous cold-war attitudes is in the offing in West and South Asia. Two sets of blocs have emerged: one consisting of a close partnership between Iran and Pakistan with the U. S. and China actively supporting the move and on the other powers like Iraq, Afghanistan and India having bilateral relations with Russia

Implications for India

The new Iran certainly becomes an important factor in the politics of the sub-continent. Not only has Iran been pro-Pakistan and on the whole anti-Indian, but its reaction to the emergence of Bangladesh has been one of uncompromising hostility towards India. In fact, the Shah unhesitatingly blamed India for conniving at the bisection of Pakistan. He is now pleading that it was the world’s silence towards the events culminating in the disintegration of Pakistan that prompted him to resort to the present armaments programme in order to be able to protect his economic interests and borders. The Shah also made it clear that the new strength of Iran would be put at the disposal of Pakistan for its ‘defences’. Iran has not only pledged full support for Pakistan against threats but it is also helping Islamabad in dealing with regional autonomy movements like the one in Baluchistan. It is the repeated vehemence with which the Shah alleges continuing threats to Pakistan (presumably from India) and his enthusiastic committal to defend Pakistan that should cause concern for India. Not that Iran and Pakistan would mount an attack against India to settle past scores. But a clever use of an explosive situation on the borders, (fomented by Pakistan) may be used as a pretext and some territorial nibbling in Kashmir or on the West Coast may be the result. Iran’s naval base on the Straits of Ormuz is too close to our West Coast to be ignored as a potential threat to Indian security. For it is not very difficult to “engineer” or “manage” a so-called threat to one’s own security and blame it on others as its “real” instigator. Pakistan’s war in 1971 is itself an example of this. Thus the probability of a covert Pak-Iranian axis to over-react to internal threats and see in them the hands of external powers cannot be minimised. The Iranian armaments programme cannot but lead to India seeking arms from the outside powers. Before the arms race gets going speed, it will be to the advantage of all to de-fuse the tense situation in the sub-continent first.

Indo-Pakistan Relations

India has made commendable efforts to arrive at a settlement with Pakistan. The spirit of accommodation shown at the end of the Indo-Pak War of 1971 was manifest throughout and the Simla Agreement under which Pakistan agreed to settle all outstanding disputes through bilateral negotiations gave rise to many expectations. First we thought that Pakistan would recognise Bangladesh: from this it was expected that the intense hatreds existing between Bangladesh and Pakistan would gradually come down. Pakistan’s recognition might well have made Dacca cool down over the issue of the trial of POWs for war crimes. However in the event, President Bhutto proved to be unpredictable and the vicious circle of Pak refusal to recognise Bangladesh. Bangladesh’s insistence on the war trials and Pak rejection to repatriate Bengalese struck-up in Pakistan (and take the non-Bengalese from Bangladesh) is still to be broken. India on its part, along with Bangladesh, offered the three-point formula under which almost all the Pak-POWs (nearly 95,000) are to be released in return for the release of all the Bengalese from Pakistan and the taking of the non-Bengalese from Bangla. The only point of insistence on the part of New Delhi and Dacca is that the latter would try 195 of the Pak POWs for war crimes in Bangladesh. This offer was rejected by Pakistan and it went to the World Court contesting India’s right to hand over the 195 POWs to Bangladesh andchallenging Bangladesh’s right to hold the war crime trials. This Pak move was in violation of the Simla accord under which Pakistan agreed to settle all problems through bilateral negotiations. India successfully contested the jurisdiction of the court as the grounds on which Pakistan initiated the proceedings needed prior consent of India to subject itself to the jurisdiction of the court.

In spite of Pakistan’s irritating tactics of blowing hot and cold at the same time, India has been persevering for peace. Recently a high official level meeting was held in Rawalpindi and though nothing tangible came out of it certain possible approaches to solving the impasse emerged. Pakistan seemed to have relented from its rigid stand of not accepting responsibility towards the non-Bengali Muslims in Bangladesh. India on its part was prepared to take up with Dacca the issue of the postponement of the trial of the POWs so that scope for rethinking on the issue would not get foreclosed. Meanwhile the exchange of the 90,000 Pak prisoners and the Bengalese in Pakistan could be accomplished. Indian and Pakistani officers are to meet again in the middle of August and it is to be hoped that a solution to these problems would emerge.

Observers say that the apparent toughening in the initial attitude of Pakistan at the recent talks is the direct result of confidence injected by Iran’s new military avatar. Some even fear that Rawalpindi may exploit the existing confusion within borders to involve India and escalate the situation to another military confrontation. Desperation partly and Iran’s help partly could provide the cause for such a Pak adventure.

India is right in realising the immediate need to impress on world opinion its sincere wish to send the POWs. What the niceties of International Law may be, the incarceration of over 90,000 soldiers is certainly a source of diplomatic embarrassment. There is public acknowledgement now that India is prepared to advise Bangladesh that too uncompromising a policy towards the trial of POWs may ultimately be of disadvantage both to Dacca and Delhi. That India is prepared to advise a postponement of thetrials is itself a good sign. While India cannot afford to forget the long term consequences of Pak military revival via Iran, in the short run the final settlement of the issues flowing from the 1971 war is an immediate necessity. Hard postures, even if warranted on moral grounds, need to be given up by all the parties.