International Affairs: A Survey

DR. R. V. R. CHANDRASEKHARA RAO

There has not been a more eventful quarter of an year, in recent times, than the preceding three months. Developments in Sino-American relations and in Indo-Soviet relations produced surprises even for those who knew that certain crucial changes were taking place in these areas. Both the developments constitute unique events not merely because they inaugurate new trends in the foreign policies of the respective countries, but also because these trends seem to make a reversal in their respective foreign policy norms.

The Kissinger visit and Sino-American Relations

The visit to Peking of President Nixon’s foreign policy adviser Dr. Henry Kissinger in July, 1971 took the world by surprise. The spy-thriller suspense involved in the preparation and staging of the visit apart, there were more serious reasons for the surprise. It symbolised a qualitative change in America’s China policy. That such a change should occur under President Nixon, who during the height of the cold-war represented the hawks in U. S., further explains the surprise.

Though indications of a thaw in the relations of America and China have been visible for quite some time, direct contact at higher levels was absent, nor was it expected so soon. The American diplomacy accomplished “a great leap forward”, as it were, in the President’s special emissary talking across the table with Premier Chou-En-Lai of China. The result of these talks was the decision about President Nixon’s visit sometime during the course of early next year. Whether the Kissinger visit now and the Nixon visit later would resolve even some of the outstanding Sino-American issues is to be seen. But there can be no doubt that the Kissinger visit gives added significance to the Sino-American detente. At least the other powers of the world interpret it as a definite sign or America’s determination to ‘make it up’ with China.

But, though speculation about the consequences of the detente became intense since it manifested itself in the shape of the Kissinger visit, it should be realised that a change in Sino-American relations had been in evidence since nearly two years.

Symptoms

Ever since Nixon became the President, significant, though not spectacular, decisions designed to establish contacts with Peking were taken. As far as in July, 1969 relaxation of restriction on travel was effected. That during 1969 and 1970, 556 U. S. citizens were given passports to Communist China compared to a total of 423 during the ten year period 1959-68 is an indication of the impact of this small change on U. S. policy. This was followed by relaxation of restrictions on trade between U. S. A. and China. Simultaneously the Nixon administration strove for the resumption of Ambassadorial level talks with China in Warsaw. It would be recalled that such talks had been going on in Warsaw of and on between U. S. and China for quite some time until they were suspended in 1968. These were resumed in 1970. A more significant step was taken when the U. S., sensing that a great majority of the members of the United Nations favoured the admission of Communist China into U. N., initiated a full-scale review of its foreign policy which recommended that Washington should no longer oppose the admission of red-China. Close on heels of the publication of this report came the Chinese gesture in inviting a U.S. table tennis team to play in China. Partly this was the Chinese way of responding to the charges in U. S. attitudes to China. But partly, this is also a part of China’s own initiatives to mend a diplomatic fences with many of the countries in the world especially the non-Communist countries. Cultural Revolution, as is well-known, isolated China from most of the outside world and ever since the close of the Cultural Revolution, especially since mid-1969, Peking made efforts to normalise its relations and to establish new relationships with those with whom it had none before. Thus it would seem that Peking too desired a detente with America, though with less of publicity and exuberance.

Cause of the Detente

It would be interesting to analyse the causes behind these depositions for dtente. The American decision to speedily wind Vietnam commitments obviously contributed a major motive in coming to a settlement with Peking. In this sense, the detente traced to the force of American public opinion against the Vietnam War. Thus it is not an accident that President Nixon’s new China policy coincided with his policy of gradual U. S. withdrawal from Vietnam. However, it would be wrong to infer from this that it was a case of defeated America trying to make friends with its erstwhile enemy. The policy of the withdrawal from Vietnam did not imply American abandonment of its role in the region, but meant to impel the regional powers themselves to share most of the military burdens. Understood thus, the fears about Chinese intentions still remain relevant to Washington. But, if this is the case, how to explain the new spirit of accommodation with Peking? For the whole pshchology of the detente gives the lie to the hitherto sanctified dominos theory that South-East Asian States without American protection would fall one by one to China. The truth of the matter is that even the U. S. has no clear conception of the precise reasons for its making up with China. Partly it may be due to the feeling that with a de-escalation in the Vietnam war the nature of confrontation with China would differ and that consequently there is no need to continue with the present policy of total ostracisation. In this interpretation, the assumption is that the U. S. appreciation of Chinese intentions remains as before. President Nixon in an article written (a few months before his election) in Foreign Affairs, envisaged a detente with China consequent on the U. S. withdrawal in Vietnam. At the same time he emphasized the need to contain China by fostering regional military potential. (Foreign Affairs, October, 1967; also see International Affairs - A Survey -Triveni, January 1969). It is also possible that the U. S. Government has now quite a different appreciation of Chinese intentions. In other words, she may be feeling that there is no reason to exaggerate the menace of China. It is possible all the above mentioned considerations have had their impact in the American decision.

A second major cause is that the U. S. has decided to exploit the Sino-Soviet confrontation and gain an upper hand in the global context, instead of continuing with its obsessions with Chinese threat to South-East Asia alone. In fact the intensity of the Sino-Soviet hostility reduced the scope for Chinese threat to South-East Asia and hence, irrespective of Chinese ideological intentions, the U. S. could at one and the same time make friends with China without leaving South-East Asia in danger. In the global context, a detente with China would leave the U. S. in the most favoured situation given the new triangle of forces. She is already on good terms with Russia and if only she could settle with China, she would be in the enviable position of not having to worry about either of the other two super-powers. In contrast, it is the other two super-powers that find themselves pre-occupied with their bitter cold-war. Balance of power in the context of a three-power situation would naturally flow in favour of that power which manages to reduce tensions with the other two, while the latter have a great deal to fear from each other. Thus, the U. S. A. may have decided upon its new China policy, primarily because of the state of Sino-Soviet tensions.

Then there is the reason of expanding markets for U. S. trade. There is plenty of evidence that American business circles have been pressing for relaxation of restrictions on trade with China. Trade has always been the iconoclast of ideology, and there are indeed new forces at work in this aspect. The Americans have reason to worry about the re-emergence of the Japanese economic colossus. Fears that the pragmatic Japanese may appropriate Chinese markets to themselves, only furthered the impatience of American business circles to enter the China market. China has also shown its enthusiasm to expand its trade contacts as is evidenced by the phenomenal increase in the movement of trade delegations to and from China. It is quite probable that it is the business motive that enabled the American President, to convince many of his Republican friends about the need for a new look at the China policy.

What could be the forces that are acting on Peking to seek this adjustment with America? There is absolutely no doubt that the Sino-Soviet dispute is the single major cause impelling China to seek a reconciliation with America, obviously dictated by the necessity to secure peace at least on one side in order to face confrontation on the other. Long ago, Chairman Mao stated “Oppose the strategy of striking with two ‘fists’ in two directions at the same time and uphold the strategy of striking with one ‘fist’ in one direction at one time.” Though this may be the immediate reason, analysts now interpret that the original scheme of things as prevailing at the time of emergence of Communist China, augured well for Sino-American cordiality and that therefore the present detente could be regarded as but the realisation of what would have been a normal course, save for the intervention of certain unforeseen factors. There is just enough truth in this explanation for it to be considered seriously. It is now common knowledge that Stalin never took Mao and his movement seriously. Nothing exposes this whole episode better than a little-quoted speech that Mao made in 1967 at the height of cultural revolution. He said: “In 1945, Stalin refused to permit China’s carrying out a revolution and said to us: ‘Do not have civil war. Collaborate with Chiang Kai Shek. Otherwise, the Republic of China will collapse.’ However, we did not obey him and the revolution succeeded.”

“Even after the success of the revolution, Stalin feared that China might degenerate into another Yugoslavia and that I might become a second Tito. I later went to Moscow and concluded the Sino-Soviet Treaty Alliance. Stalin did not wish to sign the Treaty; he finally signed it after two months of negotiations. It was only after our resistance to America and support for Korea (in the Korean War) that Stalin finally came to trust us.” (Mao Tse-tung, speech to Tenth Party Plenum of October 1962, summarized from a Peking wall-poster in Mainichi Shimbun, Tokyo, 9th March 1967.) Thus like the well-worn joke of America and England being divided by a common language, China and Russia seem destined to be divided by a common dogma.

It was the compulsions of cold-war to which China was unwillingly drawn by Russia, that helped the forging of the Sino-Soviet alliance. The corresponding reign of Dullesian fundamentalist anti-communism in American foreign policy enabled the Sino-Soviet bond to get faster. However, when by the end of the Fifties, Dullesian fundamentalism ceased and once again fissures began to appear in the so-called Sino-Soviet block, it was China that exhibited an anti-Americanism which lasted right up to the end of the Cultural Revolution of 1966-68. Thus was the realisation of Sino-American detente delayed till the post-68 period, which saw conditions ripe for the reconciliation. Understood in this light, the detente is not so much an exercise in real politik by China, designed to isolate and deal with the Soviet Union, but the result of the ultimate working of the forces regarded as normal to the conditions prevailing at the time of the origins of Communist China.

The realisation of the diplomatic isolation of the cultural revolution period resulted in the emergence of moderate elements in the Chinese leadership to the fore and this can also be cited as a cause strengthening the forces of detente on the Chinese side. Chow-En-Lai, long since regarded as a moderating influence in foreign policy, emerged as Number Two in the Chinese hierarchy and reports indicate that his position also symbolises the civilian leadership acquiring the upper hand over the military.

Consequences

It would indeed be hazardous to predict the outcome of the detente and, for that matter, of the proposed meeting between the American President and the Chinese Premier. Such a meeting would certainly amount to formally recognising in the political field what has already been going on in the cultural and economic field. To be sure, more stress will be laid on the need to improve the tempo of Sino-American contacts. But is it likely that the “detente” will lead up to an “entente”? It is here that prediction becomes impossible. Peking has warned that she could not be expected to yield any concessions. On Vietnam, she still demands total and prior American withdrawal before she would lend her hand for a political settlement; and on her admission to the United Nations she categorically refused to countenance the presence of Koumintang China and won her point. Thus in other words, indications are that Peking would strike a very hard bargain and would insist on a detente on her terms. Obviously she knows that there are limits to this type of a political game and that certain concessions have to be made. For example, one can almost be sure that having won her point that there is no State called Taiwan. But one thing the United Nations point of view, that is, she would not push the United States any further in trying to militarily occupy Taiwan. But one thing is certain: China will have emerged as the dominant power in the region. What with the United Nations membership, U. S. recognition not merely of its existence (that China never needed any way) but of its role as one of the super powers in the world and as the supreme power in the region, and many other powers like England, France and Germany welcoming this recognition of reality by the United States, some analysts are even talking in terms of the “dimming of America” and the “end of the American era”. In relation to the relative positions of China and America in this part of the region such predictions seem plausible.

The United States on her part would not pack up from the South-East Asian region on the morrow of the Nixon-Chou talks. Disengagement already on, with intermittent escalations, of cold-war will no doubt continue–but this has been the result of an old decision. The pace of American withdrawal is most likely to quicken. And the American client states of the region are certain to feel insecure. Washington is doing its best to reassure them that a Sino-American detente is not a sell-out of these ‘client’ powers to Chinese hegemony. But the U. S. would find it difficult to allay their fears. For here lies a dilemma in American policy. How to convince South Vietnam, Thailand, South Korea, not to say of Taiwan, of the credibility of the ultimate American protection in the face of her actively sought-after detente with China? To the extent the detente signifies a departure from the dominos theory, it implies not merely a change in its strategy of dealing with China but its basic premises about Chinese intentions. And to this extent the fears of the ‘client’ states only get heightened American efforts in promoting a regional military answer, (with itself remaining in the wings) for any eventual Chinese let-down may only appear to be attempts to cover up the escape from present commitments. All the same it is not improbable that the Americans are getting to believe that China may really respect a settlement in the nature of, say, the neutralisation of South-East Asia subject to firm guarantees. In any case the smaller client states may only have the alternative of making the best of Washington’s offers.

But in the case of bigger powers hitherto tied to Washington, like Japan, in particular, the detente has caused positive bewilderment. Tokyo’s resentment can be gauged from the fact that Washington’s reconciliation with China not merely makes the Japanese-American Treaty almost ineffectual but that Japan is aware that this ‘reconciliation’ is partly caused by America’s desire to gaurd against prospective Japanese influence in the area. The Japanese are sure to search for alternatives. Already the radicals are up against Premier Sato for not bringing off Japan’s own detente with Peking. There is also the alternative–though a remote possibility–that Tokyo might develop links with other powers of the region, like India–who in the wake of the Sino-American detente are apt to evolve their own system of security against potential aggressors. Now the last-mentioned outcome has already emerged as one of the earliest Consequences of the Sino-American detente in the shape of the Indo-Soviet Treaty. This and its likely repercussions in other parts of the region are dealt with a little later. Suffice it to state here that new forces are most likely to emerge as counter weights to the new manifestation of Chinese power.

Obviously the detente will be felt most by the Soviet Union. As already observed, both Peking and Washington have the objective of checkmating Moscow in deciding to come to terms with each other (though for different reasons and with different interests). Moscow has promptly called the Kissinger Mission an instance of Sino-American collusion against Moscow. It would be quite an exaggeration to say that Washington’s real aim is to let the Chinese and Russians fight it out each other, but it is most probable that Nixon is out to derive the benefits resulting from any exacerbation of the Sino-Soviet quarrel and the Sino-American detente was designed to accomplish just this. Barring a few half-hearted statements about negotiating with the Chinese, the Russians show no let-down in their preparations to face the Chinese confrontation–which they are sure will be intensifying now that the Sino-American detente reduces China’s commitments on her southern boarders. At the same time the detente might indirectly serve the cause of peace even in the Sino-Soviet context. The Russians cannot now be contemplating any sort of a pre-emptive strike against Peking–for that would be too risky in this changed context. The Indo-Soviet Pact is one move in that direction. Russia’s rush for a reconciliation with the West in Europe is another significant step. This can be illustrated by the breath-taking suddenness with which U. S. A., U. S. S. R., Britain and France agreed to a treaty on Berlin in September–a treaty under negotiation for the last few months. Russia yielded many concessions not the least significant of which is the firm recognition of the West’s rights of access to and from Berlin and a recognition that West Berlin de facto belongs to West Germany.

The concessions that Moscow obtained from the West are considerable–like the one relating to the establishing of a Russian embassy in West Berlin. The earlier dragging on of the talks and their sudden finalisation in September is attributed to Moscow’s haste to consolidate its detente in Europe to enable itself face the Chinese. The Russians are also eager to convene the European Security Conference to usher in a tension-free Europe. Kosygin is busy befriending many European nations and shopping for ‘treaties’ with these. The fact that Russia did not resort to harsh reprisals against the British action in expelling over 100 Russians from Britain for alleged spying also supports this. The Russians are thus prepared to continue and consolidate the detente with America in the context of European issues. Thus curiously enough Washington’s overtures to China did not make Moscow retaliate by assuring surlier postures in its relations with Washington. It cannot simply afford to do so. Washington on its part seemed to assure Moscow that its (Washington’s) detente is not aimed at Moscow–Nixon’s decision to follow up his proposed visit to Peking with a journey to Moscow is to satisfy the latter’s ego. With all this Moscow is prone to search for a European understanding projecting its Europeanness. A new phase in pan-Europeanism, with American influence withdrawing, may be in the offing in the near future.

The recent events greatly influenced the Bangla Desh issue too by strengthening Pindi’s position. As analysed in the previous issue of this journal, both Washington and Peking have now a common interest in ing up Yahya Khan. The Indo-Soviet treaty may have the effect of convincing Peking that to counter-balance this new force she may have to continue to support Pakistan as an entity. This, however, may not make her underwrite Pindi in all its activities for, in spite of Yahya Khan’s braggadocio, Peking has her own fears of joining forces in a Pindi-initiated war in the sub-continent.

The Indo-Soviet Pact

The treaty of friendship between India and the Soviet Union signed on 9th August, 1971 is a landmark in India’s diplomatic history. It is the first of its kind India has ever entered into with a foreign country. Given India’s non-alignment and, in particular, the exuberance with which she went about being non-aligned, the treaty’s significance only gets heightened.

A treaty of friendship, and not a defence agreement, the Indo-Soviet treaty differs from other treaties that the Soviet Union entered into with some of the other non-communist powers. Articles VIII, IX and X, in particular, constitute the essence of the treaty. Under articles VIII and IX each high contracting party not only undertakes “to abstain from any aggression against” the other but also (i) “to prevent the use of its territory for the commission of any act which might inflict military damage to the other” and (ii) “to abstain from providing any assistance to any third party that engages in armed conflict with the other.” But these provisions in themselves do not amount to anything more than the enunciation of the principles of non-aggression which norms of international law already prescribe and which Panch Sheel further reiterated. What is of real significance is the stipulation in the second part of Article IX that “In the event of either party being subjected to an attack or a threat thereof, the high contracting parties shall immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to remove such threat, to take appropriate effective measures to ensure peace and the security of their countries.” While the phrases, ‘shall immediately enter into mutual consultations’, ‘remove such threat’ and ‘take appropriate effective measures’, might on first reading appear to involve some sort of a commitment of either of the parties come to each other’s rescue, yet it is important to realise that what is demanded is only ‘consultation’ between the parties and not material support. There is thus no provision for an automatic commital to support each other. In some quarters it is argued that the treaty is nothing short of a military commitment and that Russia and India are now pledged to be drawn into each other’s wars. But apart from the remote circumstantial reason that Russia appeared to have assured India of its full support in case of war with Pakistan, there is nothing else to support this view. The Indian Government explicitly repudiated the suggestion that the treaty is a defensive alliance. It is very instructive to notice that in this respect this treaty provides for less intimate relationships between the signatories than the Soviet-Egyptian treaty signed during last summer. Art. VII of the latter stipulates that “In the event of the emergence of circumstances which, according to the view of both parties constitute a threat to or violation ofpeace, they will contact each other immediately with a view to co-ordinating their stand to remove the arising threat or to restore peace.” Strangely enough, even the Soviet-French Protocol on consultations of October 1970, calls for co-ordination of the two countries’ policies. Russia, thus, in its treaties with two powers, one non-aligned (Egypt), and the other a power still formally aligned to the opposite camp (France), entered into more involved relationships than she sought from its treaty with India. In fact, the Soviet-Egyptian treaty goes much farther in promoting military co-operation including aid in training personnel for Egypt’s armed forces. Still Cairo not only claims to be non-aligned but has demonstrated that it can afford to keep its choices open with Washington and to even work against Soviet interests in Sudan. This point must be remembered by those tending to exaggerate the obligation for mutual consultations as amounting to India’s hitching its wagon to the Russian stow.

Then, there is Article X of the treaty which runs thus: “Each high contracting party solemnly declares that it shall not enter into any obligation, secret or public, with one or more states, which is incompatible with this treaty...” Here again one can make a distinction between the apparent and real meanings of the term. On the face of it an obligation of non-aggression implies, an obligation to remain out of alliances hostile to the other party. But it could also be said that this clause could be used to prevent India from making up with its erstwhile ‘enemies’, like China, as long as the Sino-Soviet rivalry remains at the prevailing pitch. Interpreted thus, the treaty certainly makes a dent in India’s non-alignment.

The timing of the treaty ostensibly connects it to India’s fears of a Pakistani threat, to India on the Bangla Desh issue. President Yahya Khan, anxious as he is to convert the whole issue into a simple Indo-Pakistani conflict, is itching for a confrontation while India could certainly take him on, the prospect of a Chinese intervention coupled with Kissinger’s caution that Washington could not be counted upon to come to India’s rescue in the event of Chinese entry into the fray got India worried. Not because India wants to fight Pakistan but because a confrontation may be thrust upon her by Pindi in collusion with Peking.

While this Context was compelling, later events showed that this only constituted the immediate cause for the treaty. In fact, other considerations confirm that the treaty has had a long gestation. The role of former Ambassador Dhar in its finalisation suggests that it was during his tenure in Moscow that the agreement was negotiated. This was confirmed in so many words by Swaran Singh when he said the treaty was on the anvil for the last two years.

Thus the two governments thought of a formal alliance, which to India, at any rate, constitutes the launching of a new version of foreign policy, quite sometime ago. What then, could have been the cause–the need to counter-balance China, of course. The Sino-Soviet conflict touched its peak point just over two years ago and oddly enough it is also about the same time that President Nixon started implementing his intention to open a dialogue with Peking. Hence it is the possibility of Sino-American ‘rapproachment’ that must have set Moscow and Delhi even two years ago on the way to explore the possibility for an alliance. The Kissinger Mission must have given the final push to this Indo-Soviet exploration.

India’s isolation in South-East Asia was quite evident and Russia was concerned at the prospect of China’s diplomatic break-through into the international system which, of course, would be the obvious sequel of a Sino-American detente.

Though geopolitically India was to have been the dominant Power in South-East Asia, in fact she is not regarded even as a power of the region by the others. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 ought to have led her to project herself into the region. But nothing happened. She figures in neither of the two regional groupings–the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) and the Association of South-East Asian States (ASEAN)–though she is participating in the Asian Bank. In fact she is ‘unique’ among the world’s powers not to belong to foster closer political contacts, not to speak of a military alliance. It is true that India showed some enthusiasm to play her role as a major power in the area and that towards this end, Mrs. Gandhi undertook her goodwill visits to some of the countries of the region, as also to Japan, two years ago. But judged from the fact that no follow-up measures were taken these attempts could only be regarded half-hearted. Partly, New Delhi might have relied on the fact that American-Chinese confrontation assures an ultimate American protection to its security. But, when once the whole basis of Sino-American relations is to be altered the loneliness of India gets strikingly exposed. In other circumstances an American withdrawal could have seized as a God-sent opportunity to mobilize the smaller powers of the region into an alliance, for these powers are none too happy with what they consider to be, Washington’s unilateral decision to call off the confrontation with Peking. But India is not able to do anything partly because of her self-denying ordinance against ‘alliances’ and partly because the powers of the region do not any longer respond to her call. For while these powers like Malaysia may be enough anti-Peking, they turn away at the prospect of any involvement in an Indo-Pakistani conflict because of pan-Islamic considerations.

That is why an American withdrawal might not imply a very activist Indian policy in the region. What is likely to happen is that the Americans and the Chinese would come to a gentlemen’s agreement not to disturb the peace of the area to each other’s detriment. Something similar to a French solution of a neutralisation of South-East Asia is what is likely to be the outcome of the Sino-American detente. Still Washington will have to underwrite the integrity of her erstwhile client-states and an American guarantee of their territorial security will remain inarticulate major for any future arrangement.

Two groupings are likely to emerge, one consisting of the client-states U. S. A. and the other comprising the Communist States under China. Under the assumptions that underlie the Sino-American detente, these groupings would not necessarily be hostile towards each other.

Whatever may be the developments in South-East Asia, India’s role in the region proved to be less than marginal. And it is a realisation of these limitations that made South Block anxiously search for a viable partner. This anxiety, primarily caused by fear of Chinese intrusion and augmented by the phenomenal increase in her nuclear and missile capacities, got further heightened by Yahya Khan’s desperado politics. That this anxious search should discover the Soviet Union should cause no surprise either.

In fact, the Indo-Soviet treaty can be said to have given birth to a third grouping in the area: a vertical grouping of the largest Eurasian power with a South Asian power. The Russian motives in consolidating its friendship with India range from finding a firm friend against China to one of acquiring special links with South Asia. In another sense an alliance with India could be of a greater consequence to the Soviet Union in the global context itself. European Communist States like Yugoslavia and Rumania, not to speak of Albania, are likely to be even less anti-Chinese than before. The Brezhnev Doctrine of limited sovereignty sufficiently scares them away from Moscow. Peking’s new flexibility with the U.S.A. makes it (Peking) all the more acceptable to them. Western Europe is not going tobe of much importance and in any case the optimum that Moscow can achieve with the powers of the area is a detente but not an entente. Its special relations with West Asia, with Egypt to be more precise, are such as not to give the Kremlin much of confidence in the Far-Eastern contexts. Further it is probable that the recent developments in Cairo may have made Moscow sceptical of depending too much on the Egyptian alliance. All these, and in particular the fear of what China, now relieved from the American pressures on its southern flank, might do in the north, might have led to Moscow’s decision.

The Indo-Soviet grouping can conceivably be enlarged to include Afghanistan and Indonesia. The former has been linked with many of the Soviet proposals of an Asian security system. Further her relations with Pakistan are such as to make her prone to identify herself with this group.

As for Indonesia, under normal conditions she should belong to this alignment. Her bitter experience with Peking should caution her against any prospect of China emerging as the super-power of the region. Secondly, her long association with India in the politics of non-alignment makes her foreign policy perspectives come closer to those of India. But there are a couple of considerations that stand in the way. Indonesia is a member of ASPAC and may find that she has options both with ASPAC group and the Indo-Soviet group. Secondly, she may now flaunt her non-alignment at India’s face and refuse to be drawn into even a formal treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union. There is also the factor that identification with this group might involve her in an embarrassing position vis-a-vis Pakistan, for it must be remembered that like other Muslim countries, Jakarta too remained silent on Bangla Desh and it is only recently that New Delhi claimed that it persuaded Jakarta to take a major positive approach over the Bangla Desh issue. These qualifying factors not withstanding, some attempts are bound to be made to draw Indonesia into the Sino-Indian alliance syatem. That the Indian External Affairs Minister chose to visit Jakarta immediately after signing the pact demonstrates this.

Peking does not show the same flexibility vis-a-vis Tokyo that it showed towards Washington, as the harshness of Peking’s broadcasts indicate. Given this situation a possible link up of Japan with Indo-Soviet alliance can be projected. Presuming that Jakarta joins too, a horseshoe shaped grouping emerges. It will be recalled that when Moscow resorted to kite-flying its project for an Asian Security pact last year, it chose to do so in Japan. The proposed visit of a high level Japanese team to Delhi further underscores Japanese interest in the developments and its realisation of the need for new options. On the other hand the very prospect of the encirclement of China makes it most unlikely that Peking would ‘allow’ relations with Tokyo to deteriorate to the extent of compelling the latter joining the Indo-Soviet grouping. More important still is the consideration that the U. S. herself would not welcome the emergence of Indo-Soviet-Japanese link up as that would surely affect the balance of power in the region. As it is, the American move for a detente is motivated as much by a desire to bail out of the perilous Indo-China involvement as to exacerbate the Sino-Soviet conflict and thereby increase her manoeuvrability in the power triangle pattern. This would be severely neutralised if Moscow were to persuade not merely Delhi but Tokyo too, into getting closer to her.

The question whether the Indo-Soviet treaty implies the end of non-alignment is everywhere asked and in fact is a natural question to be asked. Official circles assert that non-alignment remains as no military commitments have been made and as India’s foreign policy options remain as open now as before. Swaran Singh’s offer to sign an identical pact with the U. S. A. is cited in confirmation of this and even Senator Edward Kennedy endorsed our stand. But such an approach is a purely formal one. Other criteria reveal the unique character of this foreign policy venture. Such an alliance has never been entered into by New Delhi before and hence this novel experience cannot but constitute a new definition of non-alignment.

Let us take the course of our non-alignment since 1962. Vis-a-vis China our policy seemed to have changed radically, while as between Moscow and Washington we claimed to be neutral. Yet neither of these positions was correct. First, by 1962 it was no longer very meaningful to talk of being neutral as between Moscow and Washington. Second, strangely enough, we remained non-aligned even between the Chinese and the Americans. For, even after 1962, we disagreed with Washington’s assessment of Chinese designs in Asia and totally disapproved of its policies to combat the ‘dominoes’ game. Thus, in a sense, it is precisely in relation to Peking and Washington we exhibited our non-alignment. Now it is this Peking Vs. Washington dimension that seems to lose much meaning even as the Moscow Vs. Washington dimension started losing relevance since the early sixties. Our attitudes, then and now, towards the following three pairs of powers–Russia and U.S.A.; China and U.S.A.; Russia and China–show up the contrast in our positions. The China-India War was supposed not to have affected our relations vis-a-vis pair one; to have radically changed vis-a-vis pair two and pair three then remained a rather uncertain category indeed. Contrast the present position. The question of non-alignment vis-a-vis the first pair has now become rather unimportant, the issue regarding pair two now seems far-fetched, and it is pair three that assumes critical importance to non-alignment.

This transformation in the dimensions of non-alignment is not merely the product of the growing Sino-Soviet conflict. Even more responsible is the changing perspective of Washington on Peking. In short, the former seems to have jettisoned the ‘dominoes’ theory.
The treaty also illustrates the transformation in another manner. For a long time analysts wondered whether Nehru’s non-alignment did not have as its inarticulate major premise an ultimate dependence on the West in case of Communist expansionism. And this was vindicated in October 1962. The treaty now suggests that India’s number one ally is the Soviet Union.

We have seen that our External Affairs Minister sought to prove our non-alignment by citing our readiness to sign a similar treaty with the United States. How one wishes that the Foreign satellite Minister also mentioned the name of China in the same context! But what Swaran Singh omitted to say D. P. Dhar stated expressly later at a press conference in Calcutta. There are, of course, some hurdles on the way–the continuing Chinese occupation of considerable areas of Indian territory being the most important. For this reason any talk of India’s readiness to sign a treaty with Peking is indeed premature. The most that can be attempted is to break the existing tension in Sino-Indian relations. But, still, at lease at the academic level comes the question whether in case of a step-by-step easing of Sino-Indian relation, the Soviet Union would remain silent. On present calculations Moscow must have ruled out the prospect of a Sino-Indian agreement to such an extent that it would feel distressed if a move in that direction were to manifest. It is this that indirectly limits India’s options vis-a-vis Peking. But, of course, one cannot always analyse present events from the standpoints of remote possibilities. There can be no bar whatsoever for New Delhi opening a dialogue with Peking without being over-enthusiastic about it.

After all, Moscow has contacts with Pakistan, irrespective of Indian sensibilities in the matter. By the same logic one cannot be oversensitive to Moscow’s feelings about our options towards Peking. The case of Egyptian-Russian relations offers even a better example. In spite of the pact of last May, which brings Egypt into a much closer Russian embrace than the Indo-Soviet pact does India, President Sadat manages to retain his initiative to deal with U.S.A. and to help suppress Communist takeovers in his sphere of influence. India too should be able to deal with China as and when she feels it advisable.

Finally, there will always be inflexible ‘purists’ harping on the theme of non-alignment being ‘equi-distance’ from Moscow and Washington. An alliance with Moscow, they say, is ipso facto violation of non-alignment. The effective answer to that is to point that there was a time when India was in the point of arriving at an understanding with Washington for some sort of a collaboration for maintaining south-East Asian security. As recently pointed out by Chester Bowles, it was the Johnson administration’s reluctance that dashed the proposal. Thus India did not hold to any model of equi-distance. Then, as now, it is the queerness and unpredictability of the U. S. policy that is partly responsible for India seeking ‘security’ from other Sources.
Nov. 12, 1971