International Affairs: A Survey

DR. R. V. RAMACHANDRASEKHARA RAO
Reader and Head of the Department of Politics and
Public Administration, Andhra University

The Paris Talks on Vietnam-Perspectives and Prospects

The Paris Peace Talks over Vietnam are continuing and will, doubtless, continue for a long time. While well-informed political analysts do not expect spectacular results in the near future, the very fact that the North Vietnamese and the Americans are meeting is most significant. Either in terms of the sufferings of the Vietnamese, or in terms of deaths of American G. I. S., or in terms of the possibility for explosion into a hot war, commonsense and humanity demand speedy efforts at ending the conflict.

The talks commenced on the 12th May, the veteran U. S. diplomat Averell Harriman leading the American team, and Minister without portfolio, Mr. Xuan Thui, heading the North Vietnamese delegation. The talks have for their short-term end the complete cessation of hostilities in Vietnam that will lead to the long-term goal of arriving at a political settlement in South Vietnam. Unfortunately, but as anticipated, no agreement could be arrived at even on the first issue. The Americans demand that now that they have called off intensive raids on the North, it is Hanoi’s turn to demonstrate good faith by halting infiltration of guerillas into the South. Only in such an eventuality will the U. S order complete cessation of bombing. This demand for ‘reciprocity’ the North Vietnamese are rejecting. They protest that there can be no question of halting infiltration for the simple reason that there never was any infiltration to halt. To them the problem of ending hostilities is just ‘to see how and when’ the U.S.A. would stop the bombing of North Vietnam. The Americans, with equal conviction poophoo Hanoi’s disclaimers. Mr. Harriman said, ,No one in the world believes in Hanoi’s claim and I don’t know why the North Vietnamese try to keep it up.,

Thus over the issue of the next step towards de-escalation there has been no agreement forover two months. The teams do discuss other matters like prisoners-of-war, neutrality of Cambodia and etc., but the crux of the talks is howto de-escalate–and on this one only sees a merry-go-round of American demands for an initiative from Hanoi and Hanoi charges of American aggression.

To handle such fruitless talks where each of the parties has to bear with the other’s incessant repetition of ‘untruths’ and ‘lies’ (as it perceives) is indeed a stupendous job.

It must be emphasised that in spite of the frustrations and provocations, neither side is prepared to bear responsibility for breaking the talks. Though occasional adjournments are made for consultations with their respective governments, talks do get resumed and the dialogue is well on its way. The strategy of each of the parties seems to be aimed at extracting the maximum possible concessions from the other. Even the communist adherence to their stand that they need take no initiative in de-escalation need not be taken too seriously. Only very recently did they disclose that in effect they slowed down the pace of fighting and wanted that Washington should take note of this. Thus a formal duty to reciprocate in reduction of tension they would deny, but yet they seem not totally unaware of the need ‘to give and take.’ This only indicates that the negotiations might eventually end in something. Yet on present reckoning the prospects for a political settlement at Paris are very distant indeed. It must also be remembered that the present American policy does not imply an American withdrawal from Asia, and that Washington cannot afford to ignore the feelings of her Asian partners, in particular, the present government of South Vietnam. The decision of President Johnson and the President of South Vietnam, at their very recent meeting in Honolulu, not to relax military vigilance in South Vietnam only reveals the limitations to American concessions. Thus there is every danger that too unconscionable a procrastination at Paris will only harden the position of the parties.

However, it is not too unrealistic to speculate about the possible shape of a political settlement. The following conditions can be regarded as a must for any settlement: 1. The future government of South Vietnam will have to shed its present military complexion becoming broad-based, and, most important, it will have to include representatives of the National Liberation Front, the Political wing of the Vietcong of the South. 2. The freedom of South Vietnam must be suitably assured against all possible intervention either by Hanoi or by America. Neutralisation of South Vietnam is suggested as a way out of the problem. But, then, the deep involvement of the Americans in Laos and their alleged ‘penetration’ into the Cambodian scene might make the communists argue that the American presence in these areas itself constitutes a basic threat and that nothing short of the neutralisation of Laos and Cambodian also will create the necessary precondition for South Vietnamese independence. The Americans might counter by saying that if it comes to that, the Communist Government in North Vietnam also poses a basic threat to the South. But this American argument has the basic weakness of equating the presence of the North Vietnamese in North Vietnam with the American presence in South-East Asia. This has the implication that a power geographically remote can always justify its intervention in a region, to counter the prospect of mischief from potential aggressors in the region. This implication may not be received well in many circles. All these considerations are bound to bog down the deliberations of the Paris talks further.

The Paris Talks, as already noted, seek a political solution for South Vietnam. This goal is certainly narrower than the one envisaged by the Geneva Conference of 1954. For this Conference the end-goal was a unified Vietnam through elections. Of course, it was only a long-term goal. The point to be noted is that now the issue of the unification of Vietnam is no longer even mentioned. This change is an indication of the irrelevance of the Geneva Agreement to the present context. No wonder, neither Washington nor Hanoi depend on these Agreements. Russia and the U. K., the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, on whom devolved the responsibility of giving effect to its decisions, do not share common ground either on the implications of the Agreements or on the interpretation of the post-Geneva developments. The failure of the British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Michael Stewart’s Moscow visit in May confirms the ineffectiveness of the Geneva perspectives to the present times.

The American Presidential Election

The assassination of Senator Robert Kennedy in Los Angeles on the 6th June, by one Sirhan Bishara Sirhan, brought sorrow and dismay throughout the world. The brilliant career of a very bright young man who raised hopeful expectations in the minds of the poor and neglected sections in America and the poor and underdeveloped regions outside America, has thus been cut short.

This gruesome event following the murder ‘most foul’ of the Rev. Martin Luther King, in April, once again brought to the fore the problem of the presence of a persistent streak of violence amidst the glitter and glamour of American affluence.

Conflicting interpretations are given to the real motive behind the Senator’s murder. First, there is the view that Sirhan, the assassin, being an Arab and a former native of Jordan, simply reeked vengeance on the Senator for his pro-Israeli stand, especially during the June ’67 war. Some entries in the dairy of Sirhan and the fact that the killing coincided with the first anniversary of that war, lend some credence to this view. There is the second viewpoint that Sirhan was in fact operating as an Israeli agent and that the murder was the result of a conspiracy hatched by the enemies of the Kennedy family aimed at destroying Robert Kennedy and discrediting the Arab States. There is yet another theory that the assassination is motivated by the ultra-rightists against the ‘liberalism’ of the Kennedy line. It is difficult to divine the right motive at this stage.

The death of Kennedy meant a great loss for the Democratic Party, as its chances to win the Presidential race were brighter with Kennedy as its candidate. Now only Vice-President Hubert Humphrey and Senator Eugene McCarthy are in the field, though Senator McGovern of South Dakota may also enter the race for the Democratic nomination. Humphrey, once rated as a ‘liberal’, was very forthright on the issues of racial equality and the extension of governmental programmes for the relief of the poor sections of the country, advocating a conciliatory policy towards Russia and even communist China. All these are anathema to the majority of the Southern Democrats. But unfortunately for Humphrey, his association with the Johnson Administration’s Vietnam policy ruined his liberal reputation and it is Senator Eugene McCarthy, who now projects the liberal image far more convincingly. Yet it is precisely this liberal image that may earn him the contempt and hatred of the Southerners, who, led by Governor Wallace of Alabama, are seeking to form a third party. It is thus probable that Vice-President Humphrey, with his experience in the Senate and the Administration, might prove to be less unacceptable to the Southern die-hards and this may prevail upon the Democratic Party machine to go in for Humphrey. It is also significant that the Vice-President is trying hard to disassociate himself from the wrongs of the Johnson policy over Vietnam in order to live down the reputation earned during the last four years. His statement that America has no right to behave like an international policeman, viewed in the context of the Administration’s policy of containing communism in South-East Asia amply illustrates his anxiety to project an independent line on foreign policy.

On the Republican side former Vice-President Nixon won the nomination beating Governor Rockefeller of New York and Governor Reagan of California. He had the advantage of being a ‘proper’ Republican without any appreciable taint of liberalism to be taunted with, which proved to be a great drag on Governor Rockefeller. It must, however, be admitted that Nixon, with all the Republican penchant for the Dullesian policy of massive retaliation against communists, openly opposes the present policy over Vietnam and is eager to end the war there. For the last few years he has been a globe-trotter, meeting world leaders and making first-hand assessment of men and matters. This acquired for him the stature of a world figure among the ranks of the Republican leaders. While his moderation over foreign policy made him not hostile to the ‘liberals’ among the Republican Party, his economic conservatism and stoic silence over the race issue assured him the support of the majority of the Republicans. Governor Rockefeller’s liberal reputation has always been regarded as a disadvantage to him. He is the most outspoken champion of Negro rights among the Republicans which assured him Southern hostility. Governor Reagan of California was a former Hollywood actor with a self-confessed mistrust for radical ideas and intellectuals. He was more in the tradition of Barry Goldwater, the former Republican rival to President Johnson. It is almost certain that the Republican Party leadership, considered his conservatism too conservative to serve the Party’s electoral interests. Evidently, in choosing Nixon, the Grand Old Party, as the Republican party is popularly called, opted for a middle path shunning the ‘progressive’ Rockefeller and the ‘reactionary’ Reagan.

The question about the final prospects for the Presidency is indeed a difficult one. It is almost certain that the time is past when Americans will choose anyone credited with too conservative an outlook. It is this fact that might create difficulties in the way of Nixon. But he has to his advantage the support of the Southern vote, which is most likely to support him rather than the democratic nominee. If a third party is formed with the racist elements, it will surely cut into the democratic vote, thus benefiting Nixon. On the other hand, there are many even among the Republicans who regard Nixon with deep distrust, suspecting that his real roots lay with the extreme Right in American politics. To these, his criticism of Johnson’s Vietnam policy might appear as a piece of calculated veneer motivated by cynical political opportunism. Perhaps, one strong obstacle in Nixon’s path is that in times of crisis Americans tend to vote for a ‘progressive’ candidate. If today Vietnam is dominating the election, no rational American can be led to think that peace will be round the corner any more with a Republican of the Nixon ilk in the White House than with Lyndon B. Johnson there. It is this that augurs well for the Democratic Party.

The Liberalisation in Czechoslovakia–Developments and Implications

Events in Eastern Europe moved very fast during the last few months. A wave of de-Stalinization in Czechoslovakia seems to have eroded the communist foundations of the political structure itself. Rumania continues to toe an independent line, especially in matters of foreign policy, and together these two countries have gone to the extent of declining an invitation for a Warsaw Pact meeting recently.

In Czechoslovakia, the election of the liberal communist Mr. Dubcek itself implies a significant trend. Next came the edging out of the once powerful President Novotny who, when confronted with a new dispensation openly suspicious of his conservative leanings, reluctantly resigned. He is succeeded by General Svoboda, a war-hero with no active associations with the Communist Party. The newly-constituted Cabinet led by Premier Oldrich Cernik consists of younger men pledged to carry on the programme of democratisation and economic reforms. It is significant that it includes many who had quarreled with the former leadership and were in ‘disgrace.’ These are now committed to ensure full intellectual freedom without prejudice to the ideology of the party. In fact, the wave of liberalisation seems to have opened the doors for criticism against the sanctity of the party itself. An eminent philosopher and ex-party member Mr. Ivan Svitak, boldly pleaded, in a recent article in a trade union daily, for the access of other political parties to real power through free elections. He wrote, “The leading role of the Communist Party as formed during the last twenty years in Eastern Europe is a completely unsuitable type of political life and has nothing in common with Karl Marx’s conception of the working class and socialist society.” For the first time Press censorship was relaxed on a large scale.

In economic affairs measures of decentralisation in industrial decisions, that were fanatically opposed under the previous regime are now enforced along with a frank admission of the need for decentralisation in the political set-up also. These events brought to the fore the long suppressed anti-Russian feelings. Some sections of the party and Parliament even made a hint at disengagement from the Soviet bloc.

On the other hand a note of caution and even criticism against going too far is bound to be voiced by conservative sections which are surely there. Only very recently did Mr. Dubcek escape a censure for his ‘adventurist’ deviations. He commands only a marginal majority within the party circles. This consideration compelled these reformers to announce a halt to further reforms in June.

Naturally, the Soviet Union could not have regarded these developments without grave misgivings. Internally, the Czech reforms as promised, and partly implemented, constituted deviations from communist norms and in their external implications these might endanger communist unity itself. To study the situation at first hand Mr. Kosygin made an unannounced dash to Prague. It was rumoured that it was as much a mission to warn as one to understand. Apparently the Czech leaders reassured their guest of their firm loyalty to the Communist bloc while asserting their rights to re-define socialism. The members of the Communist bloc did not voice much opposition to the events till late. In July, alarmed by the trends, a meeting of the Warsaw Pact members was called. Prague declined the invitation to the meet. The Soviet Union, Poland, Hungary and East Germany gave a joint warning to Prague not to betray communist principles in its enthusiasm for reforms. Moscow followed this up by calling for a joint meeting of the parties of both the countries for a show down. Mr. Dubcek could not reject this challenge though he managed to shift the venue for the confrontation from Moscow to Czech soil. The recent Russo-Czech meeting at Cierna and the conference of the Eastern European communist parties later at Bratislava were regarded as deciding the fate of the Czechoslovak developments. The outcome of these, however, proved to be not so consequential. There has been no sign of a climb-down to conformity on Prague’s part excepting an assurance that she would not sell her soul to ‘bourgeoise ideology’. That the Russian party later hailed this assurance indicates that the Russians themselves did not expect Prague to bow down to seek forgiveness for ideological errors. And as if to proclaim their self-assurance the Czechoslovak leaders had sent a high powered team to Yugoslavia to study the working of industrial reforms there. In spite of persistent opposition from within, the Parliament itself seems to be fairly solidly behind Mr. Dubcek. It is significant that while the Russo-Czech talks were taking place the people of Prague demonstrated their faith in the ‘leberalisation’, going to the extent of cautioning their leaders from succumbing to Moscow’s demands.

While Czech internal reforms cause enough concern for Moscow and others, the problem of Czech policy towards the Warsaw Pact seems to precipitate a Moscow-Prague confrontation.

The Czechs demanded the withdrawal of the Soviet and Polish troops from their soil. These troops were there under Warsaw Pact agreements. Though Mr. Dubcek demands a revision of the Pact, it is significant that Prague did not so far as to hint at withdrawing from the Pact. Presumably, Prague remembers the lessons of Hungary in 1956 when Imre Nagy, riding the tide of de-Stalinization, announced his intention to opt out of the Soviet bloc. This promptly brought the Soviet tanks into Budapest crushing the Hungarian Revolution culminating in the murder of Nagy himself. Now even the Czech demand for Russian troop-withdrawal caused concern in Soviet minds, enough to suspect American hand behind the affair. In June, the Soviet leaders gave open warnings. The ‘hawks’ in Moscow pressed for sterner action. The Czechs on their part persisted in their demand. Though ultimately the Soviet troops withdrew, it was not before conflicting reports were set afloat that the Soviet Union want to intervene in Prague for the restoration of Communism. Is the Russian withdrawal an indication of Russian relation that it can no longer dictate to its allies even in matters of foreign policy or has Dubcek assured the Russians of Prague’s continuation in the Warsaw Pact? The most probable conclusion seems to be that Moscow, at best, can insist that liberalisation should not cause loss of face to her and that the preservation of the integrity of the Warsaw Pact is the touchstone in this regard. Surely, what with the ‘hardliners’ warning Kosygin and Brezhnev of soft peddling and China constantly upbraiding them of having ruined Communist purity, the minimum required for saving Moscow’s face is the integrity of the Warsaw Pact. Czechoslovakia has assured this much at the Cierna and Bratislava talks.

The conclusion of these ‘show-down’ confrontations between Prague and her ideological allies with a mere whimper indicates that liberalisation has come to stay. But the world may not have seen the end of the story yet. The demands for futher liberalisation and democratisation are on the increase and it is uncertain whether the Communist leadership will decide to bend further or apply the brakes. If it bends to the demands of the students, intellectuals and others less committed to the party, the possibility of a Russian intervention cannot be ruled out. Thus the curtain has not fallen on the Czechoslovak ‘affair’.

The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

The General Assembly of the United Nations has endorsed on June 12 with an overwhelming majority the U.S.–Soviet Draft Treaty to ban the spread of nuclear weapons. Ninety-five nations voted for. 4 against and 21 abstained, India being one among the last category. The U. N. endorsement is only recommendatory and formal adherence to the Treaty is required by willing nations affixing their signatures and later getting it ratified through their respective constitutional processes. The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) is now open for signature in Washington, London and Moscow. The Treaty will come into force when the U.S., the Soviet Union, Britain, and 40 non-nuclear weapons signatories have ratified it. The Treaty is of 25 years duration.

No doubt it can be expected that those who voted for it in the U. N. will become signatories to the Treaty. The NPT will, thus, be ed by more than three-quarters at that. The Russo-American sponsoring indicates that it cuts across ideological and world power political barriers.

The provisions of the Treaty may be summarised as follows:

1. States possessing nuclear weapons cannot transfer nuclear arms or other nuclear devices to non-nuclear weapons states.
2. Non-nuclear weapons states cannot receive such weapons.
3. The non-nuclear weapons states agree to accept an inspection system to be worked out with the International Atomic Energy Agency.
4. Research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, except for the development of nuclear explosive devices is guaranteed to all non-nuclear weapons states.
5. The possession and application of nuclear explosives will be made available to non-nuclear weapons states through an international body.

The implication of the Treaty in a nutshell is that with the exception of the U. S. A., the U. S. S. R., the U. K., France and Red China, no new state will be permitted to ‘go nuclear.’ Thus the Big Five will continue to enjoy nuclear monopoly. One need not condemn this treaty merely for this reason. Any effort at disarmament can be initiated only by preventing the further spread of weapons. The contention that the nuclear powers should have imposed on themselves nuclear disarmament by destroying their present arsenals is not realistic. The logic that the less the number of nuclear powers the less the possibility for small brush fires leaping into nuclear holocausts is impeccable. A self-abnegation of nuclear weapons also means considerable saving on the economic front for the weaker nations. These indeed are very strong grounds where the Treaty should be regarded as a step in the right direction. Yet countries like India hold it as entirely unsatisfactory. Mainly two reasons can be given in support of India’s objections. First, the Treaty leaves individual signatories to nuclear blackmail by any of the ‘monopolists’. And in view of the Indo-Chinese conflict–more so in the context of China’s absolute freedom from restraints of international law–India is more likely to become a victim of such blackmail. This objection could be met if international guarantee could assure automatic nuclear protection in the event of a nuclear threat. The Americans and the British talked some time before of a nuclear umbrella for India. But on questions as to when the umbrella would unfold, at whose instance, and whether it would be free from foreign policy considerations or the guarantors, the suggestions remained non-committal. But the sponsors alive to the fears of the small powers made a fresh effort by offering ‘security assurances’ in the event of aggression. They pledged themselves to seek immediate Security Council action in the event of nuclear aggression against a non-nuclear state that becomes a signatory to the NPT. The Security Council endorsed this proposal in a resolution of June20. But this assurance, it must be emphasised, is limited only to those non-nuclear powers who sign the NPT. India vehemently objected to this resolution as inadmissible under Charter, as its discriminatory character violated the principle of sovereign equality of the members. To deny the benefit of nuclear protection to some of the UN members on the ground that they did not choose to sign a treaty seems rather odd. In any case, the point is that even if the guarantee is extended to all it does not meet the fears of members like India, who are sceptical of such guarantees being enforced when need arises. The Indian Government, thus, feels justified in not committing itself to a self-denying ordinance in the absence of a tangible and dependable nuclear ing. Further would not a nuclear equilibrium as between the ‘haves’ act as a deterrent for anyone of these going to the rescue of a non-nuclear power? Why should, for instance, Russia or America risk nuclear retaliation from Peking in going to India’s rescue in the event of an Indo-Chinese war?

The second objection to the NPT is bound on the absence of any obligation on the part of the nuclear powers to limit their nuclear capacities. This makes the treaty a document legitimizing the existing division between ‘nuclear swans’ and ‘non-nuclear geese’. The great powers are not blind to this. Kosygin, in fact, suggested just a few days ago a nine-point plan for total disarmament, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and an end to the missile race. For the past few years the Russians and the Americans have been concentrating on evolving defence systems against possible attacks by each other’s missiles rather than developing more effective offensive missiles. The reason is that none of the offensive missiles could be depended upon to be optimally offensive! Crash programmes for erecting anti-missile systems around industrial regions and cities means colossal cost. And hence the Kosygin plan. But it cannot be denied that the plan is also designed to assure the small powers of the great powers’ readiness to effect disarmament among themselves. But even this would not satisfy the feeling among some nuclear powers that while the NPT demands immediate renunciation of nuclear ambitions, the Great Powers are only talking about what limitations they should observe.

The even more objectionable part of the NPT is its subtle limitations on the scope for research on nuclear energy even for non-military purposes. The prohibition of research for the production of all nuclear explosive devices would include any attempt to put nuclear energy for such purposes as, say, boring underground tunnels. The ostensible reason for this provision is that the line separating the use of nuclear explosive devices for war purposes and their use for peaceful uses is pretty thin. But while this may be so, it cannot also be denied that this single provision in the Treaty effectively stifles the freedom to explore peaceful use of nuclear energy. The compensatory provision that an International Agency will make available such information to non-nuclear weapons states is indeed of very little consolation. The nuclear weapons powers would be the ultimate arbiters even in this regard, for how on earth are the non-nuclear weapons states to know what is going on in the field of research on nuclear explosive device when once they are forbidden to venture into this area under the terms of the Treaty.

The above objections are indeed powerful. In short, the fear of an unscrupulous China on the one hand and a realisation that the rest of the nuclear powers cannot be depended upon to extend nuclear protection on the other, together determine India’s attitude, to the NPT. We could scarcely have reasoned thus had we not been confident of having acquired the know-how and of possessing the technology to make a nuclear bomb. A British scientific periodical estimates that India can manufacture a bomb at the rate of one a week. Yet, neither this fact nor our refusal to sign the Treaty does in any way mean a departure from our policy not to manufacture the bomb? It is just that India does not want to forego the right to make one to face any future provocation. Critics are not wanting even against this limited show of hard-headedness in defence policy. These advocate an unconditional adherence to the Treaty. The moral argument derived from the Gandhian imperatives that we should have no truck with a sinister thing like a nuclear weapon constitutes the main plank for this. Others less prone to be sentimental, advance the argument that we can ill-afford to divert massive sums towards a weapon which, after all, is not intended for actual use, because the theory is that it will only serve as a deterrent. On the whole, the Government of India’s stand seems to be justified; but whether it can afford to remain un-compromising on this issue, if the U. N. comes forward with more effective guarantees against nuclear threats, is to be seen. Recently, Secretary General, U Thant called for a meeting of all the non-nuclear weapons states to discuss what type of guarantees would satisfy them. If any tangible agreement comes out of this, India will have toreconsider her stand seriously. But, of course, there will be many who will be reluctant to see India forego her right to make the bomb till Communist China comes within restrains of international agreements.

South-East Asia: Possible New Power-Alignments

The withdrawal of the British from South-East Asia, part of the Labour Government’s policy to wind-up British military commitments East of Aden, has posed the problem whether a power vacuum would develop in that region. While being yet another indicator of the declining role of the British even in this once-exclusively British sphere as also of Britain’s inability to maintain even a facade as a world power, the British withdrawal would mean a new power-equation.

Firstly, there is the imminent prospect of further American advance into this region. Even though President Johnson’s move to de-escalate the American involvement in South Vietnam was interpreted in some quarters as prelude to the U. S. departure from Asia itself, such does not seem to be the U. S. intention. The American commitments to form South Korea, Thailand and their own conception of their vital interests in the area make them tarry long. In fact, the Vietnam experience taught the Americans to depend less upon land-committed troops and to look increasingly for facilities for off-shore presence. Malaysia would positively welcome enhanced American commitments, as Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman has repeatedly stressed the reality of the Chinese threat. Nor would Indonesia pose objections. The Suharto regime’s hostility towards China and dependence on the U. S. make them accept any American more in this direction. In fact, there have been some reports that the Americans have actually secured a naval base somewhere in the Indian Ocean area to the East of the Indian Peninsula. What would be the Indian reaction? We are, no doubt, opposed to any theory of regional ‘vacuums’ to be filled by big powers. Time was when we were most allergic to American solicitations for another country’s military security. Even now our opposition to the American policy over Vietnam discloses the persistence of such attitudes. Yet an acute awareness of the Chinese threat makes us ill-afford to oppose with any conviction the forging of an American protective shield. The repeated references by Mrs. Indira Gandhi, during her tour of the countries of this region early last summer, to the need to contain China, belies any Indian objections on this score. The point is that prior to 1962, even when we did not credit China with a war-like disposition we drew comfort, albeit silently, from the British presence. Now that we are certain of China’s expansionistic designs we certainly dare not object to the American presence. No doubt, we have our non-aligned conscience to satisfy. But this can easily be taken care of, if the Russians can be brought into the picture. The Russians themselves are staking claims for a naval role in the Indian Ocean. They have been more than willing to augment our naval forces (in spite of their balancing-act of supplying arms to Pakistan). It is a fair guess that in our anxiety not to appear to be relying on an American naval shield we might have welcomed at least a nominal Russian entry into the area. Already some Western experts are suspecting whether the Russian naval supplies to India did not involve a quid pro quo in the shape of India extending shore facilities to the Soviet Union. This may not be true. Even if the Russians are worsted in their efforts at securing a footing it is unlikely that they would seriously object to the implicit dependence of India on the U. S. naval shield.

The possibility for any regional alliance based on the principle of self-help seems to be remote. By themselves the powers of the S. E. Asia do not add-up to much, and the slightly mote potential countries like ourselves, are averse to reverse our disinclination to enter into formal military pacts. This is not to say that our perspectives on S. E. Asia have not changed. With Malaysia our notions have changed for the better and with Philippines too we are anxious to improve our relations. The fact that Mrs. Indira Gandhi’s visits to these countries and Australia and New Zealand constituted the first ever of an Indian prime Minister’s visit, shows how keen we are to impress upon these that we are one among them and that we should be counted for in any South East Asian framework. Primarily, the Prime Minister’s visit was an attempt to meet the criticism that India for long had neglected to cultivate the good-will among the people of the region and failed to impress upon them that India belongs to this region. Some Indian newspaper men were sceptical about any lasting effects of the visit. These advocated an active initiative on our part for a military arrangement aimed at containing China. This alone, these contended, would amount to a tangible proof of India’s readiness to stand forth as a S. E. Asian power. In other words, it just will not do to merely claim the courtesies of a major power, unless we assume the responsibilities also. But the Premier did not go beyond talking about closer economic ties and pledging sympathies in our common plight in facing an unscrupulous neighbour like China. Thus, beyond initiating a polite dialogue with these powers no immediate blue-print for common participation in S. E. Asia had emerged. A purely regional alliance is possible only in the event of a complete American withdrawal which is highly unlikely.

The Russian decision to sell arms to Pakistan is certainly a letdown for India, and for Mrs. Indira Gandhi in particular. For the country, this means that Moscow no longer gives us a special place in its calculations. Such a special position was the characteristic of Kruschev’s policy which Messrs Kosygin and Brezhnev are not too anxious to continue. For Mrs. Indira Gandhi, who inherited the legacy of her father’s policy, and who is her own Foreign Minister, the loss of India’s preferred status means a personal loss in that the only tangible benefit of non-alignment is no longer there. There were rumblings in the Cabinet and in the Congress Party, not to speak of the indignation in the non-Communist opposition circles. It is no surprise that the CPI itself is trying to playdown the significance of the event as it cannot hold Moscow to be ever in the wrong.

If the Tashkent spirit requires that India and Pakistan should do nothing to aggravate their present quarrels one wonders whether the very creator of that spirit should resort to an act that directly engenders adventurism in Pakistan. That the Russians are firm that Pakistan should not use these arms against India need not be doubted. But such conditions can rarely be enforced. The Americans gave similar assurances to India when they supplied arms to Pindi and these did not prevent President Ayub Khan from undertaking a costly adventure. And the Russians know this only too well. But having said this one should also realise the compelling reasons that prompted Moscow to adopt the line it did. The desire to veer Pakistan away from Washington and to prevent further flirtations with Peking, are the two main reasons. Since the Moscow-Washington detente and Pakistan’s diplomacy of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare, Moscow began to feel it unwise to leave out Pindi in its diplomatic calculations. Even the issue of arms supplies has not cropped up overnight. For quite some time it was on the anvil. It figured during Kosygin’s visit to Pakistan early this summer, and the wishful thinking of our External Affairs Ministry notwithstanding, the proposal was agreed to in principle during this visit. Later, the Russian Premier wrote to Mrs. Indira Gandhi informing her of the Russian readiness to consider favourably Pakistan’s request for arms and requesting her not to misunderstand the decision. Finally, came the official announcement on the eve of President Zakir Hussain’s visit to the Soviet Union.

While the event is certainly a setfor our diplomacy, one should not exaggerate the effect it would have on Pakistan’s military potential. After all our defences could not have been so marginally balanced as to be upset by this new source to Pindi. It should also be realised that the Russians are ready to augment our potential to counteract possible Chinese intrusion in the Indian Ocean. The Russians seem to have no objection to helping us against China but are not prepared to consider our objections against their help to Pakistan too. It cannot be denied that the Russian readiness to strengthen us vis-a-vis China to a great extent vindicates our non-alignment. Yet here again to what extent is the Russian stand dictated by genuine concern for our security and to what extent is it motivated by a desire to settle scores with Peking? If the latter is the major consideration there can be no talk of India being rewarded for her non-alignment. In fact, the Russo-American detente has made non-alignment no longer relevant. The situation is so changed that in all probability the Russians themselves would not mind our seeking American collaboration for defence against China in S. E. Asia. There have been rumours that the Russians will seek a bridge-head in the Indian Ocean area with Indian help and that a sort of competitive co-existence of the two super-powers will be in the offing in this strategic area. But the Russian disregard for Indian feelings do not augur well for any possible Indo-Russian venture. This being the case, turning to the U. S. A. for arms seems most probable. The visit of the American team led by Mr. Katzenbach to examine our requirements is very suggestive in this regard.

Thus a new arms race between India and Pakistan is bound to be on and this is just no good either for us or for the superpowers.

The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Recent Trends in a Continuing Crisis

The Arab-Israeli conflict remains where it was. Since June 1967, many flare-ups, of which the recent one between Jordan and Israel is the latest, occurred, keeping alive the issue of basic insecurity in the area. A major flare-up is usually followed by the ritual of a Security Council meeting where uncompromising attitudes are tried to be glossed over with pious platitudes, culminating in the passing of an innocuous resolution.

The Jarring Mission, appointed by the U. N., to mediate between the Arabs and the Israelis and bring them to a conference table, has for all practical purposes failed. The Israelis are all set to talk about normalisation of relations but brook no mention of vacating the Arab territory and the Arabs on their part refuse to recognise the Israeli conquests. Curiously enough, it was announced in April of this year that both sides had accepted the Security Council Resolution of November ’67, requesting the parties to revert to the status quo prevailing before the June ’67 war and negotiate on the basis of the recognition of the territorial integrity of all the states in the region. But soon it transpired that Israel accepted only the ‘spirit’ of the Resolution and that it was not prepared to vacate the areas conquered.

While the Resolution thus remains ignored and the odds are against any immediate prospects even for a move in the direction of conciliation, three significant and welcome developments have occurred. The first is the indication that influential sections in Israel, led by Mr. Yigal Allon, a member of the Israeli Cabinet, are advocating the vacating of the Arab territory. The fact that only a little more than a month ago, Mr. Allon had been promoted in the hierarchy of Mr. Ishkol’s Cabinet, is further proof that a conciliatory gesture may come from Israel, in spite of the militant postures of some other members of the cabinet, led by Defence Minister Moshe Dayan. The second development is even more welcome. Egypt announced, in a surprising turnabout, that it is prepared to take the U. N. Peace Keeping Forces. It was the Egyptian demand for the withdrawal of these in May ‘67, and their subsequent withdrawal, that marked the beginning of the unfortunate war and an Egyptian readiness to have the U. N. forces signifies that Nasser has changed his views on striking at Israel at his convenience. This development, in fact, led to a renewed attempt on the part of the British, American and Russian Governments to effect a lasting solution, though nothing has come out of these as yet.

The third development comes also from Egypt, whose Foreign Minister, Mohammad Riad, announced early in July that Egypt is prepared to recognise the reality of Israel’s existence. But as if to neutrallse the spirit behind this statement, Nasser himself reiterated during his Moscow visit the Arab pledge to regain the lost areas. Yet the very fact that Egypt’s Foreign Minister made the statement at all indicated a change in the perspectives of the Egyptians vis-a-vis Israel. Properly viewed, there is no contradiction between Riad’s statement and Nasser’s Moscow statement. The Arabs are probably ready to put up with Isreal on the condition that Israel helps to wipe off the humiliations of the June ’67 war. And it is in this context that the implications of the Allon Plan can contribute most for West Asian Peace.

But one cannot be oversanguine about these expectations. Nasser’s prolonged visit to Moscow in July and again in August and Moscow’s assurances of arms support have rather bad implications. Increased supply of Russian arms may only culminate in another Arab military gamble. While the Russians owe it to the world not to encourage the Arabs to war, the American responsibility is no less. Neither during the ’67 war, nor since then have the Americans restrained the Israelis from annexing the conquered territories. Indeed in over-all terms, the flow of American arms and money, (both from governmental and private sources) and the failure of America to restrain Israel, may be regarded as constituting a more direct encouragement to war than the Russian arms supply to Egypt. Even the recent Russian decision to step-up arms deliveries to the U. A. R. must be seen in the context of the Washington announcement of missile supplies to Israel. This was most unfortunately timed to coincide with Nasser’s visit to Moscow in July. It is well-known that Moscow wanted to persuade its guest to agree to a comprehensive West Asian Disarmament Scheme and that a new Moscow initiative for peace was at hand. In fact, the initiative was the result of Kosygin’s talks with Mr. Gunnar Jarring, who went to Moscow only a few days before Nasser’s arrival. To what extent the U. S. decision to supply missiles to Israel compelled the Soviet Union to talk less about peace with Nasser and hear more about arms from him, it is difficult to assess. But, surely, in the absence of the Washington announcement the Soviet Union could have exerted far greater pressure upon Nasser to see some way of making it up with Israel.

The position now is that no definite initiative is yet forthcoming from either of the parties and the commando raids of the Palestinian refugees in Israel cause acute tension between Jordan and Israel. As for the U. N. Resolution, Tel Aviv continues to dishonour it in spite of repeated U. N. appeals. Still, it is not very late yet to hope that the expectations implied in the developments mentioned above would be realised.

Revolution and Reaction in France

The events of May in Paris shook the Fifth Republic to its foundations. There was practically no government in Paris and many other major cities for days. It all started with the police trying to oust some students from the campus of the Sirbonne University in Paris. The students alleged police brutalities and the workers joined the students forces in full sympathy. With Governmental efforts to quell the agitations leading to further worsening of situation, the issue very soon assumed the shape of a workers’ struggle for higher wages, better working conditions and more say in industrial decision-making. Significantly, the workers’ dissatisfaction was at its most in the state run Renault motor car factory. For a few weeks strikes, barricades and pitched battles between the police on the one hand and the students and workers on the other reduced Paris to a state of anarchy. More than 300 industrial plants were literally occupied by the workers, about six million of whom went on strike. This came as a rude shock even to the all-time optimist, President de Gaulle, who rushed home cutting short a state visit to Rumania. In a radio broadcast he offered to consider the grievances of the workers, while at the same time sternly rebucking them. The offer, however, elicited poor response though labour leaders urged the rank and file to co-operate with the Establishment. A few ministerial heads rolled in expiation of the Government’s mishandling of the situation and of the police brutalities. This did not appease the angry strikers and the state of affairs did not improve. In some cases, tri-partite talks between labour, employers and the Government were held but soon the workers disowned their own leaders. It looked as though a bitter civil war was inevitable. At this state, even some of the Gaullists demanded de Gaulle’s resignation. In sheer disgust and despair the Grand General left Paris to his country-home in Brittany in Western France. Some said that he went to sound some army units to prepare for a military show-down. Others suggested that he really went home to decide whether to bow out of office or to act. With characteristic determination not to surrender, he returned to Paris within 24 hours and bluntly told the nation that he meant business and that the workers had behaved worse than bums. Then came his offer of fresh elections pending which he demanded of the workers immediate return to work. This put the leftists and other parties supporting the strike in a dilemma. If they refuse, they would put themselves in the wrong of being more bent on destroying the State than on rectifying the wrongs. If they agreed then it meant a return to work and the General’s triumph, at least till the election day. De Gaulle’s gamble worked. The parties could not abandon the elections and they advised the workers to their factories. The anti-Gaullist parties formed a united front to oust de Gaulle and Gaullism and the end of the ‘Second Louis XIV’ seemed certain. Yet the elections returned de Gaulle to power with the largest electoral victory of any party in French history. The Gaullist Party captured 358 of the 487 seats and the Communist strength slumped from 73 to 34. The question is: what accomplished this miracle–for a miracle it was! Partly, popular disgust with anarchy, a taste of which the people saw during the nights of the strong barricades and drawn bayonets. Partly the effect of de Gaulle’s clever interpretation of the events as subserving the cause of the totalitarian communists. In other words de Gaulle reasoned that everyone opposed to him was behind the ‘revolution’ and hence demanded that every one wanting to avert it should support him. The failure of the communists is a case in point. In fact, the party was against the continued strike by its own members and was not interested in a revolution too spontaneous and amateur-led to its liking. Yet, the General managed to identify the anti-Gaullist Communist Party as the architect of the revolution. Whatever the reason, the overwhelming swing to the ‘right’ in the French vote confirms the general belief that in times of crisis French vote always turns conservative. This happened after Napoleon, when France welcomed the Bourbon restoration and again after the 1848 Revolution when a more broad-based electorate returned the conservative Louis Napoleon to power.

The reference to the Revolution of 1848 is very apt indeed. The spread of students agitation and the spontaneous and ideology-free attacks against all authority during the past months in Europe can only equal the impact of the 1848 Revolution. Belgium, Italy, Sweden, Austria and even Communist Yugoslavia felt the direct impact. Given the nature of their demands, the ground of the leadership and the fact that these rebellious cut across ideological frontiers, the stock explanation of attributing all indiscipline to the civil influence of the communists and anarchists, seems entirely inadequate. Sociologists have attributed these developments to a highly-developed sense of commitment and an almost fanatical refusal to compromise with the accepted ‘gap’ between the profession and practice of human values in all societies, communist or capitalist.