The Tashkent Agreement

There is no need to grow hysterical over the Tashkent Agreement concluded between the late Lal Bahadur Shastri, our Prime Minister, and President Ayubkhan of Pakistan, on January 10, 1966, in the presence of the Soviet Premier, Kosygin. There is no room either for too much optimism or too much pessimism over it. What is needed is to take a balanced view of the situation created by it.

The items on which the two leaders came to an agreement may be broadly grouped under two heads. It is a normal feature for every war to be followed by the conclusion of a peace treaty. By the resolutions which the Security Council passed on September 20, 1965 it tried to bring about such a treaty as a fitting sequel to the Indo-Pakistan war of August-September, 1965. Though the resolutions regarding cease-fire and withdrawal of armed personnel to the positions held prior to August 5, were accepted by both India and Pakistan and although there was a formal declaration of cease-fire on September 22, there were repeated violations of cease-fire and there was a danger of the recrudescence of warfare on a large scale. This danger was put end to by the “Treaty” items in the Tashkent Agreement under which both parties agreed to withdraw not later than February 25, 1966, all their armed personnel to the positions held prior to August 5, 1965, to restore the normal functioning of diplomatic relations, to repatriate, the prisoners of war and to discuss the return of the property and assets taken over by either side during the conflict. There was an element of sincerity in agreeing to these items which was absent when both the parties accepted the resolutions of the SecurityCouncil. The result is the putting into effect of this part of the agreement according to plan. Armies have been withdrawn to the agreed positions; prisoners of war have been repatriated; normal diplomatic relations have been restored; and postal and telegraphic communications between the two States and air-flights across each other’s air-space have been resumed. Perfect peace now prevails between India and Pakistan. This is the outcome of the Tashkent Agreement and everyone ought to feel happy about it.

But there are a few who do not feel quite happy. Their point is that in agreeing to withdraw our forces to positions held prior to August 5, we had to give up our hold over the Hajipir, Tithwal and Kargil passes which we reoccupied during the war and whose possession is absolutely necessary from the point of view of the defence of Kashmir and Ladakh and the internal security of the State. The other point raised by them is that Pakistan was not called upon in the Agreement to withdraw from Kashmir the infiltrators whom she had sent in several thousands and to own her responsibility for their presence in the State. It is also their point that on both these issues Lal Bahadur Shastri gave definite pledges to the Indian Parliament and the people and that, owing to the irresistible pressure exercised upon him by the Soviet Premier, he had to break these pledges and to make an abject surrender to Pakistan. It was both a moral and material defeat for India–so great a defeat that it was really responsible for the death of our Prime Minister.

There is no doubt a great deal of force in this criticism. The only reply that can be given is that it was the price we had to pay if peace and normal conditions had to be restored. The alternative would have been the breakdown of the Tashkent conference and the return to ceasefire violations and the threat of a renewal of war. From this point of view the price paid should not be considered as too high.

We may now turn our attention to the other items in agreement falling under the second head-items whose objective to bring about a permanent easing of the eighteen-year tension between India and Pakistan. Among these items is the basic declaration that “both sides will exert all efforts to create good neighbourly relations between India and Pakistan in accordance with the United Nations Charter” and the re-affirmation of “their obligation under the Charter not to have recourse to force and to settle their disputes by peaceful means.” This has been considered by the admirers of the agreement as guaranteeing permanent peace between the two States and as marking a revolution in the relations between them. We will have to consider below whether so much meaning can be read into either the above declaration or the re-affirmation.

The other items falling under the second head are the agreement of both parties not to interfere in the internal affairs of each other, not to encourage any propaganda directed by one country against the other but to encourage propaganda which promotes the development of friendly relations between them, agreement to consider measures for bringing about cultural exchanges, the restoration of economic and trade relations, to discuss questions relating to the problem of refugees and eviction of illegal immigration and the return of property and assets taken over by either side during the conflict and to continue meetings at the highest and other levels on matters of direct concern to both countries and also set up joint bodies for the same purpose. We have here a list of the major problems requiring discussion and settlement and also the creation of a suitable machinery–meetings and joint boards–for the purpose. Kashmir is not specifically mentioned among these problems. The machinery proposed is not an outside one like the Security Council where decisions are taken not on the merits of the issues coming up for consideration but on the effects they produce on the balance of power in international affairs. This agreed machinery is more in keeping with the dignity and self-respect of both India and Pakistan.

These items falling under the second head are of a highly valuable character and if they are accepted and put into effect without any mental reservations they are sure to inaugurate a new era of friendly and good neighbourly relations between the two States–relations like those which have existed between the United States and Canada, for a century. Both governments will then be in a position to spend less on defence and concentrate all their efforts on modernising their economy and social life and raising the living standards of their people. This might even result in the two countries uniting together in defence against common enemies.

But, alas, the situation is really different. The agreement isbased not on any real change of heart on the part of those who are at the helm of affairs in Pakistan. It is becoming clear that they signed the agreement more to avoid incurring the displeasure of the Soviet Premier, their host at Tashkent, than because of their real faith in the principles underlying the agreement. Their subsequent statements go to show that they signed it with a number of mental reservations and the result is that the relations between the two States continue today to be the same as they have been ever since the birth of Pakistan. Tension has not eased and there are no indications of its easing in the near future.

What the Indian leaders all these years wanted was a real no-war pact between the two countries but what the Tashkent Agreement provided for is only a re-affirmation of the obligation under the U. N. Charter not to use force. There is really a snag in this re- affirmation as was made clear by Bhutto when he said shortly after the Agreement was concluded that the U. N. Charter does not prevent a State from using force in self-defence. The very fact that he found it necessary to make such a statement indicates that those in authority in Pakistan do not sincerely subscribe to the Agreement. Let us in this connection remind ourselves that even the worst aggressors in history claimed that all the wars they waged were wars in self-defence.

What the Agreement speaks of is a re-affirmation of the obligation. If affirmation has not prevented Pakistan from using force to grab Kashmir first in 1947-48 and next in August-September 1965 and to grab Kutch in 1964-65 (in spite of a provision for arbitration) what guarantee is there that a re-affirmation of the obligation will produce practical results?

We find similar mental reservations in regard to the agreement not to interfere in the internal affairs of India. It is Bhutto’s view that Kashmir is not a part of India and that interference in the affairs of Kashmir–carrying on anti-Indian propaganda there, encouraging rebellion and even sending infiltrators–is, no interference in India’s internal affairs. Even President Ayub has stated that the Tashkent Agreement has not in any way altered Pakistan’s attitude towards the problem of Kashmir or her determination to see that Kashmir’s future is settled in accordance with the principle of self-determination. How can there be a real easing of tension so long as views like these are held by Pakistan’s rulers?

It is necessary here to note the difference between criticism directed against Tashkent Agreement in India and in Pakistan. In India the criticism is mainly from the parties in opposition. The ruling party and all the members of the council of ministers have unreservedly accepted the Agreement and are determined to put it into effect. They are all for the maintenance of the status quo in regard to the political and constitutional set-up of the country. In Pakistan, however, the criticism is not only by the opposition parties but also by those in power–Bhutto, the responsible minister for external affairs, leading them all with President Ayub Khan joining them. This is rather ominous for the future of the Agreement.

Among the problems listed in the Agreement for specific discussion at conferences between the representatives of the two there is no mention of Kashmir. All the same, President Ayub Khan, Minister Bhutto, and all other members of Pakistan’s Government regard Kashmir as the primary problem to be discussed, knowing all along that India has repeatedly and categorically been that Kashmir is purely an internal matter and that there is nothing for India to discuss with Pakistan about it. There is thus no meeting ground on the issue of Kashmir between the two countries and the Tashkent Agreement has had no effect on either country so far as this issue is concerned.

It was hoped at the time, when the Agreement was concluded that though there might be an impasse on Kashmir, other problems would be discussed and settled and that this would gradually pave the way for a better atmosphere when it might be easier to go into the Problem of Kashmir. But the proceedings of the first ministerial conference under the agreement held on March 1, and 2, have belied completely all such prospects. The conference ended practically in a deadlock. Even the question of the normalization of shipping lines, the exchange of cargoes seized during the September conflict, and the movement of persons and of trade between the two countries interrupted by the conflict could not be discussed with any seriousness, in spite of their urgency as Pakistan insisted on giving priority to Kashmir. Though it was agreed at this meeting, that more meetings should be held, the prospect of such meetings yielding fruitful results is rather dim.

It appears to be the purpose of the leaders of Pakistan to demonstrate to the world that the machinery for the discussion and settlement of problems provided for in the Agreement is of value and that settlement is possible only through the Security council or some other third party–a course to which India is not likely to agree.

The fact of the matter is that the barrier separating India and Pakistan is something deeper than the issue of Kashmir, of Muslim infiltrators into Assam, or of the mass exodus of Hindus from East Pakistan. These are merely symptoms of a basic and fundamental difference of an ideological character between the two States. During the discussions which led to the Indus Water Treaty of 1960 President Ayub Khan stated that the essential first step in promoting good neighbourly relations between the two countries was the settlement of the river water question. India agreed with him and concluded the Indus Water Treaty even though it meant a heavy financial payment from year to year for ten years and also depriving herself of a large share of water to which she had a legitimate claim. But the treaty was not followed by the promotion of any goodwill. It only led to Pakistan’s greater intransigence on the question of Kashmir and her collusion with China. President Ayub Khan and Bhutto now say that if the issue Kashmir is settled to their satisfaction a reign of peace will dawn. This, is however, a mere dream. The ideological differences which are at the root of the tension between the two States are bound to continue for a long time, irrespective of any agreements like the Tashkent Agreement.

Pakistan had its birth in the two-nation theory which its founders proclaimed–a theory which says that Hindus and Muslims cannot live as equal citizens of the same State. To her India is the land of Kaffirs which should be looked at with hatred and contempt and not be treated with feelings of friendship and good neighbourliness. No regime in Pakistan can last unless it is based on hatred of India and the multiplication of issues with India. It is from the idol-breakers like Mahmud of Ghazni, and plunderers like Timur, that the leaders of Pakistan draw their inspiration. They prefer the policy of Aurangazeb to that of Akbar. It is wonder that at Tashkent one of them thought it quite appropriate to describe his countrymen as the descendants of Babar, the Muslim conqueror of India. They feel that they even have a right to rule over the people of India, a rule which was unfortunately interrupted, according to them, by the conquest of the country by the British in the 18th century. They believe in a theocratic state in which non-Muslims can claim no place. This aim has already been achieved in West Pakistan and it is in the process of being achieved in East Pakistan creating for India the vast problem of refugees.

In 1947 Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan, stated that what he got was not the Pakistan of his dreams consisting of the whole of the Punjab Kashmir, Bengal and Assam but only a truncated State. His successors who have come to rule Pakistan hold the same view and it is their ambition to give reality to the original dream. This is at the basis of their claim to Kashmir and of the flow of Muslim infiltrators into Assam. To convert Assam into a Muslim majority State through this process and lay claim to it on the basis of the two-nation theory which led to the partition of India is their objective. Nothing is more humiliating to them than to see the fifty million Muslims in India accepting citizenship in a secular State. This was what Rahmat Ali, the originator and the inspirer of the idea of Pakistan said, in the manifesto he issued in 1933. Every state must have a myth to inspire its citizens and the myth on which the people of Pakistan are fed is the two-nation theory with all its implications and consequences. Any number of agreements like the Tashkent Agreement cannot persuade Pakistan to abandon this theory. And so long as it constitutes the basis of Pakistan’s policies there is no prospect of the tension between the two countries being eased.

Such a conclusion is rather depressing. But it is the only conclusion which has a rational basis. It alone is in conformity with the realities of the situation. India has therefore to reconcile herself to this situation where she has to live for generations perhaps with an unfriendly neighbour, and should take all precautions necessary to defend her national interests against the neighbour using open force, as was the case in September 1965. There is nothing strange or unprecedented in this. For more than a thousand years France and Germany have been hostile neighbours. There are many problems in history for which man has not been able to discover an effective solution. He has therefore been compelled to reconcile himself to live with such problems. It looks as if the problem of India’s relationship with Pakistan is one of this kind, in spite of the Tashkent Agreement. Political leaders in India who have been attaching exaggerated importance to this agreement will do well to revise their ideas, give up their complacency and realise that it will take a long long time for friendly relations to be established between the two countries.

Although the Agreement holds no near prospect of better relations between India and Pakistan it has produced one effect which has to be kept in mind. Whether this will prove beneficial or harmful in furtherance of India’s interests only time can answer. The Agreement has given to Soviet Russia a crucial place in the settlement of issues between India and Pakistan. At Tashkent Soviet Russia played the part of a mediator, for all practical purposes though India always abhorred the idea of a third party mediation in the settlement of her issue with Pakistan. It is to Soviet Russia that India will in future be looking for help in case Pakistan violates any of the clauses in the Tashkent Agreement. This is sure to give to Soviet Russia numerous opportunities to exercise pressure on India. What Soviet Russia is interested in is peace in the sub-continent and not in India maintaining her hold over Kashmir. She is also interested in drawing Pakistan away from China. If in furtherance of these interests she feels that India should come to some kind of settlement with Pakistan over Kashmir she will not hesitate to bring pressure for the purpose on the Indian Government. Will India be able to resist it? Perhaps not. In the past the United States and the other Western powers were interested in appeasing Pakistan at the cost of India. India was then in a position to manouvre and secure the help of Soviet Russia against the West. It was in this way that she induced Soviet Russia to exercise her veto in the Security Council whenever the question of Kashmir came up there for consideration. But today the position is different. Both Soviet Russia and the West are interested in appeasing Pakistan. The scope left for India to manouvre does no long exist. The Tashkent Agreement registers this growing influence of Soviet Russia in Indo-Pakistan affairs and there is a possibility of the two great powers of the world acting in concert in influencing India’s politics. It may therefore be not incorrect to conclude that the Agreement is responsible for limiting the freedom of action of India in her dealings with Pakistan and in shaping her international policies.