International Affairs: A Survey

By Prof. M. VENKATARANGAIYA, M.A.

All eyes are now turned on the crisis in the Middle East. The events in Lebanon show, in a general way, what the nature of this crisis is.

In this area of the world numerous conflicting forces are at work. There is no agreement among the concerned parties on the terms on the basis of which some reasonable reconciliation can be brought about. No one is in a position to indicate the nature of the ideal solution. Even in regard to the method to be adopted for bringing about any settlement of the issues involved, there is no agreement. While lip service is paid by every one to the need for adopting peaceful methods, resort to war is not ruled out. A war does not cease to be war simply because it is called a civil war.

In the view of very many people, what is most desirable in the Middle East is the creation of a strong Arab National State extending over the whole of the territory now comprised of Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt and the rest of North Africa. It is argued that this alone will satisfy the Arab national sentiment which is now too strong and too powerful to be resisted. Until this becomes an accomplished fact the crisis in the Middle East will continue. Every delay in its accomplishment will make the crisis more acute.

Like other peoples who think of their ancient glories and who hanker after their revival, the Arabs think of their past greatness–the greatness they achieved and enjoyed during the era of the Caliphate, when their imperial supremacy extended from the banks of the Indus to Spain and from the borders of the Caspian Sea to those of the Arabian Sea. A United Arab National State today appeals to them because it will be a revival, though in part, of their earlier empire. Nationalism is one of the strongest forces in modern history. Most of the new States, that came into existence in Europe, Africa, Asia and America in the period after the French Revolution, are the outcome of this force. And the formation of a United Arab State will be quite in harmony with it.

The Arabs base their case for such a State not merely on an emotion like this. They also bring forward a number of powerful arguments in support of it. Such a State will be politically strong unlike the existing States of Jordan, Iraq, Libya etc., whose independence is only nominal and who find it necessary to lean on the support of some great power or other to maintain themselves. It will not be the playground for the diplomatic activities of the West and the East. Such a State alone will be able to adopt a really non-alignment policy and save the area from the intrigues of outside powers. It will also succeed in the economic development of the whole of the Middle-East, raise the standard of living of the masses and put an end to the exploitation to which they have been subjected for more than a century by Western nations. The modernisation and the development of the economy of the area–and especially of its oil resources through their pooling under one government–will add to the material strength of the State and make it really viable. All this will give an impetus to Arab cultural revival.

This is the ideal of the Arab National State cherished by large numbers of the Arabic-speaking people in West Asia and North Africa. But because there are many who are opposed to the creation of such a State, a crisis has come into existence in the Middle East.

Among those who are opposed to it are the present holders of power. Those who are now ruling Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and other States know that it will result in their losing all power and in most of the benefits being reaped by President Nasser and Egypt. There are also other opponents of the idea. Israel is one of them. All the Arabs were against the establishment of what they regard an ‘alien’ State in their midst. The defeat they sustained at the hands of the Jewish State in 1948 has made them more bitter against it. Israel feels that so long as the Arab world is politically disunited, it has nothing to fear from it. A United Arab State will, however, mean its ruin. And unless its continued existence is guaranteed by some international agreement, it will oppose by all means the creation of such a State.

There is next the opposition from the West. Western powers like Britain, France and even the United States will lose heavily if a United Arab State becomes an accomplished fact. It is these powers that are now in control of the oil resources of the area and of the pipe lines which carry the oil from the places of production to the Mediterranean ports. They are afraid that they will lose this control, in the event of the establishment of a single State, as they will not be able to dictate terms to it just as they have been dictating terms to small States. The rulers of the new State may nationalise the oil industry, just as President Nasser nationalised the Suez Canal. In the cold war which they are carrying on with Soviet Russia they will suffer defeat if the flow ofoil from the Middle East is impeded in any way. It will mean from their standpoint the triumph–though indirectly–of Soviet strategy. It will also interfere with their communication with the countries of the Far East and Australasia.

Turkey is also opposed to the formation of such a State. For centuries the Turks ruled over the Arabs and it was only after the First World War that they lost their imperial hold. There is thus no love lost between the Turks and the Arabs. Moreover Turkey is terribly afraid of Soviet attack and the only course that can save her from becoming a Soviet satellite is help from the West. This is the reason why she accepted American aid and became a member of the NATO. Any weakening of the West in the Middle East will mean a weakening of Turkey and ultimately the loss of her independence. She cannot afford to adopt a policy of non-alignment.

France’s opposition in this connection is much stronger than that of Britain and the United States. It will mean her being ousted from Algeria and the rest of North Africa. After the discovery of oil resources in the Sahara, Algeria has become much more important to France than was the case previously. And it is in the Sahara that she now wants to carry on her atomic tests. She is, therefore, most unwilling to give up her hold over Algeria and to seeing Algeria form a part of the United Arab State.

All this is a part of the same old story. It is only in very rare cases that what is advantageous to one group of people, or to one group of States, is equally advantageous to other groups of people or of States. There is always a divergence of interests and no unilateral or simple solution can be discovered which will satisfy all the parties concerned. An Arab National State is of advantage, no doubt, to the masses of people and to certain governments under certain conditions. But it will gravely affect the interests and fortunes of certain sections of the Arabs, and of a number of States like Israel, Turkey, Britain, France and the United States. There are, of course, those who argue that, in a matter like this, it is only the interests of the majority of the Arabs that deserve consideration and that outsiders, like Turkey or Britain, have nothing to do in the matter. In the real world an argument like this has got its own limitations. The real world is an inter-dependent world. It is the product of history; and history has brought Israel, Turkey, Britain and France into the Middle East. Any solution which ignores this fact, and which denies to them any say in the settlement of the affairs of the area, is bound to be unrealistic. The solution should, while satisfying the legitimate interests of the Arabic-speaking peoples, enable States like Israel and Turkey to maintain their independence and guarantee to Britain and other Western States regular supplies of oil on which their very existence depends. It is because such a solution is not being aimed at–it is because the Arabs think exclusively of their abstract rights of self-determination and the other powers equally exclusively of their vested interests–that there is now a crisis in the Middle East.

Lebanon has been the scene of this crisis for some weeks. The government in power is being attacked by a certain section of the Lebanese people on the ground that it is pro-Western in its attitude and general policy. There is a revolt against it and a civil war has been going on. It is alleged by the government that the rebels are being aided by the United Arab Republic of which Colonel Nasser is the President, that there have been infiltrations into rebel ranks from Syria and a regular supply of arms to them from outside. It has not so far been able to suppress the rebellion which is growing in intensity from day to day. What the rebels have done is to use force and to resort to war to overthrow the government established by law. The government’s inability to suppress the revolt is due to its military weakness, and this perhaps is the result of its own army sympathising with the cause of the rebels. It can only be saved if it gets outside help, either from the United Nations or from Britain and the United States. But is it legal for the United Nations to intervene in a civil war? The Charter provides for intervention when a State is invaded from outside. This was what happened in Korea in 1950. The U. N. sent an army to defend South Korea because of the aggression of North Korea. In the view of the Secretary-General of the U. N., who recently visited Lebanon, there is no aggression against her by any outside country like the United Arabic Republic, as alleged by the Lebanese Government, and the utmost that the U. N. could do was to appoint a team of observers on the Lebanon-Syria borders to watch and report on any infiltrations that might take place. Active preparations were made at one stage, by both Britain and the United States, to help with their forces the weak government of Lebanon. But they have given up the attempt as they realised that any intervention by them might lead to Soviet intervention, either directly or indirectly through the United Arab Republic. The Lebanese Government is thus compelled to deal with the rebels without securing the help it wanted and there is every possibility that it might not come out victorious in the fight. There is every likelihood that, if things are left to themselves, an anti-Western government might come into power in Lebanon and that Lebanon might become allied–if not completely integrated–with Egypt and Syria. This will mean one more step in the direction of the formation of an Arab National State.

Another centre of crisis in the Middle East is Cyprus. It is an island with a mixed population of Greeks and Turks. The Greeks are in a majority and, on the principle of self-determination, they have been agitating for integration with Greece, although at no time in the past was Cyprus a part of the Greek State. Cyprus had long been ruled by Turkey until the British secured possession of it in the latter part of the nineteenth century. The Turkish minority in the island want self-determination for themselves, with its logical corollary of the partition of the island, just as India was partitioned by the British. They are opposed to being ruled by the Greeks. There is nothing wrong in the solution put forward by them. If self-determination is appropriate for the Greeks, it is equally appropriate for the Turks. Any solution, other than division, will not satisfy both parties and any such solution will ultimately have to rest on force. Because of the critical situation in the Middle East, the British do not want to give up completely their hold over the island. After the evacuation of Suez, this has become an important strategic centre for them. The Turkish Government is also opposed to Cyprus being handed over to Greece. The island is very near Turkey’s coast and it will be easy for any unfriendly power, which gains hold over it, to attack her. In the Utopian world, in which there is no war, it does not make much difference from the strategic point of view whether a piece of territory is in the possession of one State or another. But the world in which we are living is quite different. War is a reality and States have to be ready to defend themselves against aggression. To expect, therefore, either Britain or Turkey to reconcile themselves, without any kind of protest, to the absorption of Cyprus in Greece, is unrealistic.

To reconcile both the Greeks and the Turks in the island, and at the same time to safeguard their own strategic interests, the British have recently come forward with a scheme of settlement which will hold good for seven years. It is a settlement which recognises that the Greeks and the Turks are two different communities with separate interests and needs. It is too soon to say whether Greece and Turkey will accept it. It is, however, a solution which deserves consideration.

The third centre of crisis which affects the politics of the Middle East–and indirectly of all the Western States which are members of the NATO–is Algeria. Here ten million Arabs demand independence which the French are not willing to concede. There are one million French settlers in Algeria occupying today a privileged position, and an independent Algeria will reduce them to the status of a minority. They are much more determined in resisting the Algerian national movement than the French in metropolitan France. For the last four years a terribly costly war has been going on between France and the Algerian nationalists, but nothing but misery and suffering for both parties has come out of it. Five hundred thousand French forces have been bogged there. It has also been responsible for misunderstandings between France on one side and Tunisia and Morocco on the other. What happened recently was a rebellion of the commanders of the local French armies against their own national government in Paris and taking over control of Algerian affairs. They were disgusted with the weak and vacillating policy of the French Government and attributed to this the military failure in Algeria. They demanded that parliamentary government in France should be suspended and that all power should be handed over to General De Gaulle who had been at the head of the ‘Free French’ in the Second World War and ruled over the country for two years after it was freed from Hitler. This demand had to be conceded, as the only alternative to it was civil war. De Gaulle became the Prime Minister and Parliament agreed to go out of existence for a period of six months surrendering all authority to him. A sort of dictatorship has thus been established and the future alone will show whether it will disappear at the end of six months or will continue indefinitely.

A solution to the Algerian problem has been proposed by De Gaulle. It consists in extending to the Algerian Arabs the same rights of citizenship as the French possess. They will have equal rights of voting and holding offices–all this, however, subject to the one condition that Algeria continues to be a part of the French State. It does not look as if the Algerians will accept these terms. In the French State they will be in a minority as contrasted with more than forty million Frenchmen. What they want is an independent State of Algeria. They are opposed to any settlement which results in the loss of separate political nationhood and the acceptance of French citizenship.

This attitude is based on sentiment and emotion and it will be futile to discuss whether it is a right or reasonable attitude. If the French settlers in Algeria are sincerely prepared to give up their privileged position; there may be some chance of the Algerians revising their views on what membership in the French State will mean to them. In a shrinking world it is desirable to move in the direction of multi-national instead of uni-national States wherever this is possible. But it is only very rarely that events in the actual world take the best and the most desirable course. Desires and counter-desires act and react on each other and what actually happens is in many cases something which no one desired.

We, therefore, come to the conclusion that there is a crisis in the Middle East today, that it is the product of a variety of conflicting factors and that it is impossible to foresee in what way it will be ultimately resolved. There is every likelihood that the crisis will continue for a long time and that the final shape of events may be something of which no one can draw even a vague picture at present. The picture as it finally emerges–if at all there is anything like finality to the march of history–will not and cannot be fully and completely satisfactory to all the parties now involved in the crisis.

The crisis in the Middle East is only a part and a phase of the present-day world crisis resulting to a great extent from the cold war between the East as represented by Soviet Russia and the West as represented by the United States. Among the points at issue between them is which of them should control this region. The West is directly involved in the Middle East crisis and it is also positively involved. It is the Western States that are now in possession of its oil resources; it is with them that Turkey, Iran, Iraq–and Pakistan–are allied as members of the Baghdad Pact. Soviet Russia is interested in driving out the Western powers from this possession and this alliance. If she succeeds in this she will then be able to step into their place. She is not indifferent to the events that are happening in this area. She is not neutral. Hers is not a policy of non-intervention, although non-Intervention is a part of the doctrine of Panch Shila to which she has proclaimed her adherence. She has given active military and economic aid to Egypt and Syria. She has been carrying on a propaganda war against the West and in favour of those sections of the Arabs who are interested in driving out the Western powers. We generally forget that it is impossible to adhere to a policy of neutrality or non-alignment in the cold war, even if one does not enter into a military pact with one side or the other. The cold war is being fought not only with the help of military pacts, military and economic aid, but also with the help of world public opinion. If a so-called neutral State supports generally the United States in discussions on crucial international issues, it does, to that extent, depart from the policy of neutrality. Similarly if another State generally takes the same stand as Soviet Russia does in respect of the international issues which divide the East from the West, it has no right to say that it is not taking sides in the cold war. States like these need not be accused of hypocrisy or insincerity. It only shows that it is next to impossible to adopt a policy of strict non-alignment. By consistently supporting the Arab case against the West, Soviet Russia has been rendering great service to the Arabs who are behind the formation of a United Arab State. Whether, after the West is driven out, Soviet Russia will continue to the Arabs is more doubtful. If any lesson is to be drawn from past history, it looks fairly certain that she will try to step into the place vacated by the West and even succeed in such an attempt. It is against a ground like this that the significance of the execution of Imre Nagy, the great Hungarian patriot, has to be measured.

This execution has been one of the most sensational events of recent weeks. It was also a most barbarous deed. Soviet Russia played an important part in freeing Hungary, Rumania, Poland and Czecho-Slovakia etc., from the yoke of Hitler. But she freed them to make them a part of her own empire. Her sway over Eastern Europe is as imperialistic as Britain’s or France’s sway over their colonial dependencies. It is in addition far more terrible because it is wedded to a philosophy of materialism which denies the value and sacredness of individual human personality. Communism has been forced by her on the peoples of Eastern Europe at the point of the sword. The heaven on earth which she promised to create in these countries receded to a distant future. National slavery became the lot of countries like Hungary. The crime of Imre Nagy consisted in leading a movement to secure Hungarian national independence from the yoke of Soviet Russia. People rallied round him. He could have succeeded, had it not been, for the Soviet armies. The revolt was crushed and he was taken away to Rumania. Nothing was heard of him. Everyone thought that he was out of danger because of the assurance given by the pro-Soviet Kadar’s Government of Hungary, when he came out of the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest where he took refuge. Suddenly came a few days ago the news that he was tried and executed along with some of his colleagues and it was the Moscow Radio that first broadcast this news.

Why did the Soviet dictator Khrushchev do this, and that at a time when negotiations for the proposed Summit Conference of Heads of States were being carried on? The impression which this atrocious deed created in all the countries of the non-Communist world is that Soviet Russia has once more reverted to the policies of Stalin and to Stalinism so strongly condemned by Khrushchev himself sometime . He then proclaimed that there were different roads to Socialism and that each country was free to take the road which suited it best. The execution of Nagy was both preceded and followed by an ideological warfare by Soviet Russia and her satellites with Tito of Yugoslavia. He was accused of the crime of ‘Revisionism’–of swerving away from the principles of Marxism-Leninism, and he was refused the large economic aid which Soviet Russia promised sometime earlier on the additional ground that he was getting aid from the United States. In all this the People’s Republic of China supported Soviet Russia and clearly showed that she would not tolerate any division in the ranks of the Communist world, that every Communist State should stand by Soviet Russia whatever its effects be on her own national interests, and that the doctrine of “Different Roads to Socialism” as proclaimed by Khrushchev, or that of Mao, “Let a hundred flowers bloom” were not intended to be put into effect. The execution of Imre Nagy was meant to be a warning to all patriots in the satellite countries of Eastern Europe that they would meet with the same fate if they made any attempt towards national freedom. It was meant to demonstrate to the peoples of satellite countries that Soviet Russia had the strength necessary to put down the national movements aimed at the break-up of her empire.

It is in this situation that negotiations for a Summit Conference are going on. Neither party, however, is optimistic about the outcome of such a conference. Simply because the Heads of States meet for two or three days, nothing like a miracle is going to happen. The issues, which are responsible for the cold war and which could not be settled by the U. N. or by meetings of foreign ministers and of ambassadors, will not get automatically solved simply because the Heads of States meet in a conference. It may be that a dictator like Khrushchev can overrule the opinion of his advisers. This is impossible in countries like Britain, France and the United States where the Heads have to be guided by their colleagues and experts and where public opinion is strong and alive. In addition to this there has so far been no agreement on the issues to be discussed at the Summit. Those proposed by Soviet Russia have not satisfied the Western powers; and those proposed by the latter have been rejected by the former. The only subject which both parties think should be discussed is that of disarmament. But the question is whether in a conference extending over only two or three days any solution can be found for this problem.

Nothing short of the withdrawal of the Soviet Government from Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Sino-Soviet alliance will satisfy the West. Nothing short of the withdrawal of U. S. forces from the various bases in Asia, Europe and Africa and the dissolution of the NATO, and of the Baghdad and the SEATO Pacts will satisfy Soviet Russia. Under these circumstances there is no prospect of any kind of compromise between them. The tension is bound to continue until time changes the situation.

July 4, 1958