The Hindu-Muslim Problem

IT is but a trite saying that the future of India depends upon the proper solution of the Hindu-Muslim problem. The question has been prominently before the attention of the public for the last few years and a whole volume of literature has grown around it. The result has however been to confuse the issues more than ever and to leave the ordinary citizen more puzzled than before. I do not feel competent to offer a solution to this great and vastly complicated problem, but if in the course of this article, I have succeeded in clarifying the issues and presenting some of the arguments on either side, I feel that a valuable purpose would have been served. The Hindu-Muslim question has a two-fold aspect, the one mainly political, the other mainly social and religious. It is to a certain extent true that the two aspects cannot entirely be separated from each other, each impinging on the other, and to a large extent affecting the consideration of the other. But while the connection between the two aspects may be admitted, their essential difference also has to be recognized. The political aspect of the Hindu-Muslim problem relates to administrative questions. It deals with the problem of the relative shares which Hindus and Muhammadans should have in the government of the country. At one time, the question of representation in Legislative Councils may be emphasized. At another, the importance of the two interests being adequately safe-guarded in local bodies may come to the forefront. Again the issue may be directed particularly to recruitment to the public services, how it can be so regulated as to associate in the actual administration of the country members of both the communities. These are the principal issues on which conflict has risen and to a solution of which the best brains of the country are now dedicated. One factor regarding the political aspect of the Hindu-Muslim problem is that it is a problem which is capable of solution by the intellects of either community. It is the intelligentsia that is mainly concerned with this problem and it is they that should find the solution for it.

The question of representation of Muhammadans in the Legislative Councils is over two decades old. The need for special representation of Muslims has been recognized at one stage or other by the Government, by the Muslims and by the Hindu public. The Minto-Morley reforms brought to the forefront the need of recognizing the importance of Muslims as an important minority community in the country. At that time the claim of the Muslims was based not merely on the fact that they were an important minority, that by habits, religion and customs they were distinguished from the Hindus, but also on the ground that by their historical past, Muslims had a claim for special consideration. To-day the claim based on a historical past has practically been given up and leaders of public opinion, both Hindus and Muslims, should recognize this fact so that they may realize the advance that has been made in progressive thought during the last two decades. The next event of importance in the history of this question is the Lucknow pact, whereby representatives of Hindus and Muslims, sitting at a Round Table Conference, decided that Muhammadans should be returned to the future councils of the land through separate electorates and in certain proportions. This was a land-mark in the history of the political relationship between the two parties. Whatever opinions may now be held as to the wisdom of the Lucknow pact, whatever criticism be levelled at the agreement either by Muslim extremists on the one side, or by Hindu extremists on the other, the fact cannot be ignored that, by the free will of both the communities, a settlement such as that was come to and has been in force for the last decade.

After the introduction of the Reforms of 1920 and the system of dyarchic Government in the provinces, the question of representation in councils has come more seriously before the consideration of the public than ever. On the one hand, extreme Muslim opinion has been urging that the system of separate electorates should be perpetuated but that the numbers should be so fixed as to enable Muslims to be returned wherever they are in a majority, on the population basis, and wherever they are in a minority, in excess of their population and in conformity with their importance, as a separate religious community. Hindu opinion, particularly in Northern India, has on the other hand been entirely opposed to the system of separate electorates during the last quinquennium and no more severe condemnation has been uttered from platforms, either entirely Hindu or dominated by Hindu opinion, than the censure of the system of separate electorates. The unhappy fights and factions, riots and communal struggles between Hindus and Muslims in North India has given point to the Hindu demand, that unless separate electorates are abolished, there can be no communal peace in the land. The Hindu Maha Sabha, the militant Hindu organization brought into being largely to safeguard what were considered as the jeopardised Hindu interests in North India, took up this question of joint electorates and through the persistent vigorous propaganda of its leading members, has brought its members to consider as an axiomatic truth in politics that separate electorates are inconsistent with the establishment of democracy. Such a statement, reiterated on every occasion and uncontradicted seriously, has engendered in the people the honest and sincere belief that there can be no democratic advancement in the country unless the system of separate electorates goes and is replaced by a system of joint electorates. This volume of Hindu opinion against separate electorates became so great that Sir Sankaran Nair, a Hindu, moved a resolution in the Council of State that there should be no further political advance till Hindus and Muslims come to an agreement and give the go-bye to the system of separate electorates.

It is at this stage in the evolution of the consideration of the question that the all-parties conference met to frame a constitution for the future self-government of India. The question naturally arose, what should be the attitude of the all-parties conference with reference to Muslim representation in the future councils of the land. It is not my purpose to go into the details of the discussion that took place at that conference, especially as the veil of secrecy has been drawn, and quite rightly, over the discussions. It is however desirable that we should examine as dispassionately as possible, on its own merits, the question of separate and joint electorates for Muslims. Is the system of separate electorates the unmitigated evil that it has been suggested to be? Is the system of joint electorates a panacea for all the ills which the body politic is suffering from? Have separate electorates created hatred and bitterness? Is there justification for the criticism that men returned through separate electorates are militant Muslims unmindful of the feelings or the wishes of the Hindu public, or that Hindus similarly returned are contemptuous and unmindful of the interests of the Muslims? And how far is it really true that democratic institutions are incompatible with the system of separate electorates? One has only to go through the proceedings either of the Legislative Assembly or of the Provincial Councils to realize how far from truth is the charge that representatives of Hindus and Muslims returned by a system of separate electorates are ranged in opposing and armed camps against each other. Men of light and leading from either community have worked in harmonious co-operation for the good of both the communities and the advancement of the country. Men like Mahammad Ali Jinnah, Mr. Mahammad Yakoob, Pandit Motilal Nehru and Mr. Jayakar, may be returned through a joint or a separate electorate, but they will never cease to be Indians first and last. Neither will certain individuals, howsoever returned, cease to ally themselves with the forces of reaction and work against the real interests of the country. In the Provincial Councils, practically in all provinces, Muslims have not remained aloof as a party, but have mixed their votes freely with those of the Hindus, expect on exceedingly rare occasions. The proceedings of the Assembly and the Councils reveal the extraordinary fact that, whatever may be happening outside, however much bitterness may be given expression to, whether at the meetings of the Muslim League or of the Hindu Maha Sabha, within the Councils there has been no indication of animosity between the two communities. It seems to me therefore rather beside the mark to charge the system of separate electorates with the evil of inducing or promoting communal antagonism, nor is there any point in suggesting that democracies are incompatible with the system of separate electorates. A priori reasons and theoretical opinions cannot stand the test of practical experience and do not lead us very far in the solution of constitutional problems. The question of Government, the mechanism of Government, is a very human question and requires not the fantastic theories of the arm-chair politician and the dry-as-dust professor of political science, but it requires the sympathetic understanding of men of the world. Nor have democracies developed at various times and in different countries exactly in the same manner. Constitutions, they say, cannot be shaped after a pattern and patented for the use of different nations. The obvious fallacy of the statement that there are certain fundamental principles which must be accepted by democracies is revealed when one studies the nature of the constitutions of the different democratic countries. Great Britain and. France, America and Italy, furnish examples of how democracies can differ from each other.

Nor am I convinced that joint electorates will be the boon to the harassed Indian politician that it is claimed to be. If one may speak from experience, I should like to point out the unhappy experience of the province of Madras. In Madras, so far as the Local Legislative Council is concerned, both the systems are working: the system of separate electorates for Muhammadans and Christians, and the system of joint electorates for Brahmins and non-brahmins. It is a patent fact, as instructive as it is true, that separate electorates for these two communities have not resulted in any adverse effects. The Muhammadan representatives are divided into political groups in the Council, and each group has attached itself to a larger body of Hindus having the same political opinion. There is absolutely no indication within the Council that Muslims have entered through a special and separate electorate. The general condition in the province also shows that separate electorates do not breed communal discord or lead to communal riots. The only serious trouble in this province during the last decade was the unhappy Mopla rebellion, and whatever else may have been the reason for that rebellion, none would seriously suggest that the system of electorates had anything to do with that conflagration. If one turns one's attention to the separate electorates for Christians, one finds that the case against such electorates is even poorer than in the case of Muslims. Indian Christians, and Hindus and Muslims, have lived and are living in this province in the utmost amity and friendship and there has never been an occasion in the Legislative Council or elsewhere when the fact has been discordantly brought to the notice of the public that Indian Christians are the representatives of their own community and not of the general public.

On the other hand, what a picture is offered to us of the results of the working of joint electorates! I have no desire to go into the question of Brahmin and Non-brahmin difficulties on this occasion, to throw blame either on the one or on the other section, or even to examine the nature of the conflict that is dividing two sections of the same Hindu population. It may be based on social grounds. It may have its roots in religious antagonisms. It may be even due solely to the unhealthy competition for the loaves and fishes of office. But whatever its nature, none may gainsay the fact that to-day, after nearly 10 years of joint electorates, Brahmins and Non-brahmins, instead of being thrown together so as to realise, by understanding, their ambitions and profiting by their joint experience, are farther apart from each other than at the beginning of the decade. It is only the blind person, impervious to the voice of reason, that can say that the two communities have a happier and a better understanding now than in 1918, when Mr. Montagu and Lord Chelmsford declaimed against communal electorates. It is not suggested that joint electorates are the cause of the increasing friction, though it must be confessed that there is a school of thought which thinks that such is indeed the case. It is however sufficient for the purpose of this article to state as a matter of historical fact that in Madras, while separate electorates have not tended to increase the racial or religious or creedal animosities, joint electorates have equally failed to bring about sectarian harmony and communal fellow-feeling.

If, therefore, separate electorates do not militate against democratic forms of Government, and if they are not calculated either to induce or to increase communal bitterness, there is no case made out for their abolition. The advantages of joint electorates, with reservation of seats for Muslims, are not so great as to make the creation of joint electorates a fetish and a necessary preliminary to the introduction of full Responsible Government. The ideal state of affairs is undoubtedly where there are no communal differences, no creedal distinctions and religious animosities of any kind. In such a state of affairs, there will be no room either for separate electorates or even for joint electorates with reservation of seats to certain communities. The very fact that there is none in this country who is prepared to suggest at present, as a matter of practical politics, the establishment of free electorates on identical electoral qualifications to all persons, and the abolition of all special electorates and every kind of class representation—which is the only logical position that can be maintained—this very fact completely proves the need for taking into consideration the practical difficulties that lie in the way of the solution of constitutional problems. I feel that Hindus need not insist on the abolition of separate electorates and need not force joint electorates on those communities which are unwilling to come into the scheme of joint electorates, but must leave those classes which are at present returned by separate electorates free to make their choice, and I feel fairly sanguine that the time is not far off when, in their own interests, these classes would come forward with a proposal for the abolition of separate electorates. It will then be possible to discuss the question on freer and more equal terms than it seems to be possible at present. I have learnt from my tour in North India and from my experience, specially in the two southern provinces, that the Muslims are not really prepared to give up the system of separate electorates. They feel that if they have to give it up, it must be only because of the extreme pressure of Hindu opinion against these electorates. It is owing to the feeling that the Muslims are not really convinced of the evils of separate electorates, that the proposal for the abolition of separate electorates has been coupled by the most reasonable of Muhammadans with certain 'conditions'. If Hindus recognize this essential factor, they will not question the genuineness of those who suggest these conditions and will be in a better frame of mind to discuss the need for accepting these conditions. Even a leader like Mr. Mahammad Ali Jinnah frankly confessed that he had not been converted to the view that separate electorates are an evil in themselves, and that, if Hindu opinion insists on joint electorates, they ought to accept certain concomitant conditions which should form a feature of such joint electorates. It does not advance the case very far if we turn round and say that Hindus are being asked to pay a price for the abolition of separate electorates, or that Muslims are laying down 'conditions' which are unreasonable in their nature. The plain position is merely this: Muslims have at present separate electorates; they feel no need for a change in that direction. Hindus want that they should give them up in favour of joint electorates. Are they merely to accept what the Hindus want, or should they try to get some advantage in view of what they conceive to be a disadvantage involved in the giving up of separate electorates?

Having seen the position taken up by the Muslims, let us try and examine those conditions which the Muslims have put forward as a necessary preliminary to the abandonment of separate electorates. The proposals of the Calcutta Muslim League are (1) that the same system of Government should be introduced in the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan as is prevailing in other parts of India (2) That Sindh should be made a separate province and should come under the general scheme of reforms granted to all provinces and (3) that the reservation of seats in joint electorates should be proportional to the population of the two communities, provided that representation over the population basis may be given to minority communities on a mutually understood basis, in those provinces in which any of the two communities is in a minority. It seems to me that these so-called conditions, if examined apart from the fact that they are put forward as preliminaries to the acceptance of the scheme of joint electorates, are in themselves unexceptional. On what ground, I ask, can reforms be withheld from the Frontier Province? Every Indian politician of any shade of politics has agitated for the abolition of the system of classifying tracts as agency tracts, of classifying areas as scheduled districts, and of classifying provinces as ward provinces. It is unfortunately true that in 1923 the Legislative Assembly vetoed the proposal for the introduction of reforms in the North-West Frontier Province, an indefensible and undefended decision of the House, but last year the same Assembly passed without any dissentient the proposal that the Frontier Province should come under the scheme of reforms. How does it lie to-day within the mouth of anyone, Hindu or Muslim, who claims any political sagacity or adherence to political democratic principles, to state that the Frontier Provinces should be treated as ward provinces? On what basis does the Hindu Maha Sabha justify its opinion that the reforms should not be introduced into these provinces? It may be possible for a non-political body which is obsessed by a Muslim invasion and conjures up a bloody vision of a Muslim corridor from Constantinople to Karachi, it may be possible for such a body to raise these objections. But no one with an iota of political sagacity could seriously take exception to the proposition that reforms ought to be introduced into the North-West Frontier Province and Baluchistan.

Let us take again the second condition which has been put forward by the Muslim League—the separation of Sindh from the rest of the Bombay Presidency. The agitation for the separation of this province has gone on for the last 15 years at least, and it is clear that at one stage the protagonists in this agitation were Hindus and not Muslims. The very fact that the Congress has treated Sindh as a separate province, and in its constitution recognized it as a separate province and given it a special representative, proves beyond all doubt that an All India Political body which is predominantly Hindu so far from taking objection to the separation of Sindh, wanted such a separation and gave effect to it in the only manner in which it could possibly give effect to such a decision, that is by recognizing such separation in its constitution. Geographically speaking, the case for the separation of Sindh is complete and irrefutable. Following the ordinary canons of all democratic institutions, it is equally clear, that the Muslim population, the overwhelmingly predominant population of Sindh, being in favour of such separation, an impregnable case is made out for the carving out of Sindh as a separate province. The only objection that has been urged against separation is that financially Sindh cannot bear the burden. It seems to me that this is too thin an argument, particularly when the vast majority of the population are willing to undertake the burden and insist on such separation, and we must conclude that this is equally a condition which on its merits is acceptable to all reasonable men.

The third condition requires a little more careful consideration, and I am not at all certain whether that condition is really justified on its merits. The position stated by the third condition is that in any province where the Muhammadans are in a majority, they ought to have reservation of seats in joint electorates in proportion to their population. There does not seem to me any objection to reservation of seats in a province where the community is numerically larger than the community of Hindus. Such a position can be defended on two grounds. In the first place, except on the basis of adult franchise, it is obvious that the criterion of the strength of the population has no bearing on the relative proportion of the two communities in an electorate constituted on the basis of property qualifications. It is urged that the Muslims as a community are poorer than the Hindus and that, therefore, in any electorate where property qualifications form a test, their numbers cannot be in proportion to their population. Even if adult franchise were to form the basis of the electorates, it is obvious, having regard to the special customs and manners of the Muslims, particularly the Purdah, that where men and women are equally enfranchised, as we trust they will be in all provinces, the Muslims are under a handicap in as much as the women voters of that community cannot be expected to poll in as large numbers as those of other communities. Apart from this, there is the allegation which has been repeatedly made by different communities at different times and which must weigh in the consideration of the question, that many of the Muslims in the Majority provinces are under the control of landlords or money-lenders who are in most cases Hindus. I am therefore willing to recognize the need for reservation even in Majority provinces. Then the question arises whether such reservation should be in proportion to the population. I understand by reservation of seats for a community the safeguarding of a minimum strength to a community, and not the acquisition of the maximum strength by means of such reservation. If in the Punjab, for example, the population of the two communities were in the proportion of 55 to 45, and if reservation of seats is granted to Muslims, the idea that would naturally occur to one's mind is that the Muslims will be guaranteed 40 or 45 seats out of every 100 seats, and that thereafter they should contest and get as many more seats as possible through joint electorates. But the reservation on the population basis means that they ought to get at least 55 seats which they are entitled to on a population basis. It seems to me that such a position cannot be entirely fair to the other communities. It will lead to an obvious anomaly unless the system of reservation is not merely granted to the Muslim community but is also forced against its desire on the Hindu Community. If the reservation is granted only to the Muslims in the Punjab, the anomaly may arise that not only are Muslims guaranteed 55 seats but they are entitled to fight forand obtain even more seats. There is no corresponding privilege to the Hindus. This seems to me the really fundamental weak point in the case of the Muslims. To give a permanent majority to any community, as a community, is not essentially sound. But having said that, I must I again express my opinion that it is essentially a case for mutual negotiations and mutual adjustments, and that Hindu leaders and Muslim leaders should sit together and calmly consider this particular aspect of the proposition, and either induce Muslims to revise their views on this question or find some via media acceptable to both parties. If an agreement is otherwise possible on essential points, if this is the only obstacle in the way of drawing up an agreed constitution for the country, I am prepared to suggest that any sacrifice may be made for arriving at such a consummation. The question of mutual adjustments between the communities where either the Muslims or Hindus are in a minority, does not raise many difficulties. It is obvious that such mutual adjustments as between the provinces cannot be based merely on an arithmetical ratio. The scope that the minority community will have on the extended basis to influence the decision of the council, and the manner in which reasonable adjustments are made in different provinces, will all be considered in settling the question of a how minority should be treated.

Having so far dealt with the question of representation in the councils, I should like to just mention that the Muslim .proposal includes the reservation of seats in the Legislative Assembly to the extent of a third of the total strength of the Assembly. It is not necessary to dilate on this point. The only question that may arise is whether the proportion is not unduly high, and I am certain that if the question of provincial reservations is satisfactorily settled, the other question will not lead to a dead-lock.

I should like to refer to one question which has caused not a little searching of heart and misapprehension among the leaders of both Hindus and Muslims. Supposing an agreement is reached, whereby in provinces where the majority of the people are Muslims, representation is given to the two communities on the basis of population and through joint electorates, the Hindu fear seems to be that in such a case there is a danger of the interests of the Hindus being disregarded and the Hindu population being subjected to unfair treatment. It is urged that a Muslim majority in the Legislative Council will lead to a purely Muslim ministry which will play into the hands of extreme Muslims and harass the Hindu portion of the population. That is the danger which some of the Hindu leaders in Sindh are afraid of. It is the same fear that is given expression to by Hindus or Sikhs in the Punjab and, though less frequently, by the Hindus of Bengal. On the other hand, Muslims in most provinces where they are in a minority and where the Hindus are bound to be in a majority, are equally apprehensive that their interests will be jeopardized and their community will be penalized in many ways by the coming into existence of councils with full power and with a preponderating Hindu element. There is no purpose gained in ignoring the fact that these apprehensions do exist in the minds of the members' of either community. The only question now is how these apprehensions sometimes lead the foremost leaders among the two communities with undoubted political bias in favour of progress and reform, to take a somewhat reactionary view and give expression to opinions which they would never otherwise have countenanced. It was when he was obsessed with some such feeling that Lala Lajpat Rai, one of the most advanced Indian politicians, exclaimed that he would have the present system rather than further political advancement in the Punjab. There are Hindu and Muslim leaders who I have occasionally given public expression to these counsels of despair. It seems to me that, far from being frightened by these possible difficulties, it is our duty to take this into consideration and find ways and means by which we can remove such difficulties.

Taking the Hindu and Muslim communities as the two communities in practically all the provinces, important not merely on account of their population or political status but also on account of the possibilities of religious and social conflicts between the two, we can well devise a means by which both the Hindus and the Muslims, wherever they are in a minority may feel perfectly safe. Whatever power is granted to the legislature, there should be an unwritten convention clearly and definitely established, that in all these provinces a certain number of ministerships ought to go to the representatives of the minority community. What that number should be depends on the conditions of each province. An important consideration will be the relative strength of the two communities. But this can be firmly stated, that in every province there ought to be some representatives on the Government body—the cabinet—of the Minority community, whether it is Hindu or Muslim. The result of it will be that the principle of joint responsibility in the cabinet being recognized, there will be an inevitable tendency for the cabinet not to play into the hands of the extreme section of the other party. Such a position in no way offends constitutional proprieties, as such arrangements are accepted and practised in other dominions and countries. Taking the case of Canada which has full responsible Government, we find that in forming the new cabinet and in making recommendations to the Governor-General for appointments to ministerial office, the Premier has much less freedom of choice than is the case at Westminster. Mr. Edward Porritt in his book 'Evolution of the Dominion of Canada' says: "In considering the claims of the leaders of the political party at Ottawa and at the provincial capitals, the new Premier must also regard (1) the claims of French Canada; (2) the claims of the other eight provinces; (3) the claims of the English- speaking population of Quebec; and (4) the claims of the Roman Catholic population of the Dominion that is not French. Three Cabinet or Ministerial offices are usually assigned to French Canada. The same number as a rule go to Ontario. At least one cabinet office must, by usage, be assigned to each of the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, and British Columbia; and since the appointment of Edward Kenny of Nova Scotia, in 1869, as representative of the English-speaking Catholics, no cabinet has been long without a representative of the English-speaking Roman Catholic church. Distribution of cabinet offices based on geographical considerations, and on claims of race; religion, and special financial and material interests, is an innovation on the usages and traditions of cabinets at Westminster. The innovation has been developed by the differing conditions of Canada and the United Kingdom; by the operation of the federal principle; and by the need for conciliating assertive interests—racial and religious—which is as old in Canadian politics as the ill-assorted legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada of 1841-1867." It is unnecessary to go into further details as to how racial and religious antagonism in Canada has been attempted to be conciliated. In the appointment of the speaker and the deputy speaker of the House of Parliament and in many other ways, the principle is followed of trying to give to the two races, Anglo-Saxon and French, a certain balance of power which goes to the working of a smooth and harmonious constitution. The Tribune of Winnipeg in the year 1927 remarked: "Sir Wilfred Laurier is not the only sinner. Practically every party leader in Canada managed Quebec as Sir Wilfred has managed that province. A little more than an equal division of the spoils of office, concessions here and concessions there to race and creed, and there you have the statesmanship of Canadian premiers of both Conservative and Liberal stripe". That is the way, as good as anything thought of, for solving the Hindu-Muslim problem in India on the political side. The article has extended to such lengths already that it is impossible to examine the social and religious side of the problem. I hope to have the pleasure, in a subsequent issue, of dealing with them.