Text 159

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation of Text 159:

स च द्रव्यादिभ्यः पदार्थान्तरं भाववल्लक्षणभेदात् । यथा भावस्य द्रव्यत्वादीनां स्वाधारेषु आत्मानुरूपप्रत्ययकर्तृत्वात् स्वाश्रयादिभ्यः परस्परतश्चार्थान्तरभावः तथा समवायस्यापि पञ्चसु पदार्थेष्विहेतिप्रत्ययदर्शनात् तेभ्यः पदार्थान्तरत्वम् इति । न च सम्योगवन् नानात्वं भाववल्लिङ्गाविशेषात् विशेषलिङ्गाभावाच्च तस्माद् भाववत् सर्वत्रैकः समवाय इति ॥ १५९ ॥

sa ca dravyādibhyaḥ padārthāntaraṃ bhāvavallakṣaṇabhedāt | yathā bhāvasya dravyatvādīnāṃ svādhāreṣu ātmānurūpapratyayakartṛtvāt svāśrayādibhyaḥ parasparataścārthāntarabhāvaḥ tathā samavāyasyāpi pañcasu padārtheṣvihetipratyayadarśanāt tebhyaḥ padārthāntaratvam iti | na ca samyogavan nānātvaṃ bhāvavalliṅgāviśeṣāt viśeṣaliṅgābhāvācca tasmād bhāvavat sarvatraikaḥ samavāya iti || 159 ||

Text (159): Inherence is a category distinct from, Substance and the rest; as like ‘being’, it has a character different from “these. That is to say, as in the case of ‘being’ we find that bringing about notions of itself in regard to the substrates of the classes of ‘substance’ and the rest, it differs from its substrates, as also from other classes,—so also Inherence, being the cause of the notion that ‘this subsists in that,’ with regard io the other five categories, must be regarded as something different from these. Nor is there a multiplicity of Inherences, as there is of Conjunctions; because like ‘being’, Inherence has the same distinguishing feature, and also because there are no reasons for making distinctions in regard to it; for these reasons Inherence, like ‘being’, must be regarded as one only.

Commentary: The Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara.

(English rendering of Śrīdhara’s commentary called Nyāyakandalī or Nyāyakaṇḍalī from the 10th century)

Having thus proved the existence of Inherence, the author proceeds to show that it is distinct from the other categories:—By ‘bhāva’ the community of ‘Being’ is meant; the mention of ‘substance &c.’ includes the classes of ‘Quality’ &c. In the case of ‘Being’ we find that it brings about notions akin to itself,—such for instance as ‘this is’—with regard to its substrates, in the shape of substances, qualities and actions; similarly the class of ‘substance,’ brings about the idea of substance with regard to its substrates, Substances; the class of ‘Quality’ gives rise to notions of quality in regard to its substrates. Qualities; similarly the class of Action brings about notions of itself with reference to its substrates, Actions. And just as bringing about these notions, the classes of ‘Being,’ ‘substance’ &c, are regarded as different from one another, and also from their respective substrates,—in the same manner, in the case of Inherence also, we find that it gives rise to the idea that ‘this subsists in that,’ in regard to all the other five categories; and as such it cannot but be regarded as something different from these latter.

As regards the question as to whether Inherence is one or many, the author says—It has no multiplicity, as Conjunction has; just as in the case of ‘Being’ we find that there is no difference in the various notions of ‘being,’ so, in the same manner, wé do not find any difference in the various notions of Inherence that we have; nor have we any proof for regarding Inherence as many; and for these reasons we conclude that Inherence is one only.