Sutra 2.3.32

32. There would result permanent consciousness or non-consciousness, or else limitative restriction to either.

On the other view, i.e. on the view of the Self being omnipresent and mere knowledge, it would follow either that consciousness and also non-consciousness would permanently take place together everywhere; or else that there would be definite permanent restriction to either of the two, i.e. either permanent consciousness or permanent non-consciousness.—If the omnipresent Self, consisting of mere knowledge only, were the cause of all that actual consciousness and non-consciousness on the part of Selfs which takes place in the world, it might be conceived either as the cause of both—i.e. consciousness and non-consciousness—and this would mean that there is everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness and non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness of anything; and if it were the cause of non-consciousness only, there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. On our view, on the other hand, the actually perceived distribution of consciousness and non-consciousness explains itself, since we hold the Self to abide within bodies only, so that naturally consciousness takes place there only, not anywhere else.—The view, finally (held by the Vaiśeshikas), of the consciousness of the Self depending on its organs (mind, senses, etc.; while the omnipresent Self is, apart from those organs, non-sentient, jaḍa), results in the same difficulties as the view criticised above; for as all the Selfs are omnipresent they are in permanent conjunction with all organs; and moreover it would follow that the adṛshṭas (due to the actions of the different bodies) could not thus be held apart (but would cling to all Selfs, each of which is in contact with all bodies).

Here terminates the adhikaraṇa of 'the knower.'