Brahma-Sūtra 2.1.17

English of translation of Brahmasutra 2.1.17 by Roma Bose:

“If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is non-existent, (the effect is) not (existent prior to creation) (we reply:) no, (such a designation is) on account of a different attribute, this is known from the complementary text, from reasoning and from another text.”

Nimbārka’s commentary (Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha):

“If it be objected that on account of the designation of what is non-existent” in the passage: “The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning” (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 3.19.1^[1]), the effect does not exist prior to creation,—

(We reply:) “no”. There is such a designation because of the subtleness (of the world prior to creation). Whence is this known? “From the complementary passage,” viz. “That was existent’ (Chānd. 3.19.1^[2]); “from the reasoning”, viz. if a previously nonexistent effect does indeed arise, why is there no origin of a barley-sprout from fire? “and from another text”, viz. ‘The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.1^[3]).

Śrīnivāsa’s commentary (Vedānta-kaustubha)

If it be objected: The doctrine of pre-existent effect is not a more reasonable one. Why? On account of the designation of its non-existence prior to creation, in the text: “The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning” (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 3.19.1),—

(We reply:) “no”, why? Because there is “such a designation” “on account of a different attribute”. That is, the attribute of having name and form unmanifest is different from the attribute of having name and form manifest; and it is because of this different attribute that the world is designated thus in the text: “The non-existent, verily, was this in the beginning” (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 3.19.1), but is never denoted to be non-existent by nature.

If it be asked: Whence is this known? We reply: ‘From the complementary passage.’ For the complementary passage: “That was existent” (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 3.19.1), refers to the topic of our discussion, viz. the world, by the term ‘that’ and from this it is known that the term ‘non-existent’ in the beginning denotes the subtle reality with name and form unmanifest.

The author states another reason for the pre-existence of the effect, viz.: “From reasoning”. That is, the existence of the effect is ascertained from reason as well. To the question: What is that reason whereby the existence of the effect is ascertained? We reply: On our view, names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest, are all real, on account of being perceived. An agent, viz. a potter, makes a pot out of a lump of day that is existent. Here, like the lump of clay, the existence of the pot, too, is known from direct perception. Hence, the activity of the agent, too, is not useless. If it be objected that as the pot already exists, like the lump of clay, the activity of the agent has no meaning,—(we reply:) not so, since its purpose is simply manifestation. The pot which was unmanifest before is made manifest; hence the activity of the agent is not useless. The names and forms, mentioned in the Veda, are used just as they were before.^[4] It should he known that, on our view, the conventional usage of names and forms is not unprecedented. The origin of a non-existent effect, on the other hand, does not fit in, since the origin of a barley-sprout from fire is never seen. It cannot be said that although fire has no power of producing such an effect, it has, nonetheless, the power of producing sparks,—for, in an effect, produced from gold and the rest of a known weight, a different weight is never found.^[5] Like vise, the sparks of fire, which are its evolutes and known through the evidence of direct perception, are perceived by all,—there being no evidence for the imaginary doctrine of a power producing unprecedented objects. Hence the doctrine of a non-existent effect^[6] is unreasonable. The activity of the agent, too, is meaningless on this view, since the activities of an agent in connection with the making of a pot,—viz. digging earth, pounding it, placing it and so on,—all relate to the material cause. In the absence of the material cause, with regard to what should the agent act, seeing that the effect, viz. the pot and the rest, are not produced then, and that, in that case, the consequence will be the origin of the pot through more activity, even in the absence of the lump of clay? All this should be considered by the wise.

The manifold controversies with regard to this point are not mentioned here for fear of unduly tiring those who desire for release. In the case under discussion, on the other hand, since Brahman possesses infinite powers, everything is unobjectionable.

The author states once more another reason for the existence of the effect, thus: “And from another text”. The other text is the text aptly teaching the pre-existence of the effect, viz.: ‘“The existent alone, my dear, was this in the beginning”’ (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 6.2.1), which is other than the above quoted text, viz.: “The non-existent, verily, was the beginning” (Chāndogya-upaniṣad 3.19.1). Because of this too, it is the (pre-) existent effect alone that originates,—this is the sense.

Comparative views:

Comparative views of Śaṅkara, Bhāskara and Baladeva:

They break this sūtra into two different sūtras, viz. “Asadvyapadeśāt.... vākya-śeṣāt” and “Yukteḥ śabdāntarāc ca”.^[7] Interpretation same.

Footnotes and references:

[1]:

Quoted by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja and Bhāskara Correct quotation: “Asad eva”. Vide Chāndogya-upaniṣad 3.19.1, p. 175.

[2]:

Quoted by Śaṅkara and Bhāskara.

[3]:

Quoted by Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Bhāskara and Baladeva.

[4]:

Vide Vedānta-kaustubha 1.3.28-30.

[5]:

I.e. the weight of the gold ear-ring is the same as that of the gold from which it is made. This shows that the cause and the effect are non-different.

[6]:

Asat-kārya-vāda.

[7]:

Brahma-sūtras (Śaṅkara’s commentary) 2.1.17 and 18, p. 476; Brahma-sūtras (Bhāskara’s Commentary) 2.1.17 and 18. 100, 101; Govinda-bhāṣya 2.1.17 and 18.