Verse 3268-3269

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

किञ्चाकारणमेवेदमुक्तमाज्ञा (मज्ञ?) प्रभावि(षि?)तम् ।
केशरोमाणि यावन्ति कस्मानि ज्ञातुमर्हति ॥ ३२६८ ॥
यस्मान्निर्मलनिष्कम्पज्ञानदीपेन कश्चन ।
द्योतिताखिलवस्तुः स्यादित्यत्रोक्तं न बाधकम् ॥ ३२६९ ॥

kiñcākāraṇamevedamuktamājñā (majña?) prabhāvi(ṣi?)tam |
keśaromāṇi yāvanti kasmāni jñātumarhati || 3268 ||
yasmānnirmalaniṣkampajñānadīpena kaścana |
dyotitākhilavastuḥ syādityatroktaṃ na bādhakam || 3269 ||

Further, what has been asserted—as to the impossibility of any one knowing all hairs and nails, etc.—is without any basis, due entirely to ignorance; because it is quite possible that there may be some one for whom all things become manifested by the clear and unflinching light of knowledge and no reason has been adduced against such possibility.—(3268-3269)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Under Text 3129 et seq. it has been asserted by the Opponent that “the term ‘all’ is used in reference to the context”,—and on this several alternatives have been put forward and many objections urged (against the idea of the All-knowing, Omniscient, Person).

But there is no room for all this; because we do not admit of any such idea. When we postulate the Omniscient Person, we do not mean that He knows all possible things, even those other than Dharma. And the objections urged would be applicable to only such an idea. In fact, the ‘Omniscient Person’ postulated by us is one whose mind has become freed from all aberrations and afflictions, obstacles to knowledge and impurities,—by virtue of which Dharma and other things all become revealed to his consciousness. Against such a view you have not put forward a single argument.

Again, it has been argued by the Opponent under Text 3137 that—“In one body alone, there are so many atoms, etc. etc.—and who can know all these?—etc. etc.”—This is a mere assertion, made without any proof; and nothing can be proved by a mere assertion without reasons in support of it.—Because in this way, all things would be established for all men.

With a view to all this, the Author makes the following statement:—[see verses 3268-3269 above]

‘Without any basis’—that in support of which the three-factored Probans is not available.

The knowledge is ‘clear’, free from impurities, and aberrations obstructing the vision of things to be known it is ‘unflinching’, not shaken by the gusts of passion, etc.—The knowledge is spoken of as ‘light’, because it illumines things; all things—Dharma, etc.—become ‘manifested’—made known. The irregular compounding is done on the strength of implication.

‘No reason has been adduced, etc, etc.’—i.e. any proof to the contrary.—It is not only that no proof has been adduced; in fact, there can be no proof to the contrary.

(A) For instance, there can be no Perception annulling the idea of the Omniscient Person; because He is not amenable to that Means of Cognition. It is only when a thing is amenable to Perception that, if it is cognised as something contrary to its well-known form, such cognition is annulled by Perception; e.g. when Sound is cognised as inaudible, this Cognition is annulled by the perception of audibility. There can be no such annulment in a case where Perception is not applicable at all. As a matter of fact, the Cognitions appearing in the ‘Chain’ of other people are never amenable to perception by one who is not omniscient; and it could be only if such were the case, that the assertion of Omniscience could be annulled by Perception. And the reason for this inapplicability of Perception lies in the fact that all men are possessed of limited powers of vision. If such Cognitions were amenable to Perception by any one, that person himself would be omniscient; and hence Omniscience could not be denied.

The following might be urged—“We do not mean that it is by being applied to the Omniscient Person that Perception proves His non-existence,—but as being inapplicable to it. That is, when Perception is not applicable to a certain thing, it proves the non-existence of that thing; e.g. in the case of the ‘Hare’s Horns In a case where Perception does apply, the thing perceived does exist; as in the case of things like the Sword. As regards the Omniscient Person, Perception has never been found to be applicable; hence, from this inapplicability of Perception it is inferred that the Person does not exist”.

This is entirely irrelevant. Because the conclusion that- is deduced from the inapplicability of Perception cannot be said to have been brought about by Perception; because presence (applicability) and absence (non-applicability) cannot co-exist in the same thing. Further, the inapplicability of Perception is not invariably concomitant with non-existence of the thing concerned; and it is only if it were so that the non-existence could be inferred from inapplicability of Perception; because even when a thing is there, Perception is found to be inapplicable, if the thing is hidden or remote, etc.

The following might be urged—“We do not say that the inapplicability of Perception proves non-existence; all that we mean is that when the Perception is inoperative, it proves the non-existence”.

This is a mere change in. the wording of your statement; there is no difference in the meaning; mere change of words cannot alter facts; or else there would be incongruities.—Because ‘cessation’, or ‘not-operating’ of a thing means the denial or negation of existence; the same meaning is also expressed by the word ‘become inoperative’, ‘ceased’; the only difference is that while one (cessation) denies other things and expresses the one thing meant, the other (‘ceased’) expresses the same thing without denying other things. In reality, both terms express the ‘non-existence’ of the thing concerned. What again is non-existent cannot be a cause; and nonexistence is characterised by the absence of all potencies. It is for this reason that when one thing is productive or illuminative of another, it is so productive or illuminative only when its existence is there, not when its existence has ceased; e.g. the Seed which is productive of the sprout, and the Lamp which is illuminative of colour; and when these two (Seed and Lamp) have ceased, they are not able to do the producing or the illuminating.

Further, what is the meaning of the statement that—“Perception, having ceased, proves non-existence”? If the meaning is that Perception has ceased, disappeared, from the ‘present’ state,—then it would imply that it is there in the ‘past’ and ‘future’ states; and it has been already proved that the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ thing does not exist at all;—how then could there be any operation of what is non-existent?—If, secondly, the meaning of the statement is that though existing at the present time, it does not come about (appear) in connection with a certain thing,—and it is in this sense that Perception is said to have ‘ceased’ (become inapplicable),—even so, this cannot prove the non-existence of the thing in question; as the premiss voṇld be wrong and fallible; as the mere fact that Visual Perception does not appear in connection with Odour, Taste, etc. cannot prove that these latter do not exist.—Thus Perception cannot prove the nonexistence of anything.

[Bays the Opponent]—“If that is so, then how is it that, on the basis of Perception, in the form of Non-apprehension, you declare, in another place, the non-existence of the Jar?”

This is not so. What is said there is, not that Perception proves nonexistence of the thing because the thing is envisaged by Non-apprehension,—but that, when two things are capable of figuring in the same Cognition, if only one appears there, it means the non-appearance (non-existence) of the other. And the reason for this lies in the fact that both cannot be cognised in one and the same form, on the ground that the capability is equally present in both.—In the case in question however, we have never definitely cognised the fact of Omniscience figuring in the same Cognition as anything else; the presence of which latter could lead us to deduce the non-existence of Omniscience; because this latter is always absolutely imperceptible.

Thus it is clear that Perception cannot annul the notion of the Omniscient Person.

(B) Nor can Inference prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because it is held that Inference always envisages affirmation; as is clear from the fact that it is only Non-apprehension that has been regarded as envisaging negation. For this same reason, the other three Means of Cognition, Presumption (Analogy and Word) cannot prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person.

The following might be urged—“When we assert that there is no Omniscient Person, we are not asserting an absolute negation; ail that we

are asserting is the Relative Negation, Negation of omniscience, in relation to all men; so that there is certainly room for the operation of Inference and other Means of Cognition »

It may be so; but even so, Inference is not possible; because there is no Indicative (Probans) known to be present in all men, which is invariably concomitant with Omniscience. Such character as ‘being know able’, ‘being a Teacher’ and so forth, which have been put forward,—all these are Inconclusive, as we are going to show later on.

Nor again is Presumption able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because, in the first place, we do not admit of any Means of Cognition apart from Perception and Inference. Secondly, even if there are other Means of Cognition, Presumption is not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. Because Presumption is based upon the idea that a certain well known fact—seen or heard of,—is not explicable otherwise than on the basis of the unseen factor which is thus presumed;—and as a matter of fact, there is no well-known fact—seen or heard of—among men, which is not explicable except on the basis of the non-existence of the Omniscient Person, which, therefore, should be presumed.

Nor is Analogy able to prove the non-existence of the Omniscient Person. What is cognised by means of Analogy is, either the remembered thing having for its adjunct the similarity of the thing before the eyes,—or mere similarity of the thing before the eyes, to the Remembered Thing. For example, when a man who has had the perception of the Cow goes to the forest, and sees the Qavaya there, he perceives in this latter, the similarity to the Cow. This has been thus declared—‘Thus what is remembered and perceived as similar, forms the object of Analogy,—or the Similarity itself’ (Ślokavārtika Upamāna, 37). Thus the object that is remembered forms the object of Analogical Cognition; and what is remembered is only what has been apprehended before, not anything else;—and there is no Omniscient Person who has apprehended the Cognitions occurring in the ‘Chain’ of all men; hence these could not be remembered by any one. Nor is there anything apprehended by all men which is definitely known as possessing properties in common with non-omniscience, on the basis of which the non-omniscient character of all men could be cognised through Analogy.—As regards the quality of ‘existence’ etc. which has been found in the non-Omniscient Person, those also have not been found to be in common with non-omniscience. Besause the quality of ‘existence’ is not incompatible with the Omniscient Person also. Further, the perception of ‘existence’ in the Gavaya does not lead to the Analogical Cognition of the Jar being similar to the Gavaya. Ail men may be alike on the ground of being existent; but that does not prove their non-omniscience.

This also refutes the argument that has been set forth by the other party under the Text 3215.

Nor again can Word, as the Means of Cognition, set aside the existence of the Omniscient Person.—As regards the Word emanating from human beings, that is regarded by the Mīmāṃsaka as itself unreliable in matters beyond the senses. And as regards the Word not emanating from human beings, that cannot be reliable, as we have shown above. Nor is there any Vedic assertion found to the effect that all men are non-omniscient.—Nor can the mere fact of something not being mentioned in the Veda establish the non-existence of that thing; because all things are not meant to be spoken of in the scriptures. Otherwise, there would be non-existence of the marriage of your mother and such things, as these are not mentioned in the Veda.—Nor again can it be right to deduce that a certain thing is not mentioned in the Veda, at all from the fact of its not being mentioned in a certain text. Because there being many ‘Rescensional Texts’ of the Veda, it is always probable that the thing may be mentioned somewhere in them.—And we are going to show later on that a certain Vedic Text does speak of the Omniscient Person.

The non-existence of the Omniscient Person cannot be proved by the argument that He forms the objective of the Means of Cognition called ‘Negation’ (Non-apprehension). Because if this ‘Negation’ as a means of Cognition is described as consisting in the absolute negation of Cognition,—then, it cannot form either the Cognition, or the Means of Cognition, of anything at all; and hence the Omniscient Person could not be envisaged by it; as it is a non-entity; and hence cannot be a Means of Cognition (or Cognition).

If, on the other hand, ‘Negation’, is held to be of the nature of Relative Negation—standing for the negation of the entity—in the shape of the Means of Cognition,—even so, as it would be of the nature of the negation of the ‘Means of Cognition’, it could not be reliable at all. One who is a non-Brāhmaṇa cannot be a Brāhmaṇa.

The following might be urged—Negation, as a Means of Cognition, is not described by us as consisting in the exclusion of all Means of Cognition; it is described as a particular form of Cognition, only different from the five other Means of Cognition

If that is so, then it behoves you to explain in what form it appears.

“It appears in this form—inasmuch as the Omniscient Person is not cognisable by any one of the five Means of Cognition, He does not exist.”

If it is in this form, then it is not a ‘Means (or form) of valid Cognition’; as it is Inconclusive, False, Because the inapplicability of the jive Means of Cognition cannot set aside the entity in the shape of the Omniscient Person, which is not invariably concomitant with the said inapplicability; on the strength of which the said Cognition (that the Omniscient Person does not exist) could be regarded as true.

Thus it is established that there is no Proof that sets aside the possibility of the existence of the Omniscient Person.—(3208-3269)