Verse 2665-2666

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अन्यथाऽनुपपत्तिस्तद्व्यवहारस्य शङ्क्यते ।
अतीन्द्रियश्च योगोऽतो न नरैरवगम्यते ॥ २६६५ ॥
सर्वेषामनभिज्ञत्वात्पूर्वपूर्वाप्रसिद्धितः ।
न सिद्धो योग इत्येवं किमसौ परिकल्प्यते ॥ २६६६ ॥

anyathā'nupapattistadvyavahārasya śaṅkyate |
atīndriyaśca yogo'to na narairavagamyate || 2665 ||
sarveṣāmanabhijñatvātpūrvapūrvāprasiddhitaḥ |
na siddho yoga ityevaṃ kimasau parikalpyate || 2666 ||

It is merely suspected that there can be no other explanation for usage; but that does not bring about the proper cognition of the connection (or relationship) which is beyond the senses.—As all men would be ignorant, there could be no ‘long-continued tradition’ which could establish the connection in question. How then can such an assumption be made?—(2665-2666)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

All this being established, the Author next proceeds to point out the self-contradiction involved in the argument of the Mīmāṃsaka, set forth under Text 2273, to the effect that—“For all persons ignorant of the Connection, the Connection becomes known through long-continued tradition, etc. etc.”.—[see verses 2665-2666 above]

If all men are ignorant,—then every preceding generation would also be ignorant; under the circumstances, how could the Connection be established by that tradition? No ‘tradition’ of Blind people ever tends to bring about the right cognition of Colour; as says Śabara in his Bhāṣya—‘In matters like these mere human assertion cannot bring about right cognition, just as the word of the blind cannot bring about the right cognition of Colour’.

The following might be urged—“All men are called ‘ignorant’, in the sense that they cannot perceive things beyond the senses, and not that they do not know anything at all. And it is on the strength of the fact that

Verbal usage is otherwise inexplicable that it is believed with certainty that there have been generations of experienced men who have been duly cognisant (of the Connection in question)”.

This is not right; because Verbal usage could proceed also on another basis—that of Convention. It has not been quite definitely ascertained, but it is doubtful whether this is eternal or non-eternal.—This is the reason why the Text has used the expression—‘it is suspected’.—What is meant is that on the basis of the said ‘Presumption’, all that is sought to be proved is the mere existence of the Relationship; it indicates nothing about the peculiar feature of it;—that is, because there is no concomitance with such a feature. On this point, there is no difference between Presumption and Inference.

The following might he urged—“As a matter of fact, no non-eternal thing has ever been found to bring about the cognition of the meanings of words; nor can this be possible, as has been explained before; and it is this incapacity of the non-eternal that proves the Relationship (which brings about the said Cognition) to be eternal.

This same argument, however, can be urged against the eternal thing also. The Reason adduced is also ‘inadmissible’; for instance, it can be said, with equal justification, that the eternal Relationship also has never been found to bring about the cognition of the meaning; and further, such things as gestures by the hand, etc., even though non-eternal, are actually found to be expressive of meanings; hence the Opponent’s Reason is ‘inadmissible Hence it cannot be admitted that “it is not possible for the non-eternal thing to bring about the cognition of the meaning”. On the other hand, it is in the case of the eternal thing that the said expression cannot be right; because of the incongruity involved in the affective activity of the eternal thing being consecutive or concurrent.—What has been said therefore, deserves no consideration.—(2665-2666)