The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2653-2655 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2653-2655.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

शक्तिनित्यत्वपक्षे तु सङ्केतादि व्यपेक्षते ।
न किञ्चिदिति शब्दार्थप्रतिपत्तिः सदा भवेत् ॥ २६५३ ॥
समर्थान्तरभावे च कालिमार्यादिशब्दवत् ।
नान्यार्थबोधकत्वं स्याद्ध्वनेर्नियतशक्तितः ॥ २६५४ ॥
नानार्थद्योतनायैव शक्तिरेका यदीष्यते ।
भिन्ना वा शब्द एकस्मिन्सकृन्नानार्थविद्भवेत् ॥ २६५५ ॥

śaktinityatvapakṣe tu saṅketādi vyapekṣate |
na kiñciditi śabdārthapratipattiḥ sadā bhavet || 2653 ||
samarthāntarabhāve ca kālimāryādiśabdavat |
nānyārthabodhakatvaṃ syāddhvanerniyataśaktitaḥ || 2654 ||
nānārthadyotanāyaiva śaktirekā yadīṣyate |
bhinnā vā śabda ekasminsakṛnnānārthavidbhavet || 2655 ||

Under the view that the potency is eternal, there can be no need for anything in the shape of convention and the rest; and the comprehension of the meaning of the word would be there at all times.—If a word had the potency of expressing other meanings also,—as in the case of the words ‘kali’ and ‘mārya’—it could not bring about the cognition of those other meanings; as the potency of the word is restricted.—Is the potency held to be indicative of the several meanings, one or diverse 1 if it is one, then at one and the same time, there should be comprehension of the several meanings of the one word all at once.—(2653-2655)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The assumption of the Potency is not right,—not only because there is nothing to prove its existence, but also because the very notion of it is annulled by proofs.—This is what is shown in the following:—[see verses 2653-2655 above]

The argument may be formulated as follows:—Words that are expressive of things through the aid of Convention cannot have any eternal relationships,—e.g. such words as ‘gāvī’ and the like;—all Vedic as well as secular words like ‘go’ (Cow) are expressive of meanings through the help of. Convention;—hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant -with the contrary;—‘dependence’ being included under ‘presence of non-eternal relationship’, which is ‘contrary’ to the ‘presence of eternal relationship That this is so is going to be proved later on. On the present occasion only the Invariable Concomitance is pointed out. It is through Relationship in the form of Potency,—which is what brings about the comprehension of the meaning,—that Words are held to have a permanent relationship;—thus Potency, being eternal, cannot be helped by anything else;—hence it cannot need any such aids as the Convention and the like. Under the circumstances, the comprehension of the meaning of the -word should be there at all times.

Further, such a Potency could either be restricted to one meaning or restricted to several meanings?—If it is restricted to several meanings, is the potency of one Word to bring about the cognition of the several meanings, one or several?—These are the only alternatives possible.

Under the first alternative, there could be no comprehension of meanings as is found in such cases as—when a different Convention has been set up in reference to diverse times and places, the Word actually expresses another meaning; as for instance, in the case of the words ‘Kali’ and ‘Mārya’ as used among the Draviḍas and the Āryas, which respectively denote (among one people) ‘the last point of time’ (death?) and the ‘Peril of too much Rain’ (?);—no comprehension would be possible as the Potency will have been restricted to one meaning only; as in the case of the Eye and other organs of perception; the Eye certainly is not capable of being made by Convention to bring about the apprehension of Taste, etc.

Under the second alternative also, there would be the possibility of all men comprehending the meaning of the Word at one and the same time.—This is what is pointed out by the words—‘Of the one word, etc. etc.’,—(2653-2655)

Another objection is pointed out against the same view:—[see verses 2656-2657 next]

Like what you read? Consider supporting this website: