The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1440 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1440.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

त्रिरूपहेतुनिर्देशसामर्थ्यादेव सिद्धितः ।
न विपर्ययशङ्कास्ति व्यर्थं निगमनं ततः ॥ १४४० ॥

trirūpahetunirdeśasāmarthyādeva siddhitaḥ |
na viparyayaśaṅkāsti vyarthaṃ nigamanaṃ tataḥ || 1440 ||

As a matter of fact, the proving is accomplished by the force of the statement of the three-featured probans; consequently, there can be no suspicion regarding the contrary conclusion; hence the statement of the final conclusion is useless.—(1440)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Nigamana’, ‘Final Conclusion’ (the fifth member of the five-membered syllogism) has been defined as ‘the Re-statement of the Proposition on the basis of the Statement- of the Probans’ (Nyāyasūtra 1.1. 39). What is meant is that when it is re-asserted that “Therefore Sound is non-eternal’,—the word ‘therefore’ implies the potency of the Probans as shown in the Corroborative Instance, and then on the basis thereof, there is reassertion of what had been stated in the Proposition;—this re-assertion is called the ‘Final Conclusion’, ‘Nigamana’,—the exact connotation of the term ‘nigamana’ being that whereby the Proposition, the Premiss (statement of the Probans), the Corroborative Instance and the Re-affirmation are connected, strung together, as serving the same purpose (Nyāya-bhāṣya).

As a matter of fact however, when (as shown before) the statement of the Proposition itself is not there, how can there be any statement of the Final Conclusion, which is only a reiteration of the Proposition? Hence the Final Conclusion cannot form part of the Reasoning to prove the conclusion.—On this subject, the Revered Diṅnāga has made the declaration that ‘Inasmuch as the Final Conclusion is a mere repetition, it cannot be the means of proving anything—Against this, Uddyotakara and others, under the above Sūtra, have argued thus:—“There is no repetition here, because the Proposition states the Probandum as to be proved, while the Final Conclusion states it as proved; and without the Final Conclusion there can be no proving; because until that is stated, the suspicion regarding the truth of the other Factors of the Reasoning does not entirely cease as to whether or not Sound is really non-eternal (for instance); hence for the removal of this suspicion, the Final Conclusion has to be stated separately”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 1440 above]

When it has been definitely ascertained that in Sound there is present the character of ‘being a product’, which has been shown to be invariably concomitant with ‘non-eternality’,—how can there be any suspicion of its contrary, ‘Eternality’? When the fact of a certain substance being surrounded by flaming fire has been duly ascertained, no sane man can ever suspect the presence of coolness in that substance, [Even if there were any such suspicion ] it could not be set aside merely by the statement of the Final Conclusion, without any reasons.—(1440)

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