Verse 1438-1439

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रतिज्ञानभिधाने च कारणानभिधानतः ।
कर्त्तव्योपनयस्योक्तिर्न सद्भावप्रसिद्धये ॥ १४३८ ॥
प्रागुक्ते भावमात्रे च पश्चाद्व्याप्तेः प्रकाशनात् ।
विवक्षितार्थसंसिद्धेर्विफलं प्रतिबिम्बकम् ॥ १४३९ ॥

pratijñānabhidhāne ca kāraṇānabhidhānataḥ |
karttavyopanayasyoktirna sadbhāvaprasiddhaye || 1438 ||
prāgukte bhāvamātre ca paścādvyāpteḥ prakāśanāt |
vivakṣitārthasaṃsiddherviphalaṃ pratibimbakam || 1439 ||

If there is no statement of the proposition, there can be no statement of the reason (probans); and consequently, there need be no statement of the reaffirmation, for the purpose of intimating the existence (of the probans in the minor term, subject).—Mere presence (of the probans in the subject) having been stated at first, and then, if its invariable concomitance (with the probandum) is subsequently pointed out,—by this all that is intended becomes accomplished; so that the representment would be entirely useless.—(1438-1439)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

‘For the purpose of intimating the existence’—of the Probans, in the Subject, Minor Term.

What is meant is as follows:—The necessity of the statement of the Proposition having been negatived in the manner shown above,—if the statement of the Reason is to come after that, then it cannot come in at all; and as a consequence of this, there should be no statement of the Re-affirmation, as this has to be preceded by the statement of the Reason.—If the Reaffirmation is made for the purpose of showing that the Probans resides in the Subject, then some other purpose will have to be asserted as following from the Statement of the Reason.

It might be urged that—“The purpose served by it is the intimating of the fact of its being the Reason.”

That however cannot be accepted; because what would be the use of this intimation of that fact, when the proving of the Probandum is actually accomplished in another way—as explained previously? Consequently, barring the intimation of the fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject, no other purpose can be pointed out, for the Statement of the Reason. Thus then this fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been already indicated by the Statement of the Reason,—if the Reaffirmation is again made for that same purpose, it is clearly proved that it is a needless repetition; how too could the Probans be ‘inadmissible’ without such Reaffirmation?

As for the Representment, that also is useless; because the mere fact of the Probans subsisting in the Subject having been previously asserted by the Statement of the Reason,—and the invariable concomitance of the Probans with the Probandum also having been already asserted,—what is wanted would be already accomplished; so that the affirmation of the same thing over again would clearly bear the imprint of a needless repetition. Where then would there be ‘inadmissibility’ of our Reason in this case also?—(1438-1439)