The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 385-386 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 385-386.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ये तु व्योमादयो भावा अकृतत्वेन संमताः ।
वस्तुवृत्त्या न सन्त्येव ते च शक्तिवियोगतः ॥ ३८५ ॥
क्षणिकाक्षणिकत्वादिविकल्पस्तेष्वनास्पदः ।
तदा वस्त्वेव येन स्यात्क्षणिकं यदिवान्यथा ॥ ३८६ ॥

ye tu vyomādayo bhāvā akṛtatvena saṃmatāḥ |
vastuvṛttyā na santyeva te ca śaktiviyogataḥ || 385 ||
kṣaṇikākṣaṇikatvādivikalpasteṣvanāspadaḥ |
tadā vastveva yena syātkṣaṇikaṃ yadivānyathā || 386 ||

The ākāśa and other things which have been held to be ‘uncreated’ are really non-existent, in the form of ‘entities’; as they are devoid of all potentiality; hence there can be no room for attributing to them any such alternative characters as that of ‘momentariness’ or ‘non-momentariness’; whereby they could be regarded even as an ‘entity’—be it either momentary or otherwise.—(385-386)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Author proceeds to say something regarding the category of ‘uncreated things’:—[see verses 385-386 above]

If things like Ākāśa were such as have their existence established, then alone could there arise any discussion as to their being momentary, etc.; because Properties have no existence by themselves;—if they did, then they would cease to be Properties. Nor are Ākāśa, etc. -uncreated things,—because, being devoid of all potentiality,. they are to be spoken of as ‘nonexistent’,—like the ‘son of the Barren Woman’, This argument may be formulated as follows:—A thing that is devoid of all potentiality must be non-existent,—like the ‘son of the Barren Woman’;—Ākāśa, etc. are devoid of all potentiality; so that this is a natural reason (for regarding them as non-existent); or in reality, there is absence of the more extensive character (which implies the absence of the less extensive character).—Nor can the Reason adduced be said to be ‘inconclusive’, as this alone is enough to justify the notion of ‘non-existence Nor can the Reason be said to be ‘unproven’; as we shall explain later on. Nor, lastly, can it be said to be ‘contradictory’; as it is found to be present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.—(385-386)

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