Verse 383-384

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निवृत्तिरूपताऽप्यस्मिन्विधिना नाभिधीयते ।
वस्तुरूपानुवृत्तिश्च क्षणादूर्ध्वं निषिध्यते ॥ ३८३ ॥
अतो व्यवस्थितं रूपं विहितं नास्य किंचन ।
इति नित्यविकल्पोऽस्मिन्क्रियमाणो निरास्पदः ॥ ३८४ ॥

nivṛttirūpatā'pyasminvidhinā nābhidhīyate |
vasturūpānuvṛttiśca kṣaṇādūrdhvaṃ niṣidhyate || 383 ||
ato vyavasthitaṃ rūpaṃ vihitaṃ nāsya kiṃcana |
iti nityavikalpo'sminkriyamāṇo nirāspadaḥ || 384 ||

When it is asserted that ‘destruction is of the nature of cessation’, it does not mean the affirmation of its positive character; it only denies the continuity of the particular form of the thing beyond one moment. thus no lasting form is affirmed in regard to the ‘annihilation’, and there is no room for the alternative that it is eternal—(383-384)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued by the Opponent (under Text 372, above) that ‘If the Destruction of the thing be eternal, then it would be co-existent with the Thing itself’, This is answered in the following—[see verses 383-384 above]

When it is said that ‘there is cessation’, it does not mean the affirmation of the positive form of ‘cessation’ in regard to ‘Annihilation’,—for the simple reason that it has no positive form; it means only the denial of the continuity of the particular form of the Thing beyond one moment. Thus there is no room for the alternative that it is something absolutely eternal; because? on account of its having no character at all, it is impossible for it to have a permanent form. Specially because the properties of eternality or non-eternality are invariably concomitant with the nature of things.

It has been argued by Uddyotakam (under Text 371, above) to the effect that—“Under your view, what is without Cause may be either eternal or non-existent, etc.”—But this assertion is based upon his ignorance of the doctrine of his opponent. As a matter of fact, for Bauddhas who are fully conversant with Logic, what is without cause must be non-existent; this has been thus declared by the Blessed Lord—‘The Wise One seeking for the common property among similarngs does not perceive any such property in the slightest form’,—As for the Vaibhāsikas (a particular sect among Buddhists), who posit such existentngs as Ākāśa and the rest, they are converts to your view, and they cannot be regarded as Followers of the Buddha; hence the putting forward of their view cannot be relevant.

Thus all causes of Destruction being inefficacious, our Reason (put forward under Texts 353-366) cannot be said to be ‘Unproven’,

For the following reason also the Causes of Destruction should be declared to be inefficacious:—When a Thing is produced from its Cause, is it produced sometimes as evanescent by its very nature,—and sometimes as not-evanescent (eternal)? If it is produced as evanescent, then it cannot be the cause of Destruction, because it is destroyed through its own nature. When a certain nature (or character) belongs to a Thing, this thing, when produced, is produced with that same nature; and it does not depend upon any other cause (for producing that nature). For instance, the things that are bright or fluid or solid and the like—when produced—are produced along with these properties,—and they do not depend upon another cause for the bringing about of these properties. It might be argued that—“In the ease of the seed and such things, it is found that though the seed has the nature of producing the sprout, yet by itself it cannot produce it, it needs the help of other causes in the shape of water and such things,—and in the same way, though the Thing may have the evanescent nature, yet for its destruction it would require other Causes,” This cannot be right; because what is regarded as the ‘cause’ of ang is what brings it about in its final complete form; nong else is regarded as its ‘Cause’, So when a thing has a certain nature, it must produce it by itself, and it does not need another Cause. If the seed in the granary does not produce the sprout, it is because such productivity does not constitute its ‘nature’; it may be called ‘the cause of the Cause’ (of the Sprout), not the direct Cause; so that this does not vitiate our position.

If the alternative view be accepted,—that when the Thing is produced it is produced in the non-evanescent (permanent) form, then, for that also, any Cause of its destruction would be entirely inefficacious; because any change in the nature of such ang would be impossible. Because if the nature of a thing were not destroyed immediately after its production, then, later on also, as the same character of permanent standing would be there, what is there that would be done by the ‘cause of destruction’, by virtue of which the thing could be destroyed?—The following might be urged—“In the case of Copper and other things it is found that, though they are solid, yet, on the contact of fire, their condition becomes changed; similarly even though the thing may be naturally indestructible, the Cause of its destruction may change its condition; and by reason of this, it may become destroyed on its coming into contact with that Cause of Destruction—This cannot be right; as a matter of fact, it is not the same thing that becomes changed; because ‘Change’ consists in the production of another nature or character; now this ‘change’ that you speak of—is it something different from the Thing itself? or is it the Thing itself? It cannot be the Thing itself; as that has been already produced by its own Cause [and hence could not be produced again by the Cause of the change]. If it is something different from the Thing, then the Thing itself remains as before, retaining its permanence; so that it has not changed. As regards the example.of Copper and other things, that is not admissible. Because what happens in their case (according to us) is that the preceding ‘solid-moment’ of the Copper being inherently perishable (destructible) becomes destroyed by itself,—then under the influence of such auxiliary causes as Fire and the like, there is produced, out of its own constituents and under other circumstances, a different character in the shape of fluidity; again this character of fluidity, being inherently perishable, becomes destroyed, and there is produced, out of the auxiliary causes and out of the same constituents, another character in the shape of solidity. So that there is no change of one and the same thing.

Thus the ‘Cause of Destruction’ is in every way infructuous; and our Reason is not ‘unproven’.

Nor is our Reason ‘Contradictory’; as what is put forward does actually happen according to our view.

Nor is the reason ‘inconclusive’; as it has been already established before.

The following might be urged—“The Ākāśa does not need a cause for becoming corporeal (with a shape), and yet it is not permanently liable to corporeality; in the same manner, though the Things may be products, yet there may be some thing which is not permanently liable to destruction.”

This is not right. There is no Product which is not regarded as noneternal (evanescent); as all caused things are held to be evanescent; and these same Products are made the ‘subject’ of the inferential argument; how then can the Reason be ‘inconclusive’? Those things which, though Products, are yet expected to be eternal, on account of their indestructibility,—these are really included under the category of ‘uncreated things’, and as such should be regarded as discarded by the discarding of that category itself. So that there is no defect in our Reason. Nor is it admitted that Ākāśa and such other things are independent in the matter of their corporeality; because as a matter of fact, when a Property does not belong to a things that thing is certainly ‘dependent upon something else’ in regard to that property; things are never regarded as’ dependent on something else’ for the purpose of those properties that are already present in them; in fact, they are so dependent, only in regard to Properties that are not there already. So the Corroborative Instance cited by the other party is one that cannot be admitted.—(383-384)