Verse 36

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

सत्वाद्यनुगतं व्यक्तं न सिद्धं नः कथंचन ।
आन्तरत्वात्सुखादीनां व्यक्तत्वात्तत्स्वसंविदः ॥ ३६ ॥

satvādyanugataṃ vyaktaṃ na siddhaṃ naḥ kathaṃcana |
āntaratvātsukhādīnāṃ vyaktatvāttatsvasaṃvidaḥ || 36 ||

The ‘manifest’ is not admitted by us in any way whatsoever as homogeneous with (made up of) pleasure and the rest; because pleasure and the rest are ‘internal’, ‘subjective’; and that these are so is manifest from their own clear cognition.—(36)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The Text now proceeds to show the Inadmissibility of the Premiss put forward (by the Sāṃkhya under Kārikā 15) in the form “Because of homogeneity”:—[see verse 36 above]

That the ‘Manifest’, in the shape of Sound and other things, is ‘homogeneous’ with—of the same form as,—Pleasure (Pain and Delusion), is not admitted by us in any way;—why?—because Pleasure and the rest are ‘internal’,—i.e. subjective, of the nature of consciousness (feeling); and Sound and other things being insentient,—how could they be homogeneous with Pleasure, etc.?—The argument may be formulated as follows:—Things that are not of the nature of Consciousness cannot consist of Pleasure and the rest—e.g. the Spirit postulated by the other party;—and Sound and other things are devoid of the nature of Consciousness; hence the more extensive character is found absent in them (which excludes the presence of the less extensive character, that of consisting of Pleasure, etc.).

The following argument might be urged:—“it is only after the invariable concomitance of the character of being of the nature of Consciousness with the character of consisting of Pleasure, etc. has been established that the absence of the former might exclude the character of earning Pleasure from Sound and the rest; as a matter of fact however, the said invariable concomitance itself has not been established,—inasmuch as we do admit the Spirit to be of the nature of Consciousness (and yet not consisting of Pleasure, etc.)

In answer to this, the Text adds—That these are so is manifest from their own cognition« That is, the fact of Pleasure, etc. being of the nature of Consciousness is well established,—how?—from the cognition of Pleasure, etc. themselves; i.e. the cognition of Pleasure, etc. is itself quite clear on this point.—As a matter of fact, it is too clear (to need emphasis) that the Cognition itself of Pleasure, etc.—in the form of the Feelings of Satisfaction and the rest, following upon the presence or absence of Sound and other things, is self-luminous by its very nature and does not depend upon anything else to illumine (manifest) it;—and whatever is independent of other things to manifest it, and is self-illumined in the form of Satisfaction, etc.,—is spoken of by such terms as ‘Consciousness’, ‘Pleasure’, ‘Feeling’, ‘Cognition’,—all which are synonymous. If the experiencing of Pleasure, etc. were due to some other feeling,—then the feeling of Pleasure, etc. would be of the nature of something other than Satisfaction and the rest; because it itself would not be of the nature of that; as is the case with the Yogin, or the Person making inferences, cognising the Pleasure, etc. as felt by other persons. If this were not so, then these persons—Yogin, etc.—also would be themselves actually feeling the Pleasure, etc. as present in others, and (hence) being distressed and so forth (on account of those feelings). Or (conversely), as in the case of the Yogin., so in all cases, the feelings of being kindly or unkindly treated would be absent, as the circumstances would be the same in both cases.'—If then, the Feeling is admitted to be of the nature of Satisfaction and the rest, it becomes established that Pleasure, etc. are of the nature of Consciousness. Because our Pleasure is nothing more than the feeling of Satisfaction, and Pain is nothing more than the feeling of Dissatisfaction.—From all this it follows that the Reason put forward in the Text is not Inconclusive nor Inadmissible. Specially among people who (like the Sāṃkhya) believe in the Reality of the External World, it is an admitted fact that Sound and other things (which are external, objective) are devoid of the nature of Consciousness. If it were not so, then they would have accepted the doctrine of the Idealist; and this would be what we most desire.—Nor can our Reason be regarded as ‘Contradictory’, as it is found present in every case where the Probandum is known to be present.—(36)