A study of the philosophy of Jainism

by Deepa Baruah | 2017 | 46,858 words

This page describes the Concept of relation (sambandha) from the study of the philosophy of Jainism: one of the oldest religions in India having its own metaphysics, philosophy and ethics. Jainism is regarded as an ethical system where non-violence features as an important ethical value.

Chapter III.c - Concept of relation (sambandha)

The Buddhists do not admit permanence and grossness in substance. Prabhācandra has refuted the Buddhist theory of momentariness and established that the substance possesses permanence. Now he proceeds to establish the concept of relation which brings about gross form of atoms. The Jainas are the upholders of the concept of relation between substances or realities or things. Relation or sambandha is that which forms a new mode by the conjunction of two things. In Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa, Prabhācandra points out that the relation is cognized by perception. He refutes the Buddhists, who deny the relation between substances. He says that cloth is perceived to be related with threads and the whiteness etc. are also perceived as related with the cloth. If it were not so, then the threads would have been cognized as different from the cloth. There is no other thing except relation which can give rise to the cognition of connected together. Hence, when there is direct perception of relation, how can there be the imagination of nonrelation which is contradictory to our cognition. Moreover, Prabhācandra points out that in the absence of any relation, there can be no practical efficiency (arthakṛiyākāritva). Practical efficiency means the capacity of producing something or the power of performing action of some kind. Now if there is no relation among the atoms of the things like pot etc., then how come a pot is useful for fetching or holding water? But it is useful for holding and fetching water. Similarly in the absence of relations, it will not be possible to pull a rope or bamboo or a stick by pulling one end only. Thus it is evident that some relation exists among different things.

It is argued by the Buddhists that if relation is admitted in case of the atoms, then atoms will be required to possess aṃśa, because relation is possible only between two parts and not the whole thing. But the atoms are indivisible and as such cannot possess parts. In reply Prabhācandra asks what is meant by the word aṃśa, does it means svabhāva (nature) or does it means avayava (parts). In the view of Prabhācandra, here the meaning svabhāva should be accepted. Because the atoms, which are devoid of parts, become different in nature because of their relations. If this meaning of the term aṃśa is accepted, then there will be no controversy regarding the indivisibility of the atoms. Indivisibility means that which cannot be divided; it does not mean that which is devoid of nature.

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