Chapter III.b - Prabhāchandra’s refutation of Buddhists view

Prabhācandra refutes the Buddhists theory of momentariness in his Prameyakamalamārtaṇḍa. First of all, he argues that origination, decay and permanence are always present in a substance. By perception, one can know these three factors in a substance. So, substance is not momentary. It only changes in some point of time. Secondly, if everything is momentary, the self will also be momentary, and then one cannot explain memory, recognition etc. Thirdly, if the substances are kṣaṇika, then how can the Buddhists prove this either by perception or by inference? By perception, it will not be possible, because nobody perceives a thing as destroyed at every moment; rather the thing is manifested as having a permanent gross character. If the idea of momentary is not perceived by perception, then by inference also it would not be possible because inference comes after perception. So, momentariness of things cannot be proved by any pramāṇa.

The Jainas also hold that if the self is also momentary, then the theory of liberation will be meaningless. No moral life would be possible, because a momentary person could not attempt to attain anything in his life. So, things are not kṣaṇika. It only changes in some stage, but not totally destroyed. Likewise, childhood, youth and old age are only some stages of man’s life. But, this does not mean that after attaining youth, childhood stage would be destroyed. It is only the developed stage for one’s life.