International Affairs: A Survey

Welcome advances in some fronts and ominous reverses in others have been characteristic of trends in world politics in recent months. This has been evident in the matter of East-West relations, in the affairs of the powers within the Soviet sphere of influence as also in the matter of relations among the Asian Powers themselves.

East-West Relations

Among other indications of efforts to maintain the tempo of relaxation in East-West relations, the developments over West Asia and Vietnam should rank prominent. It is true that in each of these cases the net advance seems negligible, but reading between the lines one can easily find ample proof of a readiness for mutual co-operation between the two super powers. The events in West offer interesting insights.

West Asia and the East-West Detente

A solution to the problem is nowhere in sight and frequent engagements still remind the world of the explosiveness of the situation. Since last March no less than half-a-dozen engagements of considerable magnitude took place. Truly had an American cartoonist remarked that the June ’67, ‘six-day war is over 700 days old!’ Yet it is chastening to look at the U. S.-Russian efforts in this area, if only to realise that both sides are sincere in their efforts for concerted action for peace in the area.

It is well-known that the four major powers evolved a plan for West Asia. This plan was itself the product of intense initial negotiations between Washington and Moscow with the Security Council Resolution of November ’67 as the basic guide line, The U. S. came out with a plan in March last with proposal for Israeli troop withdrawal from occupied Arab areas and assuring Israel of ‘secure and recognised boundaries’, and providing for free transit for Israeli ships in the Suez Canal. A demilitarized zone in the Sinai Peninsula and a new U. N. military force to separate the combatants and keep peace were the other important items of the American Plan. The whole arrangement, the Americans insisted, should go through as a contractual agreement, implying thereby that the Arab States must sign a Peace with Israel–a condition to which the Arabs have been intensely averse. While this condition remained a bitter pill for the Arabs, the advance in the U. S. position lay in the fact that it ask for a total withdrawal of Israeli troops from former Arab areas–a proposal disliked by Tel Aviv. In fact this was to establish the American bonafides vis-a-vis the Arabs.

Moscow, though showing the usual reticence in approving of the Plan, did not reject it outright. The Russian leaders themselves proposed, earlier in December’ 68, that a West Asian peace should be the result of a ‘peace document’ and strangely enough, hinted at its preference for the presence of the U. N. troops in area–an arrangement to which they had opposed strongly till then. Thus, there has oflate been a welcome convergence of Moscow’s and Washington’s attitudes to the problem.

As for the two belligerent sides themselves, Israel had opposed the big-power effort to solve the problem. President Nasser did not commit himself to the U. S. proposals at the start. But a statement he made to the effect that “Israel must accept a package deal embodying all points of the U. N. Security Council resolution, if they want to gain access to the Suez Canal” implied a great deal. For one, it clearly envisaged Nasser’s readiness to allow Israeli ships into the canal and for another, its conditions were not too far removed from those of the U. S. Plan.

This bridging of the gap between Arab sentiment and American king was apparently reinforced with the U. S. announcement of for the solution of the refugee problem. Hitherto, Washington had opted to keep silent over the problem of 1.3 million Arab refugees, which obviously constituted a major dimension of the larger problem. In April last, Washington proposed that the refugees given a choice, between repatriation to their former homes or compensation for resettlement, as part of the over all West Asian deal. It was reported that the U. S. was even prepared to foot a substantial part of the Bill. The fact that this proposal was made by the Asst. Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Mr. Joseph Sisco, at a meeting of the American Israeli Public Affairs Committee, indicates Washington’s readiness to talk plain with Israel, which was none too happy with the big-power efforts for a settlement. In the context of this, the American problem for a general settlement assumes added significance.

The American Plan became, as it were, the basis for the big-power plan. The Russian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrei Gromyko, was despatched post-haste to Cairo (while the Communist summit was still under way at Moscow). Ostensibly, Mr. Gromyko went to discuss a number of problems of interest to the United Arab Republic and the Soviet Union; in reality he went to persuade Nasser to accept the big-power proposals. It is highly significant that on the eve of his visit, Pravda of Moscow came out with an article denouncing in pungent terms ‘nationalists and revanchists’ in Egypt, who are demanding Arab military action to recover territories occupied by Israel. Obviously, Moscow was setting the scene for Gromyko’s pressures on Nasser. A more determined disposition on the part of Moscow to play the middleman for big-power efforts is hard to find.

The Big-Power Proposals

The substance of the big-power plan lay in a formula evolved between Washington and Moscow. The formula, which was never made public, was reported to have envisaged (1) retention by Israel of the Old City of Jerusalem, with concessions to Jordan. (2) Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights (formerly of Syria) till Syria recognised that United Nations resolution of November, ’67, (3) Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula. In certain respects it was less favourable to the Arabs than the U. S. Plan of March, but it should be remembered that the former was general in nature and the big-power proposals were the result of the adjustments made to the U. S. Plan to suit conflicting claims in particular matters. In so far as these involved the Arabs losing the Old City of Jerusalem, these fell foul with the Arabs, who were determined not to surrender an inch of territory to Israel. Yet, Gromyko hoped to extract this concession from Nasser. And he failed. Obviously, the Arabs refused to yield and started accusing Moscow of betraying Arab interests by identifying itself with Washington. And it could not be expected that Moscow would allow its public image of being the champion of Arab interests to be exposed, even if it did really attempt compromising the optimum of Arab demands. It is this that explains why after four days of futile efforts at persuasion, Gromyko reverted to the patent Russian public stance of full support to the Arab cause, demanding that Israel should forthwith withdraw from all Arab areas occupied since June 1969 War. This, no doubt, points out to the limits of East-West collaboration. The point is that, given the best disposition on the part of these major powers to settle their differences, they cannot go beyond a certain point in committing themselves on behalf of their ‘proteges’. Strangely enough, there seem to be better prospects for agreement between the big-powers over issues directly involving themselves than over those involving the claims of their ‘proteges’.

The failure of the Gromyko mission should not, however, detract from the significance of the Russo-American action in trying for a West Asian settlement. It provides the satisfying thought that the ‘detente’, after all, has come to stay.

Vietnam Negotiations

This pattern of progress towards a solution and reversion to a stalemate could be seen over the Vietnam issue too. Though, in the end, the stalemate is as sticky as ever, the American decision to start unilateral withdrawal of their forces constitutes an advance of a qualitative nature. Why these initial hopeful indicators faded into near non-starters warrants closer examination.

First signs of optimism appeared with the South Vietnam President’s offer of 27th March of direct talks with the National Liberation Front and his readiness to offer it a political role. As Saigon had never agreed to this before, President Thieu’s offer was certainly a good augury. Close on this came indications that the U. S. may relax its firm stand not to take a second unilateral step towards de-escalation without Hanoi reciprocating its initial gesture of stoppage of bombing raids in the North. In April, Secretary of State, Rogers, hinted that “We are not prepared to assume that the only alternative to early progress in the peace talks is an indefinite tension of our present role.”

These two moves by Saigon and Washington put Hanoi and the N. L. F. in a fix, for the moves certainly gave a propaganda advantage to Saigon and Washington. Apparently as a counter move, Hanoi and the N. L. F. announced a Plan (known as the ten-point plan) at the Paris Conference table, which envisaged, among other things, the constitution of a coalition government immediately; the holding of free elections; and the ultimate formation of a representative coalition. The most surprising part of the Plan is its implied recognition of the presence of North Vietnamese troops in the South. The Plan mentioned that the issue of the presence of other armed forces could be tackled by a more representative government than the present one. The implication that Hanoi would withdraw its men after the establishment of a coalition in Saigon is thus clear. And, this in itself signifies a great shift in Hanoi’s stand. For, till, then, vehement disclaimers of the presence of its forces were its refrain at the near comic-opera style of negotiations at Paris. Surely, the Russian hand must have been there in the recent Hanoi moves. But this Plan was promptly rejected by Saigon. The U. S. reacted to this Plan with a counter-plan, which Mr. Nixon laid out on the 14th of May. This eight-point plan, stressed more the procedures for the withdrawal of foreign forces from South Vietnam; the appointment of an international body to arrange for the supervision of the resulting cease-fire agreements, and for the holding of free elections as soon as the first two conditions were met. The Nixon Plan envisaged that any participation of the N. L. F. in the Government should materialise only as a result of the free elections proposed. In other words, there could be no question of the N. L. F. being admitted into a coalition in the immediate future as demanded by Hanoi under the ten-point Plan. Obviously, this crucial withholding of N. L. F’s participation in Saigon’s Government promoted Hanoi to reject the U. S. Plan. Yet, it was reported that Hanoi did show a great deal of interest in the American proposals through private diplomatic channels.

A little later, Saigon, which had all along rejected the Hanoi proposals, grew even more flexible in announcing that she would never agree to a coalition with the Vietcong. Though, apparently, the ‘never’ referred to an immediate coalition, and not the possibility of long-term coalition, the tenor of Saigon’s refusal suggested a significant step from its previous offer of allowing the Vietcong a political role. In fact, it was widely reported that there was a clash between Nixon and Thieu, In view of the fact that the Nixon Plan did visualise a coalition coming about after the proposed elections, the Nixon-Thieu quarrel arose from the former objecting to any coalition at all. Seen thus, President Thieu accomplished a political somersault indeed. Reports of a Nixon-Thieu split gained added credibility when Nixon proposed a meeting with his South Vietnamese counterpart at Midway Islands in the Pacific. President Thieu sought clarifications on the Nixon proposals of May l4th especially on the issue relating to future elections. Presumably, he was worried about the implications of the Washington Plan. It is difficult to say what exactly happened at Midway, but Nixon came out of it with the announcement of a partial U. S. troop withdrawal, immediately after the meeting. Though the number to be withdrawn was just 25,000 out of a total of 5,38,500 U. S. soldiers out there, even that is most significant. For, hitherto, the U. S. refused to consider such a step on the plea that it was for Hanoi to reciprocate Washington’s first step in stopping bombing raids in the North. That the U. S. chose to take this further step in deescalating the Vietnam war without waiting for Hanoi’s gesture is a measure of her sincerity in trying to end the tragedy there. As if to meet Saigon’s fears of being left alone to face Communist aggression, President Nixon repeatedly assured that the U. S. would keep its pledges of supporting Saigon and that the ‘withdrawal’ could always be reversed if the situation so warranted. He proposed a continuing review of the situation. In spite of these, Thieu could not have welcomed the American proposals. It is a safe guess that President Nixon had to concede something to get Saigon reconciled to his decision. And the concession seems to lie in letting Thieu talk tough about future elections and about the prospect of a coalition. This is evident in the latter’s references about elections. President Thieu merely stated that if the enemy would talk seriously and show good-will for peace “he would be willing to discuss when and how elections might be held.” On the issue of a coalition in the short run, the President’s statements are indeed provocative. He stated “from now on, those who spread rumours that there will be a coalition government in the country, wherever they may be, whether they may be in the executive or the legislature, will be severely punished.” Thus, the price for the U. S. decision to withdraw is to let Thieu get away with his rejection of an immediate coalition. The U. S. position vis-a-vis Saigon is, in a sense, comparable, to Moscow’s vis-a-vis Cairo, over the West Asian affair. Over Vietnam it was Washington’s turn to have failed in persuading its ‘protege’ to be more accommodative over the coalition issue, as it was Moscow’s misfortune to have failed in convincing the Arabs to accept the big-power plan. Newspapers definitely expected out of the Midway meeting something spectacular by way of Nixon moulding Thieu to a more reasonable frame of mind apropos a viable political settlement in the near future. Judged from these expectations Midway had not seen much headway. Moscow, with characteristic scorn pooh-poohed the conference by likening it to a “mountain labouring to give birth to a mouse.”

The Midway decision was dismissed as a propaganda gimmick by the N. L. F. Obviously, what irked it most was that the U. S. decision was coupled with Saigon’s total rejection of any political participation of the N. L. F. in the near future. As a result, the N. L. F. proclaimed itself as the Provisional Government of South Vietnam getting immediate recognition from the Communist bloc, as also from some of the Afro-Asian group. Countries like India chose not to recognise the revolutionary government. No material alteration in the situation occurred by this Communist move except that, at the Paris Conference table the name of the N. L. F. delegation, from henceforth will be different. No doubt, to some extent, it gets the status of a parallel government, a status enough to spite the Saigon Government for its refusal to treat the N. L. F. as representing even a considerable section of the South Vietnamese. The Americans have also very prudently let the change take place without any sharp rejoinder at the Paris table.

Thus, the world is as far away from sighting a settlement in Vietnam as before. The hopeful point is that the Americans decided to go a bit farther in their search for a way out of Vietnam.

Other Indications

If the moves in the West Asian and Vietnam problems disclose the readiness of the two major powers to co-operate and conciliate, there are other indications in this direction too.

A development indicating Russia’s anxiety to project a non-belligerent image occurred during the May Day Celebrations in Moscow this year. For the first time since the cold war, the annual May Day parade went off without the show of Russian military might. That not a single armament was put on show that day discloses the uniqueness of the event. As if to confirm this symbolic symptom, Brezhnev in his speech on the occasion played up Moscow’s peaceful predispositions.

Attitudes among the Western powers showed similar determination not to dilute the ‘detente.’ President Nixon’s European visit soon, after his assumption of office, was intended as much to tell his Western European allies that he will have to have a free hand in negotiating with Moscow, as it was to assure them of America’s continuing interest in European unity and security.

EVENTS WITHIN THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Events within the communist world also exhibit an admixture ofprogress and regress from the point of view of respect for the autonomy of the States within the Communist State system. And on balance the regressions are more conspicuous.

Mr. Dubcek Goes

The fall of Mr. Dubcek and his close associates from power in Prague is a rude reminder that the Russians never forget past ‘wrongs’. It was in June, ’69, that Mr. Dubcek formally asked to be relieved of his party post and himself proposed the name of Mr. Husak, who was reported to be Moscow’s man in Prague. It was evident since the rape of Czechoslovakia last August that Mr. Dubcek was marked out for an early ouster, and it is a measure of the influence he wielded and the affection he commanded in the party and outside that the Russians took so long to get him out. Like all ‘realist’ liberals, Mr. Dubcek had to play the unenviable role ofcarrying out the ‘diktat’ of the overlord while trying to salvage, wherever possible, the gains of liberalisation. Even this degree ofcompliance was not enough for the Russians who were smarting under the humiliation of being compelled to expose the uglier side of their nature in sending troops into Prague last August. Rumours ofMr. Dubcek’s dismissal were frequent since then. And his departure now constitutes the culmination of the process begun last year ofsystematic and remorseless undoing of the democratisation and liberalisation in Czechoslovakia. Howsoever foreseen and inevitable it may be, this event underscores Moscow’s spirit of revenge and should make one beware that the Kremlin is never too far from reverting to the Stalinist ‘mores’.

The Red Summit and Russia’s Road to Reaction

The Conference of the World Communist Parties, summoned by the Russia and vehemently opposed by China, opened on the 3rd of June, in Moscow. Altogether parties of 75 countries took part. The significance of the event cannot be underestimated for it is the first in nearly a decade to be organised by Moscow to discuss the problems facing the communist movement. Since the Sino-Soviet rift itself had its early manifestations around the year 1958-59, the Moscow Conference is the first to be held after the rift assumed the shape ofan irreconcilable contradiction within the communist movement.

Though the opening session was conspicuous by the absence of anti-chinese speeches, pro-Moscow delegations later took up the theme which soon reached a ‘crescendo’ in the shape of a scathing Russian invective against Peking. Yet it is portentious that the conference did not pass any resolution against the Chinese. The politics behind this development are very revealing indeed. Originally, the Russian leaders intended to censure China but in the face of opposition from some leading parties, such as the Italian and Rumanian, they had to drop the item from the agenda to get the conference held at all. But as the conference progressed the anti-Chinese mood suddenly flared up as news of new clashes between Russia and China near the Sinkiang borders spread. The prospects for the passage of an anti-Peking resolution looked certain indeed. And yet, the Russians did not press for it for fear that it might add too much fuel to the fierce fires already raging at the conference.

But the Russians did score a point in another area. They managed to get a majority of the delegations to pass the main document of the conference –the one relating to the item: “unity in the struggle against imperialism.” The point about this document is that while it does not specifically endorse the infamous Brezhnev thesis of limited sovereignty, with which the Kremlin sought to justify the Czech invasion of last August, it contains the sinister implication. The Brezhnev declaration announced: “…..when external and internal forces hostile to socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of a restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in that country–a threat to the security of the socialist commonwealth as a whole, this is no longer merely a problem for that country’s people, but a common problem – a concern of all socialist countries.” Reading this along with the ominous phrase, “theinternational duty of Communists,” which comes in the document on “unity,” the sinister implications of the letter become evident. This cannot but be regarded as a warning that Russia might not do to other socialist countries what it did to the Czechs. Thus, plainly, the Russians, given up whatever inhibition they may have had (since the days of de-Stalinisation) about interfering in the internal affairs of other parties. Even Rumania, which so vehemently opposed the Russian attempts to condemn China at the meet and was pursuing much too independent a line in foreign policy to the liking of Moscow, was made to accept the document though she did express its misgivings about it. Viewed thus the Red Summit accomplished a reversal of a welcome trend.

There is, however, a consolation. For, the Russian victory is only a victory of sorts. The Kremlin leaders ardently wished and surely expected that the document would receive the unanimous imprimatur of the conference. In the event, it was approved of only by a majority–albeit a large majority. That the apparently innocuous words of the document might conceal frightening potentialities was made plain by its critics. One delegate stated it in so many words when he denounced that the document “does not say clearly that each communist party should have the right to judge and decide for itself when internal questions are at stake.” It is even more noteworthy that the discussions over the document should occasion a reopening of the debate over the Moscow-led Czech invasion. Apart from constituting the requiem to Czech liberalisation, persistent referenccs to the Czech episode clearly imply a bitter attack against the Brezhnev doctrine itself.

On the whole the Communist Summit is being as having brought a setto the autonomy of the members of the Communist brotherhood.

Whither Russian Policy

The moves in the Czech scene and the shotgun passage of the document on unity, seem to have provided the basis for recent Western assessments of Soviet attitudes. Significantly enough, it is the liberal press in England and America that has come out with the conclusion that there is a right about turn in the Kremlin’s policies under Brezhnev and Kosygin. Mr. Anatole Shub of the Washington Post, returning from a three-year stint in Moscow, published a series of articles, characteristically captioned: ‘Russia turns the clock.” To him, the post-Krushchev leadership has reluctantly continued the liberal line in foreign policy. He rejects the idea that the internal struggle in the Kremlin is one between ‘moderates’ and ‘conservatives.’ It is much nearer the truth, says, Mr. Shub, to say that there is in-fighting amongst the conservatives and reactionaries themselves. This he infers from the Russian decision over Czechoslovakia–the gravity and implications of which suggest that only a conservative and reactionary team could have taken such a plunge. He contrasts the liberal foreign policy of the early and mid-sixties (Cuban missile withdrawal, Test Ban Treaty, Krushchev’s thesis of peaceful economic competition with capitalism, etc.,) with the Russian role in instigating the Arabs to the costly misadventure of June 1967 and, more important, with their hatchetman mentality in dealing with the members of their ideological bloc. The Economist of London was even more forthright. “No partnership with him”–was the title of its write-up on the leadership of Brezhnev. Referring to the recent summit and the passing of the document on unity, it says: “It is too simple to say that the post-Krushchev regime in Russia has reverted to the habits of Stalinism. The Romans, after their relative relaxation under Claudius, did not get a return to tiberianism. They got Nero. Mr. Brezhnev’s Russia has much in common with Nero’s Rome: not least in the fact that the dominant interest of its ruler has become the preservation of an impossibly inflexible power-structure.” Very powerful indictment indeed.

The two assessments given above confirming the trend towards neo-Stalinism, can be accepted only in so far as they relate to Moscow’s attitude towards other communist countries. If, however, these Western perceptions imply a general switch in the foreign policy style of Russia then, serious objections crop up. For, in fact, in recent times Russian foreign policy has taken to unorthodox ways, departing even from basic principles of communist ideology. Witness the most surprising proposal to come out of the Kremlin: the proposal for creation of a defence alliance for the balance of power in South-East Asia. Even if Moscow did not envisage defence pact aimed at encircling China, the very suggestion that some South-East Asian countries, particularly India, Pakistan, Cambodia and some others, should join in a collective security arrangement, indicates that the Kremlin does not feel inhibitions any longer to don the mantle of the supervisor of the world order, eager to see that no maverick–even if it be a communist maverick–disturbs the present world order. Indeed, the stages in the evolution of this proposal are very suggestive.

It was first mooted in an article in the Soviet Government daily, Izvestia, at the end of May. The article referred to the threat from “Mao and his henchman,” and envisaged a collective security arrangement with India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Burma, Cambodia and Singapore as possible members. Then, in May, at the Communist Parties Summit in Moscow, Brezhnev himself made a mention of the need for collective security “in areas of the world where the danger of another world war is concentrated,” specifically mentioning Asia as one such area. However, later on, the Russian leaders denied that they had the Chinese threat in mind in proposing the defence alliance. There, later, Russian protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, it is difficult not to infer that the Chinese threat is very much in Kremlin’s calculations. For the magnitude of the Sino-Soviet rift has assumed staggering proportions

The Recent Armed Clashes

The Sino-Soviet border clashes on the far-eastern borders of Russia, in March, are only symptoms of the intense hatred prevailing among the leaders of these top Communist powers. The incidents occurred in the area of Nizhnemikhailovka border post, commonly known as Damansky island, in the Ussuri river, to the North of Vladivostok. For quite sometime there has been persistent haggling, as to whom these border areas belong. Under the treaty of 1860, the Chinese were made to give away large chunks of these area, as also other territories on their Western borders (Sinkiang), to the Russians. It is well-known that the Chinese were compelled to sign many such treaties with the European powers – treaties invariably to the detriment of China, and hence characterised the ‘unequal’ treaties. That Communist Russia should continue to profit from these unscrupulous gains by the hated Tzars is certainly ironical. The Chinese now demand that the Russians vacate these regions. Tension on these regions has been mounting proportionate to the intensification of the Sino-Soviet cold war, and on previous occasions border patrols did confront each other in menacing postures. But never before last March, these confrontations result in armed clashes involving casualities. But in these recent clashes, it seems, it is not the Chinese who were in the wrong, for the site of the engagement was on the Chinese side of the Ussuri river. Whether the Chinese provoked the Russians to enter into Chinese soil, one cannot say. The Russians alleged such provocation while the latter accused the Russians of starting the trouble first. That both the sides chose to make a public issue out of it is even more significant. Some analysts read in this an attempt on Mao’s part to reinsure his claims over these areas. It should be mentioned that negotiations over the border claims ended in failure in 1964. Apparently, the Chinese say that the Russians have not only been in illegal possession of their lands but have been indulging in pro­vocative actions. It will be remembered that this is but a carbon copy of Peking’s explanation over its hostilities against India in 1962. Thus the Chinese do not distinguish the Russians from the Indians as far as border claims go. The March clashes were followed by one more major engagement on the Sinkiang border in June. Given this ground of confrontation, it is not far fetched to interpret that the Russian proposal for collective security was aimed at with the ‘yellow peril’ in view.

The Russian anxiety to preserve peace in this area also underlies the other proposal to strengthen regional economic co-operation. This was Mr. Kosygin’s contribution during his visit to India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. His suggestion that consultations between Russia, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan should immediately be initiated for the opening up of an overland trade route between these countries is of great import.

It is also curious that the U. S. A. and Russia should show equal concern for South-East Asian security, knowing full well that it is not their rivalry that is likely to disturb the peace. Now that they have decided to withdraw from Vietnam, the Americans are eager to leave behind a compact alliance to contain China. The Russian design for collective security in the area, can be read as no less motivated by an identical concern. No wonder the Chinese had burst forth into a blaze of picturesque indignation at the Russian proposal. They called it “the Soviet revisionist attempt to rig up a system of collective security in Asia” based on an idea “picked from the garbage-heap of the notorious war monger John Foster Dulles.” Even if one rejects the Chinese charge, the transformation of Russian policy from ideological considerations to considerations of power-politics cannot be denied. Time was when Moscow in its role as the leader of the Communist world refused to think in terms of balance of power, had little time to think about the security of non-Communist neighbours and, above all, thought it a sacrilege even to dream of containing an ‘ideological ally.’ Apparently, the Kremlin has now shed these norms. In a sense this change could be seen in Kremlin’s role over the Indo-pakistani hostilities in 1965. Tashkent showed that apart from the Chinese angle, the simple desire to maintain peace in the sub-continent became the concern of Russia.

Of course, it is equally probable that the Russians are to compete with the Americans in forging an alliance in the area and that the recent Russian proposal confirms a struggle between the Kremlin and the Pentagon for supremacy in the region. In the absence of Russian clarification of its objectives it is difficult to ascertain its motivations. Perhaps the vagueness of the proposals is indicative of a deliberate decision to withhold elucidation until the reaction of Asian capitals is carefully sifted. On the face of it a mere look at the names of the countries mentioned in the Izvestiaarticle, raises doubts about the feasibility of the proposal.

India and East Asian Security

The Indian Government’s reaction to these proposals is consistent with its previous stand on the issue. It is opposed to joining any military alliances–American or Russian sponsored–and has politely expressed its opposition to a military security system. To proposals for regional economic security, New Delhi reacted with alacrity. In fact, long before the Russian plan was canvassed, India started cultivating better relations with East Asian countries. While India, no doubt, is concerned with Chinese expansionism, as much as any other power in the area, her search for allies is restricted to alliances in the non-military spheres. Mrs. Gandhi’s recent visit to Japan and Indonesia is an effort in this direction. Japan’s attitude, in particular, seems to augur well. Prime Minister Sato is opposed to committing his country to any military arrangement and he has openly differed with the United States’ efforts in giving ASPAC (Asian and Pacific Council) a military orientation. Yet, Tokyo knows full well the need for non-Communist Asian powers to team together. The obvious alternative, then, is co-operation in the technical and economic areas. All the same, on closer analysis, it is doubtful whether intimate economic ties could be a real answer to external military threats from a strong power. It is all very well to talk of self-reliance but if self-reliance to be ed by an inarticulate major promise of outside help, is worth asking the question whether such self-reliance is more prudent than committal to a long-term military alliance. Perhaps, Mrs. Gandhi herself was thinking of closer economic ties as capable of bringing together countries psychologically together and thus paving the way for bilateral agreements even over defence matters.

In any case, since the summer of 1968, there have been attempts on India’s part to project herself as a South-East Asian power and the starting of a proper dialogue with some of the countries in the region is itself a welcome sign.

If, without actually colluding, Russia and America are working for an identical goal: that of containing China–this very same motivation is leading them to woo Pakistan in a manner causing grave concern to India. The Russian policy in this regard is extremely interesting. In deciding to supply arms to Pindi she has put India and Pakistan on parity in her estimates. In his recent visit to the sub-continent Mr. Kosygin exhibited how necessary it is for him to keep Pindi in good humour. To top it all, Moscow announced that she no longer regards Pakistan as aligned to the West, meaning thereby that the latter is as much non-aligned as India is. The reason for this is not too far to seek. Even though General Yahya Khan did not show a pro-Chinese zeal immediately after assuming office, this cautious mood has disappeared of late. Pindi–Peking contacts have been growing rapidly and the Russians are anxious to do something to restrain Pindi. Hence the Russian anxiety to appease Pakistan. The Americans have been pursuing since a long time a policy of not hurting Pakistani feelings. No wonder that Washington has so far refused to firmly commit herself not to resume the supply of arms to Pindi. Thus the curious situation of Pakistan remaining very close to Peking and still getting arms from Moscow and Washington–remains unaltered to the great chagrin of India. Delhi’s persuasions in this regard have singularly failed. The super-powers have apparently forgotten that Pakistan might in a fit of bravado smash the fragile structure of peace erected in the sub-continent since Tashkent. As for Peking, she is eagerly waiting for this prospect.