International Affairs

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS
(Oct.-Dec. 1964)

In the first week of October there assembled at Cairo the representatives, several of them Prime Ministers, of 47 non-aligned Countries. Mr. Tshombe, the Prime Minister of Congo, arrived too, but he Was detained by the police for Some hours and then sent home. Such treatment of the head of a recognised Government was hardly in accordance with diplomatic usage, but there was no report that any of the dignitaries present demurred.

Next, probably, to Dr. Verwoerd, Mr. Tshombe is the best-hated man in Africa. Though no evidence has been produced, is accused of the murder of Patrice Lumumba. But be retains support of his Province Katanga, mainly because, while the rest of newly-freed Congo has dissolved into chaos, Katanga has preserved internal peace, and the industry, upon which its relatively high standard of life depends, has continued to work. He has been enabled to keep things going in this way by employing foreign experts and troops, and by conciliating the foreign companies; in short by what the Communists denounce as “neo-colonialism”. But while several other African States do the same things without publicity, he has seen no reason for concealment. In fact he stands out conspicuously against the hostility to the West which now rules at least in the public pronouncements of the States which so oddly call themselves non-aligned.

The Cairo conference sat for several days and discussed general and specific questions. China was not represented, but her cause was upheld by a strong group, mainly of dictators veering towards communism, who successfully opposed India’s suggestion a delegation be sent to Peking to urge the Government of China not to carry out its anticipated test of an atom-bomb. The group also successfully blocked the proposal of the United Arab Republic that the Colombo group press China to accept their compromise proposal on the Indian frontier dispute. The conference finally produced an agreed statement on world affairs. This set forth a number of principles intended to preserve peace, principles which have long been familiar and would indeed preserve peace if they were observed. The Indian Prime Minister, with the Kashmir dispute in mind, suggested that a paragraph be added declaring against application of self-determination to a part of a country, but his proposal was rejected.

In view of India’s failure to obtain support on these points, some commentators questioned the utility of participating in the conference. There was no less justification for questioning its non-alignment, and the advisability of signing a statement the political parts of which were consistently pro-communist and on some matters directly opposed to India’s interests. Thus the statement condemned as a menace to peace. America’s proposal to set up bases in the Indian Ocean which would defend India against China, and Malaysia against Indonesia; it also by implication opposed America’s support for South Vietnam, which is necessary for India’s security. Nor is it clear what interest India has in demanding the immediate liberation of colonies which would fall into chaos or become Communist outposts (no demand was made for the liberation of Tibet or of any Chinese or Russian colony). Likewise India has no interest in the withdrawal of the blockade of Cuba, the demand for which was made without mention of the provocation which led to it, namely Cuba’s attempts to overthrow neighbouring governments.

Thus the Cairo conference brought sharply to attention a clash between sentiment and interest: the sentiment of hostility to the West which has largely inspired non-alignment, and the interest of in preserving world stability, national independence and free institutions which urges India towards collaboration with and dependence on the West. This clash was felt again shortly after, when the leader of the Soviet Government was suddenly removed and when a nuclear explosion took place in China, and later when European troops intervened to rescue hostages held by the rebel forces in Congo.

On the 15th October the Russian press announced that Mr. Khrushchev had resigned his positions as Chairman of the Council of Ministers and First Secretary of the Communist Party, and that Mr. A. N. Kosygin had replaced him in the former capacity and Mr. L. I. Brezhnev in the latter. Hardly any effort was made to keep up the initial pretence that the resignation was due to his age and ill-health, but the causes and probable consequences of the event are still subjects of anxious speculation abroad. Few countries are as anxious about them as India, and the secrecy in which Communist affairs are conducted has seldom been so much deplored.

The best evidence available is that it was a group of party leaders, the Secretariat members and some other members of the Presidium of the Party Central Committee, who compelled Mr. Khrushchev to resign. They did so at a time when he and many who might have supported him were away from the centre of affairs. The Council of Ministers and the senior commanders of the armed forces, except Marshal Malinowski, had no part in the decision and were confronted with a fait accompli. His deposition from the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers took place in a meeting which was short of a quorum. The Chinese party leaders had no hand in the coup.

Most of those who took action against him owed their positions to him, but the statement in Pravda two days later, which spoke of hasty, unrealistic, one-man decisions, and the like, shows that they had come to distrust his methods of work. He had made himself almost as absolute a dictator as Stalin, and his frequent and drastic changes of policy, organisation and personnel had caused confusion in government affairs and kept his subordinates in un-certainty as to their positions; but he had not protected himself by a policy of terror as Stalin did. The conspicuous failures of his regime–the retreat from Cuba in 1962, the dispute with China and the poor performance of agriculture–no doubt counted against him, but it does not appear that there are any great differences of policy between him and his successors. Hitherto no very important changes in internal or foreign policy have been made. It is expected, however, that the atmosphere of all-round innovation which prevailed in his time will be replaced by one of greater caution.

The new leaders have announced that they will adhere to peaceful coexistence. They seem to attach the same meaning to this phrase as their predecessor did; that is, they feel free to encourage armed rebellion, as in Congo, but they will be careful to avoid major wars. Since they are less temperamental and impulsive than Mr. Khrushchev, the danger of unintended nuclear war caused directly by Russian action has probably diminished–it is apt to be forgotten that until the Cuba crisis in October 1962, Mr. Khrushchev was regarded as a reckless firebrand who had several times brought the world very near war. On the other hand, the new leaders certainly desire to improve relations with China, and if they do so to any substantial extent, China’s aggressiveness is likely to increase.

However, though the language used in their interchanges has been more temperate, relations with China seem to have improved very little. Mr. Chou En-lai visited Moscow in November apparently without achieving any agreement. The conference of 26 important Communist Parties, which had been announced for December in Moscow, has been postponed to March. This is regarded as an admission by Russia that her control of the Communist Parties has weakened, and thus as a victory for China. In general the foreign Communist Parties, and even those of Eastern Europe, whose Governments are maintained in power by Russia, expressed themselves with unprecedented freedom in criticism of the removal of Mr. Khrushchev.

The new Russian Government has made repeated statements to Indian leaders that the policy in relation to India remains unchanged, but in fact there have been indications of a change. In November a meeting of the World Peace Council, one of the Communist “front” organisations, was held in Delhi. The statements of the Russian delegation at this meeting may be taken as authoritative expositions of policy. Their resolution listed a number of conflicts and other developments as dangerous to peace, but did not include under that head China’s acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Indian Communists present, who were of the “right” or pro-Russia wing, urged that China’s nuclear weapons be named as a danger to peace, but initially at least the Russians refused, saying merely that the spread of nuclear weapons makes universal and complete disarmament more urgent than ever. The resolution also failed to mention China’s invasion and occupation of Indian territory as a danger to peace, while it urged India and China to settle their dispute “in the spirit of the Colombo proposals”. China had already accepted this formula, but India, insisting not only on the spirit but on the letter of the proposals, had rejected it as inadequate. This resolution shows a greater inclination on the part of Russia to appease China than prevailed under Mr. Khrushchev. On December 7 the Russian delegate in the United Nations General Assembly supported China’s proposal for a conference of all heads of States to decide upon complete nuclear disarmament. This is support for Chaina’s completely unrealistic proposal, designed merely for propaganda, as against India’s equally unrealistic but not insincere plea for consideration by the nuclear powers of ways to protect the non-nuclear powers against nuclear weapons. Thus the change in Russia’s attitude towards China and India which was in any case to be expected is coming about. How far it will go cannot at present be predicted.

It had been foreseen for some time that China would soon succeed in exploding a nuclear bomb. The Cairo conference discussed the matter and refused to request the Government of China not to do so. When the explosion took place, spokesmen of several of these countries congratulated China. Some of them are influenced by “left” or pro-China Communists, and they appear to be pleased because China’s possession of atomic weapons will help her campaign of expansion. Some expressed pleasure because a “white” monopoly had been broken, and it has been reported that two other non-white countries, Indonesia and the U. A. R., plan shortly to make nuclear bombs. Those countries however which are not Communist or inclined towards Communism were dismayed by the event, and the American President announced that he was prepared to enter into an agreement for defence against China’s nuclear weapons with any country expressing a desire for it.

In the long term, China no doubt intends her nuclear weapons to neutralise those of America and Russia, but in the short term they are intended to help the present campaign of expansion in Asia and Africa, not through any threat of their use but because they increase China’s prestige. The only country which they will threaten directly in the near future is India. The Government of India have tried to assure the public that there is no danger, but have appealed the other nuclear powers to consider how the non-nuclear countries in general may be protected from the danger. No satisfactory response to this appeal can be expected; it is presumably only a first step towards more specific proposals.

Meanwhile the public have been greatly agitated and have demanded that the Government should either enter into an agreement with one of the other nuclear powers which would guarantee India against the danger from China or undertake to make nuclear weapons in India. Both proposals, however, are strongly opposed. An agreement of this kind with another power would offend against the principle of non-alignment, which many still cherish. Moreover, as the French have argued in the parallel case, such an agreement would not entirely allay the public’s fears, for when China becomes capable of devastating the guaranteeing country, that country’s guarantee will cease to convince.

To make nuclear weapons in India would violate a solemn undertaking of the former Prime Minister which has been repeated by his successor. Those who would ignore this consideration have to think mainly of the expense. From what is known to the public, it might not be prohibitively costly to make a considerable number of bombs of the simpler types, though if more “sophisticated” weapons are needed the cost is said to be much higher. : But to make the bombing planes or rockets necessary to carry them to the vital targets in China would be very expensive. China has advance air bases within a few hundred miles of India’s main industrial centres, and therefore needs only light bombers. India would have to carry bombs at least two thousand miles, which would need much bigger bombers or intermediate range ballistic missiles, both of which are enormously costly. After persisting with it for some years, so rich a country as Britain abandoned as prohibitively expensive the effort to maintain her independent manufacture of ballistic missiles, and she is now wholly dependent upon America for her defence against Russia’s nuclear weapons.

It would be possible to overcome this difficulty if one of the nuclear powers were willing to supply weapons and suitable bombers or rockets on “lend-lease” or similar terms, and to surrender their control to India. Nobody, however, has yet had the courage to suggest such a thing publicly, and no country has yet surrendered control of any of its atomic weapons to another country. Immediately after the war in 1945 America denied even her closest allies any further access to her nuclear technology, and the American President “keeps his finger on the trigger” of all the nuclear weapons in bases overseas. Similarly Russia ceased to aid China’s nuclear development four years before it fructified last October. However, India’s is a unique case, of vital importance to the free countries, and a solution of the problem on these lines is at least more likely than general nuclear disarmament, which is unacceptable to the non-Communist countries, and probably to the Communist countries, and must be regarded as unattainable in the foreseeable future.

In the middle of October a general election took place in Britain. As had been expected, theConservative Government was defeated and the Labour Party won. Mr. Wilson became Prime Minister and formed a Government. Almost his first decision was to impose a drastic all-round reduction of imports, which will have adverse effects on India, as on other exporting countries. This was intended only to meet a crisis and probably will soon be rescinded; in the long run a Labour Government in Britain is expected to be somewhat more liberal in regard to trade and aid to the developing countries. However, the future of the Wilson Government is uncertain. Its majority, of seats and of votes, is very narrow. Indeed the vote for Labour was slightly below the figure at the previous election. The Conservative Party vote fell by nearly two million, and the Liberal Party, despite its lack of able leaders, gained more than two million and received almost one-seventh of the total vote. Under proportional representation the Liberals would occupy 80 seats and a position of great influence. This result is interpreted as due to a desire to displace the Conservative Party after thirteen years in office, combined with a persistent dislike of the socialist tendency to impose irksome and inefficient state controls. In the West, aided by the more profound analysis of the post-Keynesian economists, capitalism has regained much ground and is now more successful and more popular than at any time since the First World War. On the other hand, the economy of the socialist countries has not been strikingly successful in recent years, and doubt is growing as to the capacity of any socialist system to cope with the vast complexity of its problem.

Early in November a presidential election was held in the United States. The Democratic Party candidate, Mr. Johnson, defeated the Republican, Mr. Goldwater, polling a bigger percentage of the votes cast than had ever been obtained before. The Democratic Party also won a considerable number of seats in both houses of the legislature. Mr. Johnson has not the attractive personality of his predecessor, President Kennedy, but he appears to be a man of genuine liberal convictions, and in internal affairs he has won a reputation for outstanding political ability. He is, however, comparatively inexperienced in foreign affairs. His opponent professed to stand for true conservatism, a doctrine which aroused much interest and might have had considerable appeal in a world tired of tumultuous change, often for the worse, and Utopian promises which are never fulfilled. But he failed to expound his views in a convincing way, and caused consternation by his irresponsible attitude on the colour problem and more especially on nuclear weapons. His overwhelming defeat was greeted with relief everywhere except among those who think that Utopia can spring from universal catastrophe.

Very soon after the liberation of Congo from Belgian control in 1960, the State proved to be unable to maintain an orderly administration, and called for aid from the U. N. The aid was generally successful but was expensive and had to be brought to an end on June 30, 1964. Soon afterwards, a rebellion broke out in the far north-eastern corner of the State bordering on the Sudan and Burundi. Chinese agents were known to be active in Burundi, and it was later proved that the rebels were armed with Chinese and Russian arms, some of them brought by Russian air crews from Algeria, and, it is alleged, from Egypt, Bhana and Mali, all Communist-inclined States. The rebel force advanced quickly, recruiting men as it went, and in August captured Stanleyville, the important town in the north which in 1960 was the capital of Lumumba and his Communist-inspired followers. Though it had received a small amount of American aid, the Congo Government in Leopoldville had hitherto failed to withstand the rebels. In this crisis it asked Mr. Tshombe to take the lead, and he has achieved some success. Strengthened by several hundred European officers and men; the army began to progress against the rebels. In November, the rebel forces, now in retreat, seized some thousands of Congo Government officials and some hundreds of foreign business people, missionaries and experts, including about 40 Indians, and threatened to kill them if the Government forces did not withdraw. Negotiations under the auspices of the Organisation of African Unity failed, and the rebels carried out their threat in part and executed many of the hostages.

On November 24 a Belgian paratroop regiment was flown by American planes from the British possession of Ascension Island. It seized Stanleyville and the neighbouring town of Paulis, and rescued many of the hostages. The Belgian force was withdrawn, immediately, but almost all the African States, supported by most of the non-aligned, including India and the Communist bloc accused America, Belgium and Britain of imperialism and unjustified intervention in the internal affairs of Congo. Mobs attacked the American embassies in Cairo and Moscow, and language of unprecedented bitterness was used in the meeting of the United Nations General Assembly which discussed the matter. The Belgian and American spokesmen replied that the expedition was authorised by the Government of the Congo, and was purely humanitarian; and when the troops were withdrawn, excitement gradually subsided.

Once again India felt the clash between sentiment and interest. Sentiment was against the West, especially on an occasion when white and coloured troops were in conflict, and the fact that the Belgian troops saved 40 Indian hostages from a gruesome death did not appear to weaken the general feeling. On the other hand India’s interest is that the Leopoldville Government should suppress the rebellion, even if it has to be propped up by the West. For the alternative is a Congo in the hands of Communists, financed and armed by Russia and China and committed to the expansion of Communist power throughout Africa by the formidable methods of which the Chinese Communists are masters: infiltration and guerilla warfare. A most sinister development of the past two years, no less alarming than the nuclear explosion, is China’s success in establishing bases in Africa, a continent which Mr. Chou En-lai, after his three months tour there a year ago, pronounced to be ripe for revolution.

“No less disturbing is the vigour with which Russia has supported the rebels. Whether this is being done from revolutionary fervour or to maintain her influence as against China’s competition, is of no importance. Just as she supports the Viet Cong and Indonesia, though they are China’s allies, Russia is putting her influence, money and arms at the service of the effort to Communise Africa which she has long studied and prepared, though she has recently allowed China to take the lead. It hardly needs to be said that a Communist Africa would be a deadly danger to India, and if it were coupled with Communist control of South-East Asia, India’s position would be precarious indeed. The rejoicing of the enemies of Communism over the quarrel between Russia and China may prove to have been premature: the quarrel may stimulate both to greater efforts in the cause of world revolution. India’s quarrel, on the other hand, is internal: the clash between the sentiment of pre-independence days and the interest of the present and future is hampering understanding and action.

Jan. 10, 1965