The Vietnam Tangle

MAJOR S. G. CHAPHEKAR (Retd.)

Recent moves by U. S., Egyptian, British, Japanese and Russian diplomats to resolve the Vietnam tangle have again focussed world attention on this chronic sore in the body politic of South East Asia.

The United States of America have been pouring men, money and material into South Vietnam in the hope of an early settlement. The U. S. enjoys the mastery of the sea and air in the region. The material aid has been on a massive scale. Over 200,000 U. S. troops are now engaged in a fierce struggle with the Vietcong forces and their allies in the jungles and hills of S. Vietnam. Yet this aid instead of ending, apparently, seems only to be prolonging the struggle in this corner of South East Asia. Not only the people in other countries but also the citizens of U.S.A. are puzzled at continuation of the fighting. This article is an attempt to explain the paradox of the fighting in S. Vietnam.

By the last decade of the 19th century, the whole of Indo-China (Laos, Cambodia and Anam) came under French control.

These three states of Indo-China were administered by their respective rulers one of whom boasted the title of ‘Emperor’. But France controlled all foreign trade and had established a firm hold on the administration through their local representatives at the Courts of these potentates who led the lives of gay play-boys spending most of their time in Paris or on the Riviera.

As literacy spread and young Indo-Chinese returned from studies in France, they began to dream of freedom and democratic institutions. They resented both the French domination and the autocratic rule of their indigenous rulers. But the French and the local rulers united to put down demands for popular rule and freedom.

Then came the Second World War. Japan took over the East Asia. Then also came the Japanese surrender in August, 1945. This was a crucial time. I am not writing this from hearsay. I had the misfortune to be a prisoner of war in Japanese hands for 3 ½ years. From Singapore I was packed off with 300 Indian prisoners of war to Hanoi in Tonking (N. Vietnam). The surrender, terms laid down that North Anam (now N. Vietnam) was to be occupied by Chinese troops, whole South Anam (now S. Vietnam) was to be occupied by British Indian troops. The British were prompt in occupying the area allotted to them, but not so the Chinese. It took them over 2 ½ months to assemble enough troops to occupy N. Anam. Thus there was a political vacuum of over two and half months. This was fully exploited by the Nationalist elements who took complete control of the administrative machinery. If I remember right, Dr. Ho Chi Minh announced the independence of his country at a mass rally in Hanoi either on 3rd or 4th September, 1945. Later the Allies decided to restore French sovereignty over Indo-China. This was the beginning of the trouble in Indo-China. The Nationalists, naturally, vociferously opposed the restoration of French Imperialism. They now wanted no foreign domination, either European or Asian. The return of French Imperialism was a signal for the start of a liberationmovement in Indo-China, particularly in Tonking where the nationalists were strongly entrenched. In the initial stages it was a peaceful movement like the one in India. But repression invited retaliation.

Dr. Minh may have had socialist leanings, but on the whole the movement was essentially nationalist, that is, Dr. Minh called his party as The Viet Minh Party. The movement was not confined to the north. It established its focal points in the south also. The Viet Minh took to guerilla fighting.

Till 1949 the Viet Minh did not or could not make much headway because they received no outside aid. In 1949 a great change came over the Far East. Communist rule was established on the Chinese mainland.

The Chinese province of Yunan is contiguous to Tonking. Vietnam’s culture definitely still retains features which are Chinese in origin. Till the French introduced the Roman script for the Anamite language it was written in Chinese ideographs. There is also an influential Chinese Community in N. Vietnam. The Viet Minh naturally turned to China for help. China was only too willing to do so. The Viet Minh troops were trained in Yunan across the border, in the successful technique of guerilla warfare, which had enabled the communists to establish themselves in China. The Viet Minh volunteers were not only trained but also armed and equipped by the Communist regime in China. It was, therefore, no wonder that Communist ideology soon came to dominate the Viet Minh polices in Vietnam.

This entirely changed the complexion of the struggle in Vietnam. The French were now fighting not against a few rebels but against an ideology. France fought a losing war in Indo-China and in spite of all the massive military hardware she received from the U. S. A., the end came with the fall of Dien Bin Phu. The sympathies of Afro-Asian countries were naturally with the Viet Minh who represented nationalist struggling against colonialism. In the meantime India had begun to feel uneasy because the possibility of the extension of the war to South East Asia, which would affect her safety. She, therefore, took an active part in bringing about the calling of the Geneva Conference to bring hostilities to an end.

The Geneva Conference under the co-chairmanship of Britain and Russia succeeded in ending the conflict in Indo-China. France realising that the battle had been lost and more particularly becoming worried by similar struggles nearer home in Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco, agreed to part with power in the East. Indo-China that is, the three states in that country, were granted freedom.

In S. Vietnam the French handed over control to the play-boy Emperor Bao Dai, who was more interested in pretty faces on the Riviera than in the affairs of his own country. This paved way for the overthrow of Bao Dai and the emergence of the strong man, Dr. Diem. According to the International Commision a common formula was to be evolved for holding elections in North and South Vietnam.

But the elections could not come off in 1957 because N. and S. Vietnam could not agree over the election procedure and the machinery to control the election. This made these people feel that they were let down and doomed to remain under the unsatisfactory S. Vietnam regime. They, therefore, resolved to stage a struggle on their own against the regime, of course, with the assurance of the moral and material support from the regime in the north. To avoid confusion and deny the charge of collusion with the Viet Minh, they began to call themselves the ‘Viet Cong’. This was nothing but a repetition of the same struggle.
Meanwhile, a Coupe-de-etat overthrew Dr. Diem and the armed forces entered the political arena, which meant the end of even the thin facade of democracy in S. Vietnam. The new regime sought military aid from the U. S. A. who was only too willing to oblige. U. S. Military personnel arrived to train the S. Vietnamese forces in the techniques of modern warfare and the use of modern arms. The inevitable result was the imposition of U. S. policies and strategy on the policies of the S. Vietnamese government.

The U. S. A. now intervened in the struggle on the invitation of the S. Vietnamese. U. S. A. jumped into the fray hoping, with her modern arms and mastery of the air and the sea, to finish the affair in a short time. Here the U. S. A. made a mistake. She now found herself bogged down in a quagmire. The more she triedto get out of it the deeper she found herself in the mud.

Troops and supplies are supposed to pass across not one but four frontiers. China is sending supplies across the Yunan border. Russia too is sending supplies through China. Supplies and troops are being sent across the 17th Parallel, the Laotian border and, if we are to believe the Americans, the Combodian border. The USAF is losing planes because apparently the N. Vietnamese are using ground-to-air-missiles. Meanwhile the ground fighting in S. Vietnam is daily growing in intensity.

What is the secret of the apparent success of the Viet Cong ? Their total strength can hardly exceed 1,25,000. Against them are pitted 2,00,000 U. S. troops and perhaps 1,50,000 Government troops. This means numerically they are inferior to the U. S. and S. Vietnamese forces. They have no planes, no air cover and armour support. Yet the U. S. forces, with all their modern weapons are unable to suppress them. Why? Because the U. S. forces and their allies are not fighting an army but they are fighting a people.

The Viet Cong are local people, though their strength is supplemented by troops from N. Vietnam. And even the Vietnamese are not foreigners in S. Vietnam. The only foreigners are the U. S. troops. The terrain is admirably suited for guerilla warfare. The American soldier can never be at home in the jungles and paddy fields of Vietnam. He can be easily out made out by his colour, stature and uniform, The Viet Cong guerilla is fighting in his own home, helped by his own people, fed by his own people, eating the same food, wearing the same clothes.

Why then is U. S. fighting an apparently losing war in Vietnam? The answer is to be found in U. S. world strategy. The U. S. A. by now, is resigned to the Existence of Communism. The U. S. A. and U. S. S. R. are drawing closer. But U. S. A. is naturally worried about the expansionist tendency so apparent in Chinese Communism. The fears have increased since China joined the ‘A’ Club two years ago. China must, naturally be now busy developing rocket missiles to carry atomic war heads over long distances. When she develops these, she will become a power to reckon with. So the Chinese potential must be destroyed while it is in the experimental stage. To do so U. S. A. must have an excuse to go at China.

The U. S. A. is seeking this excuse. One such excuse had presented itself in October-November, 1962 when China invaded India. It will be recalled with what alacrity both U. K. and U. S. A. had offered to extend air cover to India against China. But the clever Chinese unilaterally stopped the fighting as they realised the implications of U. S. intervention.

What lies behind the escalation of fighting, particularly air bombing, of N. Vietnam? It is simply a bait to China. Will China bite it? China is too shrewd to walk into the parlour. What was the object of U. S. planes from Saipan coming to bomb objectives in N. Vietnam? I feel it was to demonstrate to the Chinese, the capacity of U. S. bombers to bomb objectives across a distance of 3000 miles. What will be the obvious target for U. S. bombers in case of a showdown with China? I presume it is Sinkiang, the source of Chinese atomic power. Chinese atomic plants are located in that province. A few atomic bombs on these targets will destroy the Chinese atomic potential in its infancy. U. S. military aid to Pakistan must also be viewed from this angle. Air bases in Pakistan enabled U. S. planes to fly over Russia and in the future they can be used to bomb Sinkiang from nearer, distance. This is the secret of U. S. partiality for Pakistan. Chinese aspirations in Ladakh flow from this same fear. The recent halt in U. S. bombing of N. Vietnam was prompted by, I feel, a sincere desire to resolve the tangle in Vietnam.

What then is the solution of the problem?

I feel that U. S. will promptly stop the war if she was assured that United Vietnam will not be a henchman of China, though she might become a Communist State. The other solution to this tangle is more difficult and complicated. The first requisite is to have a real stable government in S. Vietnam truly representative of the Nation. Administrative reforms must be introduced to liquidate corruption, nepotism and religious animosities. The farmer and the worker must be given a fair deal. Law and Order must prevail over the countryside. But this is a very tall order.

In this connection U. S. feelers for settlement have so far produced no tangible results. China refuses to be drawn into the struggle. The recent attempt on the part of U. S. A. to bring in the U. N. is likely to fail because of Russian opposition and possible veto. The only alternative which suggests itself is the recall of the Geneva Conference which was instrumental in resolving the Vietnamese-French struggle in 1954. But the members of the Geneva Conference must be willing to enforce its majority decisions by collective sanctions against the party violating the terms of truce. Only collective sanctions can enforce peace. No country should enjoy the prerogative of veto whose use will nullify the work of the Conference.

One thing is certain. No decision can be forced on the warring parties by strength of arms. Only sanity and a spirit of co-operation can solve the issue. The fighting has brought untold sufferings to the masses in both N. and S. Vietnam. Ultimately the people themselves must decide their future and the form of government they want to live under. South East Asia needs peace to heal the wounds of war.