The Governor Under Swaraj

The Governor Under Swaraj

If you ask a man in the street whether he desires to have a Governor for any of the self-governing Provinces of India under Swaraj, he will not hesitate to say that a Governor will certainly be needed at the head of a Provincial Government. The people in our country have been so long accustomed to a personal head for their State, that it is almost impossible for them to think of a Province without a Governor. But all those fairly numerous people who have been in touch with the Nationalistic politics of the past two decades are anxious to find ways and means to have self-governing Provinces without a Governor. Recently, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru has joined their ranks and he wants to do away with the Governors of our Provinces. Let us examine the reasons for which these Nationalist Radicals wish to avoid Governors in the Provinces, They feel that the future Governors will be as costly and as fond of pomp and show as the present Governors. They seem to fear that a Governor can only be a disturbing element, as he is today, in the inevitable political conflicts which will ensue on the formation of Parties. Thirdly, they are afraid that this institution will tend to produce and maintain a slavish mentality in the masses. But they seem to forgetthat, in future, Governors will have to be only the figureheads of the Provincial Government, and so may not be as costly as they are to-day. They ignore the fact that in a self-governing province, a Governor can only function as a mediator in politics. Lastly, they are unaware of the fact that even in democratically-governed countries, a symbol of the authority and the prestige of the State is found to be necessary. The United States of America and Switzerland are the only countries whose Presidents are not only supreme heads of the State, but also members of the Executive and the leaders of Parties. In U. S. A. the President is more than a constitutional ruler and he is less controlled by the representatives of the people than the Prime Minister of a country like England. Since we suppose that our Provinces are to enjoy constitutional governments fashioned after the British Parliamentary institutions, a Governor enjoying the powers and prestige of an American President is not suitable. On the other hand, a Governor of the type of the Swiss President does not serve our purpose. Switzerland is a very small country and her politics are not as much vitiated by party conflicts and factious crises as will obtain in a large country like India. Therefore, the President of that country, although a responsible member of the Executive and a leader of a Party, is looked upon as the head of the State, and is respected and revered from a non-partisan and national point of view. But in any of our Provinces the same kind of Governor will not do, because the parties in our country will have more clear-cut policies than those of Switzerland, the population consists of more heterogeneous elements than those of even Switzerland, and there is not that tradition of respect and obedience shown to, and status maintained by, a party head of the State which is to be found in that country. Moreover, the Executives of our Provinces are to enjoy more powers of initiative and responsibility than that of Switzerland, and the Provincial Legislatures will certainly have to be no less powerful and exacting and very industrious, because the functions of our Provincial Governments will be more manifold, their activities will be on a larger scale, and the risks involved in the work of the State will be greater. In a country like ours, where people have been accustomed to generations to look up to a visible head of the State, who is expected to be wise, impartial and statesman-like, it is really inadvisable to create an institution which will be assailed every minute by accusations of unstatesmanlike, partisan, or unintelligent policy. In this connection, it is worthwhile to note what a former President of France has to say: "the head of the" State brought to book for the most trivial incidents, forced to reply personally to daily interpellations, drawn into practising an individual policy, the stability of the Executive compromised, the representation of France abroad interrupted, -such would be the inevitable results of such responsibility, it the President of the Republic is made responsible to the representatives whose duty it is to make the Laws."

METHOD OF APPOINTMENT

If, therefore, we decide in favour of having a Governor for each of our self-governing Provinces, how is he to be appointed? In France, the President is elected by the National Assembly, which is formed of the Deputies and Senators. In Germany, he is elected by all the voters of the Republic. But in the British Colonies, the Governor-General and Governors are appointed by the King of England. Are we to vote for a Governor, elected by our own people, or are we to accept the general practice available in the Empire, i.e., the King nominating the Governors? Those of us who may prefer the first method must beware of the inevitable inconveniences and dangers of such a practice. The most important quality we want in a Governor is his impartiality and non-partisanship, and an equally important consideration in this respect is that the people must credit him with impartiality and statesmanship. Can we be sure that a Governor elected by the people of a Province in India will be able to satisfy these two conditions? We must all admit that we are rather a temperamental people like the French. If we are to elect like the French, we are apt to elect that person who is behind the most popular party in the country. The evils of electing a statesman with a partisan past and a live interest in the destinies of one of the parties are many, and Presidents like Poincaire and Millerand have brought them into prominence. In a country like ours, where communal, religious and economic cleavages are rampant, and where for that reason an unhappy choice of a Governor is beset with so many dangers, it is not after all advisable to go in for an elected Governor. But the advocates of election may reasonably cite the example of Germany, where popular election has brought Hindenburg to the Presidency and he has not proved a failure. They must, however, remember that the question of Republic versus Monarchy, with which Germany is faced, was decided once for all in 1919 and no President could, with impunity, effectively try to turn the wheel the other Way. Barring such exceptional questions, as Republic versus Monarchy, Germany is faced with less troublesome problems than those which will confront us. We must, nevertheless, admit that, if at all a Governor is to be elected, it is better to elect him by universal franchise than by the members of the Legislature, because the former method ensures greater chances of returning a statesman than the latter. But because in Germany and France, the institution similar to our King-Emperor is absent, the Chief Magistrate has to be elected either by the Legislatures or by the people at large. We have, on the other hand, the excellent institution of the King-Emperor and we may reasonably expect this institution to choose for us, and on our behalf, Governors with the capacity to satisfy the two requisite qualities demanded of them.

If thus we are in favour of allowing the King-Emperor to choose the Governors for us, how is he to exercise this function? Is he to be guided in this by the Provincial or Central Ministry, or by the British Ministry? In Canada, it is the Federal Ministry which advises the King through the Governor-General to appoint particular persons as Governors. In Australia, on the other hand, it is the British Ministry which takes up the responsibility of advising the Crown in the choice of Governors. In our case, if we wish that our Governors shall be Indians, it is the India Government which will certainly be well-fitted to choose the proper persons. But if we decide in favour of English or British Governors, the British Government is more capable of making the best selection.

INDIAN OR BRITISH GOVERNORS?

The answer to the question as to which nationality our Governors must belong to, is dependent upon the attitude we take with regard to the relations that must subsist between the Central and Provincial Governments. If we wish to leave the residuary powers with the Provincial Government, as is advocated by Sir K. V. Reddi in his scheme, then the Governors will have to be nominated after the example of Australia by the British Government. But if, as is envisaged by the schemes of Mr. S. Srinivasa Iyengar and the All Parties' Conference, we are to have a strong Central Government with residuary powers and, Provincial Governments enjoying certain specified powers, and privileges, then, Governors may be appointed by the India Government after the fashion of Canada or by the British Government, if it is so agreed. Although we may hope for a strong Central Government, we must admit to ourselves that Provinces like Burma and the North-West Frontier Province will be very unwilling to accept Governors appointed by the India Government. Moreover, the time may not come for another half a century when we can safely expect the Central Government to show that much of statesmanship, impartiality and non-communalism, as is necessary for the choice of proper Governors.

If, under the circumstances, we prefer that the King-Emperor should nominate the Governors on the advice of the British Government, are we to have Indian Governors or British Governors? Certainly the appointment of Lord Sinha has more than justified itself and we can feel sure that there will always be a few such statesmen in our country. But in the present century, one of the most important requisites for a Governor will be a sufficient knowledge and experience of the British Parliament and Cabinet, without which it will be impossible to steer the ship of a Provincial Government clear of the dangerous rocks of unparliamentary and arbitrary methods of politics, which are a common feature in Italy and Spain to-day. British Governors willbe useful in another respect, namely, that they can approach the problems ofour Provinces with disinterestedness, impartiality and open-mindedness, which are the most desirable qualities in a Governor. Therefore, it is, I think, fairly safe to conclude that it is in our own interests that most of our Governors should be British for a few decades to Come.

CENTRAL Vs. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENTS

The relations between theGovernors and the Governor-General must in future be more distinctly defined than at present. A Governor does get into direct Communication with the Secretary of State for India, before he gets into touch with the Governor-General, though in matters which are not very important. I think it is largely true to say that at present in almost all the questions of first-rate importance, Governors communicate with the Crown only through the Governor-General. The same practice obtains in Canada. But in Australia, where the State Governments enjoy the residuary powers, Governors claim direct access to the Crown, and declare that before the Crown they are as important and powerful as the Governor-General. If Sir K. V. Reddi's scheme were to be adopted, then the Australian system of appointing Governors will have to be adopted. But the complexity of life in Our country is so much more, the contacts between one Provincial Government and another are more numerous, and the risks involved in any bad feeling between different Governments are greater, than is the case with regard to the similar problems of Australia. What this direct access of every Governor to the Crown means is that, whenever any conflict arises between two Provincial Governments, the Central Government can interfere only as a third party, provided the disputants wish for her mediation, and not as the higher authority. And the parties to the conflict may take the case to London and fight itout at the other end. Instead of giving the Central Government, which certainly possesses more knowledge and needed statesmanship in the matter than the Crown, a power to mediate and decide upon the questions involved, we shall be forced to ask the intervention of the Crown for everything. Moreover, the Provincial Governments will have a natural tendency to ask the Crown to interfere, whenever they come into collision with the Central Government, whose functions are ever on the increase, and whose activities are so intermixed with those of the former. Then a regular establishment will be necessary in London to help the Crown to settle the numerous disputes which will arise between different Provincial Governments, and between them and the Central Government. Therefore, the Australian system, for the modification of which, by the way, there is a strong public opinion in that country, will not be suitable to our constitution. It will indeed be a mistake to introduce it into our country, where much the more advanced and convenient system is already in existence.

GOVERNOR'S CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION

So we are agreed to have our Governors nominated by the Crown who will be subordinate to the Governor-General. What exactly shall be the place occupied by the Provincial Governors in their respective Governments? As has been the practice till very recently, a Governor will not hold a portfolio. Secondly, he will not be expected to carry out any policy dictated or suggested to him by the India Government or by the Crown, as is the practice to-day. For instance, Governors are at present anxious to interfere in the local politics as far as possible in order to coax and coerce the Provincial Legislatures into accepting the Simon Commission. Such a thing will not take place. Thirdly, a Governor will have to be only a mediating element to smoothen the contacts in political life, and will be expected to interfere as little as possible in the internal organisation of different political parties, and the relations one to another. But at present it must be admitted that a Governor is more a disturbing element than a pacifying force, and creates more bad blood among the different sections of the people than need be, and prevents the growth of that harmony between the many and varied national interests, which must after all be the chief objective of a constitutional head. In fact, many of our Governors remind us of George III¹ of England. But we cannot blame any particular Governor for this. It is the vicious constitution of a semi-political and semi-constitutional Governor which is to blame. Fourthly, a Governor will in future be more interested in the maintenance of a proper Constitutional Government in his Province than in the upholding of the prestige of the British Government. As it is, a Governor tends to be more a bulwark for all the reactionary forces and the rigid Civil Service and the outworn and pernicious idea of the prestige of the British in India. Although in future a Governor will have to safeguard the interests of the Crown as such, he will not find it necessary to bolster up this dangerous idea of prestige and create an opportunity for another Bardoli. Fifthly, a Governorwill take more pains than at present to get into touch with the social and economic life of the people of his province and preside over the most important social and political functions of a non-partisan character, andstimulate the latent capacity of our people for social work and self-sacrifice by helping to organise Exhibitions, Orphanages, Social Service Centers and so on. Lastly, he will have to be judged in future by the Crown as a success, not by the extent of slavish mentality he succeeds in sustaining among the people, nor by the ability with which he forces the political activities into underground channels, and certainly not by his tact in demoralising the politicians and in paralysing the political consciousness of the people. That Governorwill be Considered a success who has endeared himself to the hearts of most of the people, who has guided the State to safety through many political crises, who has whipped the dormant capacity for political work into renewed activity, and who has helped the growth of the sense of justice in the political, social and economic activities of his people.

Such a Governor will however find much useful work to do in his constitutional capacity². The constitutional Governor will have to perform all those functions, supply all those political utilities and exercise all those constitutional powers which are enjoyed by the King of England in the British Constitution. He is to advice his Ministers whenever necessary. He has to warn them whenever he thinks they are likely to take a decision beset with dangerous results, and he has to protest against the adoption of any policy, which he may feel would be detrimental to the interests of the nation. In the words of Bagehot, "a Constitutional Sovereign has three rights–the right to be consulted, the right to encourage, and the right to warn. And a King of great sense and sagacity would want no others."³ A constitutional Governor may, on behalf of his Ministry, announce a new and epoch-making departure in social or economic or even political practices, and his announcement is sure to be accepted by the generality of people with gratification, while a similar announcement, made by a Prime Minister, however popular he may be, is inevitably misunderstood by certain sections of the politically-minded people. For instance, the Declaration of King George V at Belfast, calling upon the people of Great Britain and Ireland to cease their hostilities and to come to an amicable settlement of their disputes, has certainly paved the way to a considerable extent for the Round Table Conference between the plenipotentiaries of Ireland and England. Lastly, a Governor may, by postponing the coming into force of a Bill passed in the Legislature, provide an excellent opportunity for the minority to convert the majority to its view. He may, by admonishing at the right moment, check any Minister from committing himself to an untenable policy in the heat of a moment.

GOVERNOR AND MINISTERS

Let us see how the constitutional Governor will work in his office. The most important events in his tenure of office will be the general elections, the choosing of the Prime-Minister and his colleagues, the maintenance of the Ministry, the dissolution of the Legislative Council, and the exercise of the prerogatives of the constitutional head of the Government. It will help us to understand matters if we picture to ourselves the part played by the present Governors on all these occasions. Rightly or wrongly, the Madras Governor, H. E. Viscount Goschen, was understood by "The Hindu" to have suggested, in his proroguing speech to the Legislative council in September 1926, that it should help the country to return at the forthcoming meetings, the representatives of non-communal parties. The future Governor must not give room to such misunderstanding. Rightly or wrongly, the Justice party passed a vote of no-confidence in the present Governor at its Coimbatore meeting, on the plea that His Excellency had misused his constitutional powers. The supporters of this vote meant as much as to say that the Governor had utilised his political powers. But they forgot that, under the system of Government, His Excellency cannot but exercise his political powers. But in future our Governor must never be able to make use of his political powers at all. Only recently the Governor of the Central Provinces made a fervent appeal to the Legislative Council to accept the Simon Commission, although he knew that, at that time, the majority of members in the Council were against co-operation with the Simon Commission. He did so because he is empowered to do so and it looks as if he is going to succeed. Whether we are agreed or not, upon the question of co-operation with the Simon Commission, we must admit that many of our Governors have been able to make an excellent use of their political powers to achieve success. But such opportunities for interfering with the free-play of opinions and policies of legislators will not be open to our future Governors. It is rather a noteworthy fact that our Governors have preferred to work with Ministries which have not even a decent semblance of popular support, to dismissing them. It is much more astounding that none of them has thought it necessary to dissolve the Council, even though the Ministry has not the confidence of the Council. Thus the present constitution does not provide inducements to a Governor to prefer his constitutional privileges to his political powers. This pitfall will have to be avoided in future. Lastly, the experiment of Joint responsibility of the Ministry for the general policy, and individual responsibility of each Minister for the administrative problems of the Departments under his charge, was initiated by Viscount Willingdon in Madras. But it failed miserably in the last Independent Ministry Madras had, and the Ministers who were forced to resign admitted that this experiment would not work under the present conditions. It was introduced only in one other Province–the Central Provinces–and it seems to have failed even there. But in all the other Provinces, the principle of joint responsibility of the Ministry for the general policy is not even accepted. In future the system of anarchy in the Councils of Ministers cannot be allowed. To come to our constitutional Governor, it is his duty to suggest to his Ministry that, since it has no majority in the Council, it can do either of two things: it can ask for dissolution of the Council or it may itself resign. If the Council was elected only a year ago, and if the Governor thinks there is no need to appeal to the people again, he may refuse dissolution. Even then, it is always better for him to persuade his Ministry to agree with his reading of the situation than to make the same mistake as that committed by more than one Australian Governor who disagreed with his Ministry. If, on the other hand, the Governor agrees with his Ministry that the Council shall be dissolved, the Governor-General shall certainly be empowered to interfere and prevent a dissolution which may, in his opinion, bring to a head many unpleasant and dangerous questions. This additional safeguard against the misuse of the privilege of dissolution is as much needed in our country as in France, where, to dissolve the Chamber of Deputies, the President must get the consent of the Senate in addition to the advice of his Ministry. Supposing that the Governor and Governor-General have decided against dissolution, the only course open to the Governor is to ask for the resignation of the Ministry and to call upon the leader of the Opposition to form a new Ministry. If even he is unable to form a Ministry, then the Governor may dissolve the Council and ask the people for a fresh mandate to form a new Ministry. "A Chamber appointed for a determined time may, in the course of its existence, forget the promises which it has made to the country, may disregard the interests which are confided to it, or seek to usurp powers which do not belong to it. If it were nevertheless able to continue in the fulfillment of its functions, it would present a spectacle of impotence and disorder. The better to defend itself against encroachments and abuses, the Executive power should have the resource in such cases of enforcing a fresh consultation of the electors." The necessity for such a dissolution of the Legislative Council becomes more apparent in countries like France, Germany and India, where the traditions of parties and representative institutions are not yet well laid, and where there is a strong tendency for the growth of many political groups rather than two or three National Parties. Because, wherever the group system of politics prevails, it is impossible to have a stable Ministry with a clear-cut and well-known policy to follow, and to have a fairly homogeneous body of Ministers who believe in a common and popular general policy. More than two Ministries are usually formed in France within one parliamentary period, and many politicians find a place in different Ministries which stand for almost opposite general policies. Therefore, neither the people nor the politicians can expect to find stability of power, consistency of policy, and sincerity of purpose in their Ministries or Ministers. The same holds good of Germany also, and our experience of our Councils and Ministries in the last ten years warns us that our politics may not be different from those of Germany and France. Under these circumstances, the Parliament of the country becomes too powerful, Executives tend to be the playthings of the leaders of several groups, the position of Ministers becomes undignified, weak and non-political, and the representatives of the people tend to care more for jobbery and log-rolling than for the real interests of the people. There are only two remedies for the development of such a corrupt policy. One is the growth of a few nation-wide parties and the other is an effective threat of dissolution.

FORMATION OF A NEW MINISTRY

The Governor will have to show much tact and statesmanship in the formation of a Ministry soon after a new Council is formed. We have reason to believe that there will be very many groups in each of our Legislative Councils. No two groups will be able to command a majority in the future Council, even though the nominated bloc disappears. Therefore, a regular bargaining will ensue between the leaders of different parties for the number of, and the kind of, Ministerships which should be allotted to each of the groups. The leaders of some groups may be unwilling to co-operate if a particular leader among them is nominated the Chief Minister. In the Conferences that will ensue, the bargains that will take place, the compromises and arrangements that must be effected, a Governor will find himself extremely useful to the accredited leaders of the people, because, being an outsider, he can gauge the situation, avoid the pitfalls and choose that leader of a group who is most acceptable to the leaders of the groups which may agree to co-operate with that group, and which may be able to command a majority in the Council. Before nominating a leader as the Prime-Minister, our Governor will have to get into conference with the various leaders of the groups and form an opinion as to which wings of the groups have won the confidence of the people, and which of the leaders they are prepared to accept as a natural leader. After nominating one of them as the Prime Minister, the Governor will have to help him in choosing particular leaders for different positions, and in so forming the Ministry that it can win prestige and favour, for strength as well as principle, not only in the Province but also in the country. If our Governor studies carefully how the French and German Presidents have been trying to solve the most difficult problems, he will be able to find himself best equipped for the job. A Governor may be in a better position to judge the Parliamentary capacity, skill and statesmanlike ability of young and pushful politicians than the leaders of groups, and he may make himself extremely useful to the Prime-Minister by helping him to avoid the mistake committed by Sir Robert Peel in neglecting Disraeli's claims.

THE GOVERNOR'S GUIDANCE

Much the most important and difficult Part of the work of a Governor commences after the Ministry is formed and the Council accepts its general policy. The Governor may give the Cabinet, from time to time, the benefit of his readings of the political situation in the country, since on his tours to different parts of the country he will have come into touch with the leaders of all sections of the people. He may suggest new Bills to safeguard the interests of certain sections of the people, and may warn against certain Bills or certain provisions of such Bills on the plea that the Cabinet will unnecessarily become unpopular, without doing any good to the country. He may be able to keep effectively in Control the ebullitions of enthusiasm of certain members of his Cabinet for certain unpopular or unreasonable Bills, administrative Ordinances, or Declarations, by threatening that he will have to ask the Council to reconsider its Bills or Resolutions, or that he will postpone the sanction he will have to give to Bills or Ordinances before those can be put into execution. He may even go to the length of protesting against the policy of the Ministry when he fears that policy cannot reasonably be expected to be popular in the Council. In this way, a Governor who knows his job and understands his responsibilities, will be able to introduce the necessary element of stability, the spirit of compromise and give and take, and the proper consideration for the ultimate interests of the country. Again a Governor will be in the best position to call for informal meetings of the leaders of different groups to discuss and come to an agreement over questions which may threaten to bring about unnecessary and even dangerous cleavages among large sections of people. To smoothen the passage of such Bills as the Sarada and Gour Bills, the Religious Endowments Bill, he will be the best channel through which different forces of public opinion can flow to a common vantage ground. At times a Ministry may be afraid of the consequences of certain interpellations in the Council. The Governor may then feel that the maintenance of the existing Ministry is essential in the national interests and that the interpellations will weaken the Ministry, and so he may call for the Opposition leaders and may try to avoid unpleasant consequences. Without compromising the political or personal interests of any leader or Minister, a Governor is best able to set the ball of compromise and reconciliation rolling and he can help a popular Ministry to wade through many difficulties. He may also hasten the downfall of an unpopular Ministry by bringing about dissolution on the advice of the Governor-General and with the consent of the leaders of all parties.

A Governor may ask for the resignations of his Ministers so soon as a vote of ‘no-confidence’ is passed against them in the Council. But he may, if he thinks it more in the national interests, again call upon the former Premier to form a Ministry. But the most constitutional practice will be to ask the leader of the Opposition to form the Ministry, and if he is unable to form it and yet is unwilling to let the other leader carry on H. E's Government, then the Governor ought to call upon the former Premier to form a new Ministry and on the passing of the vote of ‘no-confidence’ against the new Ministry, order the dissolution of the Council.

The Governor of a Province is the highest authority in the Province for all matters of state. He will be at the head of ceremonies and he must be the sole medium to approach the Crown for mercy or freedom, political or personal. No Edict or Ordinance, no Bill or Regulation, and no Constitutional Declaration shall be valid, unless the Governor has previously given his consent. All that a constitutional Monarch can do is permissible to him. But all the public records, papers, Bills, Rules, and Regulations that are signed by him must be counter-signed by one of the responsible Ministers of the Cabinet.

But in view of the fact that the legal Sovereign for our Provincial Government is the Crown, and that the Governor is the accredited representative of the Crown and that he is expected to function with the aid, and on the advice of, the Governor-General of India, a Provincial Governor will certainly be more powerful than the French President; he will be more independent than the German President; and he will be less a tool of the Council than a Constitutional Monarch. When the Governor-General and the Governor are both well- experienced men, and when the experiences of the different Governors of the Provinces of India are available, it becomes more easy for a Governor to become an effective check upon the irresponsible elements in a Council or a Cabinet, and to form a useful and authoritative element in the constitution of a Provincial Government. But the nature and functions of a constitutional Governor in an Indian Province are still in the womb of the future, and our speculations can only helpto indicate the possible ways in which he may be able to work for the good of the country.

In conclusion, we must note that the time has not yet come when we can elect Governors; that it is yet too early to think of dispensing with the British Governors; and that the future Governor will be more like a constitutional Monarch enjoying all the prestige and status of birth, culture, and common sense than a Republican President. Lastly, our Governor will inevitably be more powerful than a constitutional Monarch and he will tend to be an influential and useful link in the chain of political institutions of a Province.

Books for further study :-

1. The English Constitution–Walter Bagehot. .
2. The German Constitution–Rene Barnet.
3. The Irish Constitution–Darrell Figgis.
4. The Government of France–Bartholomew.
5. How France is Governed–Raymond Poincaire.
6. The Governance of England–Sydney Low.

7. Report on Indian Constitutional Reforms.

8. Development of Indian Polity–M. Ramachandra Rao.

9. Modern Democracies–Lord Bryce.

10. Government of Switzerland–Brookes.

1 ‘The Present Discontents’ by Edmund Burke.

2 There need be no fear that we may not be able to get first-class British Statesmen if an Indian Governorship were to be deprived of its political powers, for our Governorship will only be an effective stepping stone to all the aspirants for the Cabinet Ministership in England.

3 ‘The British Constitution’ by Walter Bagehot, P. 75.