Verse 3416-3418

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

ये चापचपधर्माणः प्रतिपक्षस्य सन्निधौ ।
अत्यन्तापचयस्तेषां कलधौतमलादिवत् ॥ ३४१६ ॥
सम्भाव्यन्ते तथा चामी क्लेशज्ञेयानृतादयः ।
यथोपदिष्टधर्माणस्तत्प्रहाणेऽमला धियः ॥ ३४१७ ॥
यथोक्तधर्मणामेषां सम्भाव्यो यदि वा मलः ।
अत्यन्तोन्मूलने दक्षः प्रतिपक्षस्तथैव हि ॥ ३४१८ ॥

ye cāpacapadharmāṇaḥ pratipakṣasya sannidhau |
atyantāpacayasteṣāṃ kaladhautamalādivat || 3416 ||
sambhāvyante tathā cāmī kleśajñeyānṛtādayaḥ |
yathopadiṣṭadharmāṇastatprahāṇe'malā dhiyaḥ || 3417 ||
yathoktadharmaṇāmeṣāṃ sambhāvyo yadi vā malaḥ |
atyantonmūlane dakṣaḥ pratipakṣastathaiva hi || 3418 ||

In things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites,—there comes about an utter deterioration,—as is pound in the case of the impurities in gold.—Afflictions, wrong notions of cognisable things and so forth, are all endowed with the said character (of deteriorating in the presence of their opposites): hence on the destruction of these, cognitions become free from impurities. If it is possible for these, endowed as they are with the said character, to have impurities,—then it is equally possible for their opposite to uproot that impurity.—(3416-3418)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Or, things that have been found to deteriorate in the presence of their opposites are liable to utter deterioration when their opposite rises to its highest stage of development; as is found to be the ease with the impurities of gold;—Love, Hatred and the rest are found to deteriorate in the presence of the knowledge of ‘Soul-less-ness’;—hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—The Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inadmissible’, because it has been proved that the knowledge of ‘Soul-less-ness’ is destructive of Love, etc.—Nor can the Reason be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’, because when the opposite of something rises to the highest point, that thing cannot continue to exist. Otherwise, if a thing were unable to entirely uproot another thing,—how could it bring about even a slight deterioration in this latter? For instance, the diamond, even when lying in the midst of flaming fire, does not undergo any deterioration at all.—Nor can the Reason be held to be ‘Inconclusive’ on the ground of the impossibility of the opposite rising to the highest stage of development; because it has been already proved in detail, that such high development is quite possible.

Or, those things that are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites, are likely to have opposites that are capable of utterly uprooting them,—as in the ease of the impurities of gold;—the Afflictions and the wrong notions of knowable things are liable to deterioration in the presence of their opposites; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things. Here also the charge of ‘Inconclusiveness’ and ‘Inadmissibility’ may be rebutted as in the previous cases.

‘Ādi’ includes the ‘wrong notions of action—(3416-3418)