The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3368-3370 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3368-3370.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

चक्रभ्रमणयोगेन निर्विकल्पेऽपि तायिनि ।
सम्भारावेगसामर्थ्याद्देशना संप्रवर्त्तते ॥ ३३६८ ॥
इति ये सुधियः प्राहुस्तान्प्रत्यपि न सिध्यति ।
वक्तृत्वं यत्तु लोकेन मतमाध्यवसायिकम् ॥ ३३६९ ॥
तत्र तादृशि हेतोः स्यात्सन्दिग्धव्यतिरेकिता ।
ननु चासिद्धता केन मतेऽत्रानुपपत्तिके ॥ ३३७० ॥

cakrabhramaṇayogena nirvikalpe'pi tāyini |
sambhārāvegasāmarthyāddeśanā saṃpravarttate || 3368 ||
iti ye sudhiyaḥ prāhustānpratyapi na sidhyati |
vaktṛtvaṃ yattu lokena matamādhyavasāyikam || 3369 ||
tatra tādṛśi hetoḥ syātsandigdhavyatirekitā |
nanu cāsiddhatā kena mate'trānupapattike || 3370 ||

‘Even when Tāyin (Buddha) is free from conceptual content, his teachings go on under the force of the initial momentum,—in the manner of the revolutions of the wheel’;—even against the wise men who hold this view, the argument of the other party is of no avail.—(3368-3369a)

The ‘speakership’ that is popularly conceived by men,—if that is put forward as the reason, then it would be open to the charge of having its presence in the contrary of the probandum possible.—(3369b-3370a)

“When the doctrine in question has no reason in its support,—what sort of ‘inadmissibility’ would there be in regard to it?”—(3370b)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verses 3368-3369a]:

Other Buddhists have held that words proceed from the Blessed Lord, even without conceptual content;—with reference to this view, the Author says—[see verses 3368-3369 above]

In the case of the Potter’s wheel, even after the turning by the stick has ceased, its revolution continues under the force of the momentum imparted to it; similarly in the case of the Blessed Lord, even after the cessation of the entire web of conceptual content, His Teaching goes on under the force of the momentum originally imparted by His previous Piety.

Such is the view that has been held by some ‘wise men’—i.e. the Idealist Buddhists.

As against these also, the Reason adduced by the opponent remains clearly ‘inadmissible—(3368-3369a)

The following might be urged “Under the view just referred to, every thing is a mere reflection of one’s own apprehension (Idea), hence there can be no real ‘speakership’ at all in the case of any man; in fact, even when he does not speak, the reflected ideation appears in another man; so that the person remains the dominating cause, and hence people come to regard him as the ‘speaker’; and it is this popularly conceived ‘speakership’ that has been adduced by us as the Reason (for Buddha being not-omniscient); either the Reason or the ‘subject’ of our reasoning is not in accordance with our own doctrine, but in accordance with the popular notion of things. Consequently there can be no ‘Inadmissibility’ in the Reason adduced by us”.

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 3369b-3370a next]

[verses 3369b-3370a]:

Here also, its exclusion from the contrary of the Probandum being doubtful, the Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive—(3369-3370a)

The following Text clarifies that ‘Inadmissibility’ which the opponent has urged against the doctrine of the Idealist:—[see verse 3370b next]

[verse 3370b]:

The opponent argues as follows:—“Only those arguments in support of, or against, anything, are admissible which set forth ideas accepted with certainty of conviction by both parties,—not what is not accepted by either party, or what is doubtful; because arguments of the latter sort would need further arguments in support of them. When, thus, the doctrine of the Idealist is one that is not vouched for by any Means of Right Cognition, how can Inadmissibility be urged (against any Reason urged against it)? A conclusion does not become vitiated by the arbitrary assumption of admissibility or inadmissibility; it is effective only when these are vouched for by proofs; and as a matter of fact the doctrine of Idealism has not been established by any Means of Right Cognition; in fact it has been rejected in detail”.—(3370b)

The answer to the above is as follows:—[see verses 3371-3373 next]

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