The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 3366-3367 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 3366-3367.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

समस्तवस्तुविज्ञानशक्त्यपाकरणेऽपि ते ।
संदिग्धव्यतिरेकित्वं तदवस्थं प्रसज्यते ॥ ३३६६ ॥
व्याहारवृत्तिसामर्थ्ये हेतुत्वेनापि संमते ।
संदिग्धव्यतिरेकित्वदोष एवानुवर्त्तते ॥ ३३६७ ॥

samastavastuvijñānaśaktyapākaraṇe'pi te |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvaṃ tadavasthaṃ prasajyate || 3366 ||
vyāhāravṛttisāmarthye hetutvenāpi saṃmate |
saṃdigdhavyatirekitvadoṣa evānuvarttate || 3367 ||

Even if you deny the capacity to know all things, your reason still remains open to the charge of its presence in the contrary of the probandum being doubtful.—Even if you wish your reason to consist in the capacity to use, the same defect, of the possibility of its presence in the contrary of the probandum, persists.—(3366-3367)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“If we had wanted to prove only that the knowledge of all things is not always present before Him, then perhaps our argument might have been superfluous, seeking to prove what is already admitted. As a matter of fact however, what we mean to prove is the fact that He does not possess the capacity to know in detail the truth relating to all things; hence our reasoning is not superfluous; nor is our Reason ‘Inadmissible’; because what our Reason means is the capacity to use.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3366-3367 above]

In both cases there is nothing to set aside the possibility of the presence of the Reason in the contrary of the Probandum; and this doubt renders the Reason ‘Inconclusive’.—(3366-3367)

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