Verse 3280-3281

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

कार्यकारणताव्याप्यव्यापकत्वविरोधिताः ।
दृश्यत्वे सति सिद्ध्यन्ति यश्चात्मा सविशेषणः ॥ ३२८० ॥
सर्वज्ञो नच दृश्यस्ते तेन नैता अदृष्टयः ।
तन्निराकरणे शक्ता निषेधाङ्गं नचापरम् ॥ ३२८१ ॥

kāryakāraṇatāvyāpyavyāpakatvavirodhitāḥ |
dṛśyatve sati siddhyanti yaścātmā saviśeṣaṇaḥ || 3280 ||
sarvajño naca dṛśyaste tena naitā adṛṣṭayaḥ |
tannirākaraṇe śaktā niṣedhāṅgaṃ nacāparam || 3281 ||

Effect and cause, pervaded and pervader, and contrariness—all these,—as also the ‘nature’ of the thing with a qualification—are possible only when the thing is perceptible.—The omniscient person, however, is not perceptible for you; hence all these ‘non-apprehensigns’ are not capable of proving his nonexistence; and any other factor of negation, there is none,—(3280-3281)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“If the Omniscient Person is not amen-able to Apprehension,—then it may be that a particular Non-apprehension of Him is not possible; but His ‘Cause’ and ‘Pervader’ are certainly amenable to Apprehension; why then cannot there be particular Non-apprehension of these two? The contraries also of these being amenable to apprehension, why should not there be apprehension of these contraries?”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verses 3280-3281 above]

‘Kārya, etc.’—is a copulative compound formed of—(1) the relation of Effect and Cause, (2) the relation of Pervaded and Pervader, and (3) the relation of Contrariness.

(1) The relation of Cause and Effect can be proved only by the Nonapprehension of what is perceptible; and as the Omniscient Person is not perceptible, there can be no relation of Cause and Effect with Him. (2) Nor is the relation of Pervader and Pervaded possible in regard to Him; as that also has to be preceded by the Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible; for instance, when the absence of one thing is always followed by the absence of the other, the latter is said to be ‘pervaded’ by the other; and the said absence is not possible except where there is Non-apprehension of what is apprehensible.—(3) Contrariness also is recognised only between two perceptible things, not between those that are not perceptible.—For instance, there is ‘contrariness’ between two things when they can never co-exist; and this is perceived by you when there is absence of one while the other is present—even when the efficient cause of the former is present; and as a matter of fact, the presence and absence of things cannot be ascertained unless the things themselves are capable of being apprehended.—The other kind of ‘contrariness’ consists in mutual exclusion; and it is recognised in cases where the cognition of one thing is invariably concomitant with the non-cognition of the other; as between succession and simultaneity. This cognition is not possible if the thing is not apprehensible.

“If that is so, then how can there be contrariness between Existence and Non-existence? Certainly both of these are not perceptible”.

This does not affect our position. As a matter of fact, Existence and Non-existence are not cognised separately, and then they are regarded as ‘contrary’ on account of their exclusion of one another;—what happens is that they are cognised separately and then ‘contrariness’ becomes cognised. For instance, the contrariness of Existence and Non-existence is determined only in reference to one and the same thing and at one and the same time,—not in reference to different things. Certainly the Existence of the Horse is not in any way ‘contrary’ to the non-existence of the Cow.—Nor is there any contrariness between existence and non-existence, if taken in reference to different points of time; for instance, if one thing did not exist at some previous time, its non-existence or existence at some future time is not deducible. It is only in regard to the same thing and the same time that both existence and non-existence are found incompatible; and not after being cognised and then found to be mutually exclusive.—It might be asked—“How can there be exclusion of what has not been cognised?”—The answer is that it is for this same reason,—i.e. because it is not cognised in connection with the particular thing—that its exclusion would be possible. Otherwise, how could, there be any exclusion of what has been definitely cognised? In fact, this cognition itself of the existence of the thing that constitutes the exclusion of its non-existence; and the cognition of the non-existence of one thing also constitutes the exclusion of the existence of the thing other than that. Hence when the non-existence of a certain thing is excluded, and its existence is cognised,—then they must be regarded as ‘perceptible’; because what is not perceptible cannot be cognised, and what is not cognised cannot have the contrary character excluded.

All this is not possible in the case of the Omniscient Person. In the first place all men are not perceived by any one; in view of which the presence of non-omniscience could be cognised in them, and the exclusion of omniscience could be secured; because that same man would have to be regarded as omniscient.—Thus then, there can be no ‘contrariness’ (incompatibility) between omniscience and non-omniscience in connection with a person who is not capable of being apprehended. It is possible, however, within one’s own ‘chain’; but there also, not with regard to the future, because the future is not perceptible at the time.—Thus the fact remains that the relation of cause and effect and the like is possible only in that which is perceptible.

‘As also the nature of a thing, with a qualification’—‘is possible’ should be construed here. ‘Nature’ here stands for the character of the thing; and this is to be taken along with its qualification; and this qualification consists in freedom from the three kinds of remoteness.

‘All these non-apprehensions’—i.e. the non-apprehensions of the ‘Cause’ (‘Nature’ and ‘Pervader—are not capable of proving the non-existence of the Omniscient Person; because the Omniscient Person can have no such relationship with anything as that of Cause and Effect, of Contrariness, and of Pervader and Pervaded; also because, even when there are other causes of apprehension present, the said Person cannot be perceptible.

‘Any other factor of negation, there is none’,—i.e. barring the particular kind of Non-apprehension.—(3280-3281)