Verse 2473-2475

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

निष्कृष्टगोत्ववाचित्वं चिरेण प्रतिपद्यताम् ।
एकरूपतया भ्रान्तैर्जनैरध्यवसायतः ॥ २४७३ ॥
भावतः क्षणिकत्वात्तु तावत्कालमपि स्थिरः ।
नैवायमिति किं तस्य स्थितिः पश्चादपीष्यते ॥ २४७४ ॥
घटादावपि नैवास्ति किंचिन्नाशस्य कारणम् ।
इतीदमपि निर्दिष्टं तत्क्व शब्दे भविष्यति ॥ २४७५ ॥

niṣkṛṣṭagotvavācitvaṃ cireṇa pratipadyatām |
ekarūpatayā bhrāntairjanairadhyavasāyataḥ || 2473 ||
bhāvataḥ kṣaṇikatvāttu tāvatkālamapi sthiraḥ |
naivāyamiti kiṃ tasya sthitiḥ paścādapīṣyate || 2474 ||
ghaṭādāvapi naivāsti kiṃcinnāśasya kāraṇam |
itīdamapi nirdiṣṭaṃ tatkva śabde bhaviṣyati || 2475 ||

You may take a long time in explaining the fact of the word (‘cow’) being expressive of the one universal ‘cow’, as extracted (from among the several universals); on the basis of deluded people cognising it in one and the same form.—(2473)

In reality, the thing is momentary; hence even for that time it cannot remain stationary; how then can it be admitted to exist at the subsequent time?—(2474)

In the case of the jar and other things also, there is no cause for their destruction, which can be clearly pointed out as ‘this is what will destroy it’; how, then, can any such cause be pointed out in the case of the word?—(2475)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

[verse 2473]:

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2136, that—“Inasmuch as the Word envisages several Universals, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2473 above]

The following text explains why this should be regarded as a ‘delusion’:—[see verse 2474 above]

[verse 2474]:

It has been argued by the Mīmāṃsaka under Text 2140, that—“In the case of the Jar and other things, it is understood that they would become -destroyed either through decay, etc. etc.”

The answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2475 next]

[verse 2475]:

‘This is what will, etc. etc.’—As explained in the chapter on the ‘Permanent Character of Things’; where it has been explained that there can he no cause for the destruction of things. When in the case of the Jar also, there can be no cause for its destruction,—how can there be any for the destruction of the Word?—The term ‘nāśakāraṇam’ is to be construed with ‘Śabde’,

What is indicated by this is that the Mīmāṃsaka’s Reasoning is superfluous, and the Corroborative Instance per Dissimilarity is ‘inadmissible’.—(2475)