The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 2359-2361 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 2359-2361.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अथ सत्यार्थविज्ञानजन्मशक्तः स्वतः स्थितः ।
वेदो नरनिनरः(वा?)निराशंसः सत्यार्थोयमतो मतः ॥ २३५९ ॥
यद्येवं सर्वदा ज्ञानं नैरन्तर्येण तद्भवेत् ।
सदाऽवस्थितहेतुत्वात्तद्यथाभिमते क्षणे ॥ २३६० ॥
एकविज्ञानकाले वा तज्जन्यं सकलं भवेत् ।
शक्तं हेतुतया यद्वत्तद्विज्ञानं विवक्षितम् ॥ २३६१ ॥

atha satyārthavijñānajanmaśaktaḥ svataḥ sthitaḥ |
vedo naraninaraḥ(vā?)nirāśaṃsaḥ satyārthoyamato mataḥ || 2359 ||
yadyevaṃ sarvadā jñānaṃ nairantaryeṇa tadbhavet |
sadā'vasthitahetutvāttadyathābhimate kṣaṇe || 2360 ||
ekavijñānakāle vā tajjanyaṃ sakalaṃ bhavet |
śaktaṃ hetutayā yadvattadvijñānaṃ vivakṣitam || 2361 ||

It might be said that—“the Veda by itself, independent of any personalities, stands capable of bringing about the true knowledge of things,—and it is on that ground that it is regarded as truthful and reliable”.—If that is so, that knowledge should be appearing incessantly,—because its cause is always there,—as at the moment intended.—Or at the time that one cognition appears, all cognitions provided by the Veda should appear simultaneously,—because it is an efficient cause,—as in the case of the intended cognition.—(2359-2361)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following might be urged—“If we had regarded the Veda as truthful by reason of the presence of Mercy and such other excellences.in its author, then, as the excellences would be resting in the Person,—when this Person would cease to exist, the excellences would disappear, and thence the truthfulness based upon the excellences would also disappear. As a matter of fact, however, it is by its very nature that the Veda is the source of knowledge of real things,—and this capacity of the Veda is not due to any excellences in any Person; hence there can be no ‘inconclusiveness’ in our Reason. Nor is there any possibility of the Veda being meaningless”.

Anticipating this argument of the Mīmāṃsaka, the Author says—‘If that is so, etc. etc.’—Just as, it is by its very nature that the Veda has a meaning,—in the same way it might be possible that it is false; so that the Reason still remains Inconclusive. This is going to be further explained later on.

If the Veda were the source of knowledge, by its very nature, then the cognitions provided by it should appear at all times and all simultaneously, as their efficient cause would be there always. How then can the contingency of being meaningless be avoided?

The argument may be formulated as follows When the efficient cause of a certain thing is there, that thing must come about,—e.g. the cognition of the Agnihotra provided by the Vedic sentences;—the efficient cause, in the shape of Veda, of all cognitions arising from the Vedic sentences, is always present; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.—(2359-2361)

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