Verse 2356-2357

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

आनर्थ्यक्यमतः प्राप्तं षडपूपादिवाक्यवत् ।
अर्थाश्चेत्सम्प्रतीयन्ते क्रियाकारकयोगिनः ॥ २३५६ ॥
एषा स्यात्पुरुषाख्यानादुर्वशीचरितादिवत् ।
प्रतिपत्तिरतादर्थ्येऽप्यस्य प्रकृतितस्तव ॥ २३५७ ॥

ānarthyakyamataḥ prāptaṃ ṣaḍapūpādivākyavat |
arthāścetsampratīyante kriyākārakayoginaḥ || 2356 ||
eṣā syātpuruṣākhyānādurvaśīcaritādivat |
pratipattiratādarthye'pyasya prakṛtitastava || 2357 ||

Thus the Veda is reduced to futility,—like such sentences as ‘six cakes’.—If it be argued that “meanings are actually comprehended (from Vedic sentences), in respect of actions and active agents”,—[the answer is that] there may be such comprehension in cases where there are explanations supplied by men,—as in the case of the doings of Urvaśī,—even though the words (of the Veda) by themselves do not really convey any such meaning at all,—as held by you.—(2356-2357)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts show what follows when the Veda is neither truthful nor false:—[see verses 2356-2357 above]

The Veda now turns out to be as ‘futile’ and meaningless as such stray utterances of the mad-cap as ‘six cakes’, ‘ten pomegranates’ and the like.

Says the Mīmāṃsaka—“In seeking to prove the futility of the Veda, the Buddhist makes his Proposition contrary to a perceptible fact; because it is directly perceived that the Vedic sentence actually provides the comprehension of the idea that ‘from the performance of the Agnihotra, follows the attainment of Heaven’. How then can this be denied?”

In answer to this, the Author, with a view to leaving no room for the Opponent to say anything, says—‘There may be such comprehension, etc, etc.’—The idea is as follows:—There would have been annulment of our Proposition if we tried to prove the meaninglessness of the Veda by itself; what we are doing is only to put forward a Reductio Ad Absurdum; and this cannot set aside our Proposition, as there is no Proposition in such an argument at all; all that is done is to show that when the other party does not admit the absence of the narrower factor even when the wider factor is absent, he incurs an undesirable incongruity and contradicts his own words.

Nor is our Proposition contrary to any perceived fact. Because, even when the Veda is really meaningless, such comprehension of meaning as has been urged may be the effect of the explanations provided by people; for instance, in regard to the Vedic sentence ‘Heaven follows from the Agnihotra’, some one may say—‘what are described in this sentence are the doings of Bharata, Urvaśī and other persons’; and even though he may have offered this explanation without actually knowing the meaning of the sentence, yet subsequently, the man actually has the comprehension of the said idea from the sentence. But this does not make the Vedic sentence really expressive of that meaning.—In the same manner, the ‘comprehension of the meaning’ that has been urged by the other party may proceed from the Vedic sentence, even though, in reality, this sentence may be entirely meaningless.—How then can our Proposition be annulled by ‘a fact of Perception’,—(2356-2357)

Further, it may be that in the Veda, there is absence, only of the defects conducive to falsity, not of the excellences; even so, the ‘inconclusiveness’ of your Probans is irresistible. This is shown in the following:—[see verse 2358 next]