Verse 2303

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

परधर्मेऽपि चाङ्गत्वमुक्तमश्वजवादिवत् ।
नित्यतायां च सर्वेषामर्थापत्तिप्रमाणता ॥ २३०३ ॥

paradharme'pi cāṅgatvamuktamaśvajavādivat |
nityatāyāṃ ca sarveṣāmarthāpattipramāṇatā || 2303 ||

“As matter of fact, a property belonging to one thing does become auxiliary to another thing,—as has been pointed out in the case of the speed of the horse.—as regards ‘eternality’, in the case of all things, the only proof of it consists in presumption.”—[Ślokavārtika—eternality of words, 306].—(2303)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

Says the Opponent—If the Order then is a property of Time, or of the manifesting Articulation,—and does not really belong to Letters,—then how does it become contributory to the expressing of the meaning? Certainly the property of one thing cannot belong to the other.

The Mīmāṃsaka’s answer to this is as follows:—[see verse 2303 above]

‘As has been pointed out’—in such assertions as ‘People going in a boat, etc. etc.’ where the ‘boat’ is meant to stand for all kinds of conveyance.

‘Like the Speed of the Horse, etc.’—For example, when people are riding a horse, the speed of the horse is contributory to the man’s reaching a distant-place, and also the man’s notion that the trees on the roadside are moving. Similarly the Order, though belonging to the Articulation, becomes contributory to the Letters bringing about the comprehension of the meaning.

Having thus shown in detail that the assertion of the non-eternality of Words is annulled by Presumption, the Mīmāṃsaka sums up his position in the words—‘As regards eternality, etc. etc.’—The term ‘tasmāt’ as introducing the summing up is to be regarded as understood here.

‘In the case of all things’—What is meant is that it is not the eternality of Letters only that is proved by the fact that the expression of meaning by the Letters cannot be otherwise explained,—but the eternality of the Palate, etc. and also of the Articulations. This has been declared in the Bhāṣya (Śabara. 1. 1. 18, Trans., p. 37) in the following words:—‘If the Word ceased to exist as soon as uttered, then no one could speak of anything to others; and in that case, the Word could not be uttered for the benefit of another. On the other hand, if the Word does not cease to exist, then it is only right that on hearing the Word several times, there is comprehension of its meaning’.—(2303)