Verse 1745-1746

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

यथा कल्माषवर्णस्य यथेष्टं वर्णनिग्रहः ।
चित्रत्वाद्वस्तुनोऽप्येवं भेदाभेदावधारणे ॥ १७४५ ॥
यदा तु शबलं वस्तु युगपत्प्रतिपद्यते ।
तदाऽन्यानन्यभेदादि सर्वमेव प्रलीयते ॥ १७४६ ॥

yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ |
citratvādvastuno'pyevaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇe || 1745 ||
yadā tu śabalaṃ vastu yugapatpratipadyate |
tadā'nyānanyabhedādi sarvameva pralīyate || 1746 ||

“As in the case of the variegated colour, one may emphasise any one colour as he chooses,—because the colour is variegated,—in the same way ‘difference’ or ‘non-difference’ of an entity might be emphasised.—(Ślokavārtika-ākṛti, 57-58).—When a thing of a mixed character is cognised simultaneously, then all distinctions like ‘difference’, ‘sameness’ and so forth, disappear—(ibid., 62-63).”—(1745-1746)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The author puts forward—from Kumārila’s point of view—the objection against the Buddhist argument, the objection that the Reason put forward is ‘Inconclusive’;—[see verses 1745-1746 above]

‘Kalmūṣa-varṇa’—is the variegated colour.—In this case one can fix upon, as he wishes, upon any of the several colours present—regarding the thing either as Blue, or Yellow or Red;—in the same manner, in the case of the Entity which has a variegated or mixed character,—being existent in its own form, and also non-existent in the form of other things,—and also having the two-fold character of the General and the Particular,—one can fix upon Unity or Diversity, as he likes. When a man wishes to emphasise the diversity -aspect, then he fixes upon diversity; and when he all at once cognises a, thing as being both General and Particular,—then all that has been urged regarding its difference or non-difference, etc. disappears; i.e, it does not apply at all; because what is clearly cognised through Perception is the thing of the mixed character. The objection that has been urged regarding the thing being different or non-different, etc. etc. is as follows (a) The General thing being non-different from the Particular things in the shape of the Horse, etc. should also have a diversity of forms like these particular things;—(b) the Particular things, being non-different from the General, all Particular things should become the same, like the General thing;—(c) how could difference and non-difference, which are mutually contradictory, reside in the General and the Particular? The other objections are such as—Unity and Plurality being mutually contradictory, how can one and the same thing be General as well as Particular?—(1745-1746)

It might be argued against the above (argument of Kumārila’s) that—‘If so, then in all cases, there would be cognition of the Mixed Character, and it would not be successive and simultaneous’.

The answer to this (from Kumārila’s point of view) may be as follows:—[see verse 1747 next]