The Tattvasangraha [with commentary]

by Ganganatha Jha | 1937 | 699,812 words | ISBN-10: 8120800583 | ISBN-13: 9788120800588

This page contains verse 1738-1744 of the 8th-century Tattvasangraha (English translation) by Shantarakshita, including the commentary (Panjika) by Kamalashila: dealing with Indian philosophy from a Buddhist and non-Buddhist perspective. The Tattvasangraha (Tattvasamgraha) consists of 3646 Sanskrit verses; this is verse 1738-1744.

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अर्थक्रियासमर्थत्वं वस्तुत्वमभिधीयते ।
यदि तस्यानुगामित्वं सर्वं स्यात्सर्वकार्यकृत् ॥ १७३८ ॥
एकोऽर्थजनकस्तस्य भावः सामर्थ्ययोगतः ।
तच्चाविशिष्टमन्यस्मिन्नित्यनुत्पादकः कथम् ॥ १७३९ ॥
नीलाद्येव च वस्तुत्वमनुगामि यदीष्यते ।
सितपीताद्यपि प्राप्तं नील(सं)साध्यकार्यकृत् ॥ १७४० ॥
एकमेव ततो जातं द्वितीयात्मविवर्जितम् ।
सर्वं विश्वमतो नैकमनेकाकारमस्ति नः ॥ १७४१ ॥
तदेव चेन्न वस्तुत्वं कणाशिमतसत्त्ववत् ।
नैकस्यानेकरूपत्वमेव वः स्याद्विभेदतः ॥ १७४२ ॥
विरुद्धधर्मसङ्गश्च वस्तूनां भेदलक्षणम् ।
कथञ्चिदन्यथेष्टोपि न भेदो नीलपीतयोः ॥ १७४३ ॥
अनुगाम्यन्यथाभावात्स च सामान्यभेदयोः ।
विद्यते तत्कथं नास्ति तयोर्भेदः परिस्फुटम् ॥ १७४४ ॥

arthakriyāsamarthatvaṃ vastutvamabhidhīyate |
yadi tasyānugāmitvaṃ sarvaṃ syātsarvakāryakṛt || 1738 ||
eko'rthajanakastasya bhāvaḥ sāmarthyayogataḥ |
taccāviśiṣṭamanyasminnityanutpādakaḥ katham || 1739 ||
nīlādyeva ca vastutvamanugāmi yadīṣyate |
sitapītādyapi prāptaṃ nīla(saṃ)sādhyakāryakṛt || 1740 ||
ekameva tato jātaṃ dvitīyātmavivarjitam |
sarvaṃ viśvamato naikamanekākāramasti naḥ || 1741 ||
tadeva cenna vastutvaṃ kaṇāśimatasattvavat |
naikasyānekarūpatvameva vaḥ syādvibhedataḥ || 1742 ||
viruddhadharmasaṅgaśca vastūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam |
kathañcidanyatheṣṭopi na bhedo nīlapītayoḥ || 1743 ||
anugāmyanyathābhāvātsa ca sāmānyabhedayoḥ |
vidyate tatkathaṃ nāsti tayorbhedaḥ parisphuṭam || 1744 ||

‘Being an entity’ is said to consist in ‘capacity for effective, action’; if this were all-pervasive, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing. Generally, one thing is held to be productive of another, only by reason of the, presence, in it, of the capacity for that action; if then, that capacity is equally present in another thing, why should not this be productive of the same?—If the ‘blue’ and other objects themselves are held to constitute the all-embracing character of ‘entity’, then the white and yellow things also would do what is done by the blue one; and in that case, the whole universe would become a single ‘entity devoid of a second; and thus it would not be true that a single thing has several aspects.—If the blue, etc. themselves do not constitute ‘entity’,—and this is like the ‘being’ (sattva) posited by ‘Kaṇāda’,—then it cannot be as you hold, that one thing cannot have several aspects; as there would be clear difference—Further, what constitutes ‘difference’ among things is the presence of contrary properties, and no other kind of ‘difference’ is held to lie between ‘blue’ and ‘yellow this same condition is present between the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’; because while the former is ‘inclusive’, the latter is otherwise. Why then should not ‘difference’ be admitted as clearly lying between them?—(1738-1744)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (by the Jaina writer, under Text 1716) that—“in the form of entities all things are not-different from one another.”—This is answered in the following—[see verses 1738-1744 above]

The ‘Entity’ is said to be that which is capable of effective action,—nothing else.—If this capacity is present in all things, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing, It is only in this sense that things are held to be productive. This capacity then being equally present in all cases, anything might be produced out of anything.

Further, is the ‘Entity’ the same as the Blue, the Yellow and other things? Or is it something different?—If it is the same, then, as it would be all-pervasive, even the white and yellow could bring about the colouring in the cloth that is brought about by the Blue.—Then again, there being no other character or nature possible, the entire Universe would become a single conglomeration of things; and this would upset the proposition that a single entity has several aspects.—If on the other hand, the ‘entity’ is something different, from the Blue, etc.,—like the ‘Being’ posited by Kaṇāda,—i.e. just as Kaṇāda has postulated the ‘Entity’, called ‘Being’,—as something different (from the particular things),—then it becomes all the more unreasonable to attribute ‘Plurality’ to any single thing; as in this case there would be clear absolute difference.

Then again, any two things are ‘different’ only when they have contrary poperties,—e.g. Hot and Cold;—the General and the Particular are found to have contrary properties; because while the former isinclusive’, the latter is otherwise; ‘otherwise’—i.e. not-Inclusive, ‘exclusive’.—If, even on the presence of contrary properties, difference were not admitted, then there would be no difference even between the Blue and the Yellow, which is admitted in some way, by the other party;—Kumārila himself having declared (in Ślokavārtika—Sense Perception, 158) that—“as their cognitions are different, Colour, etc., cannot be one and the same”;—where it has been declared that there is difference among the Blue and other things.—(1738-1744)

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