Verse 1602-1606

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

प्रमाणाभावनिर्णीतचैत्राभावविशेषितात् ।
गेहाच्चैत्रबहिर्भावसिद्धिर्या त्विह वर्णिता ॥ १६०२ ॥
तामभावोत्थितामन्यामर्थापत्तिमुदाहरेत् ।
पक्षधर्माद्यनङ्गत्वाद्भिन्नैषाऽप्यनुमानतः ॥ १६०३ ॥
बहिर्देशविशिष्टेऽर्थे देशे वा तद्विशेषिते ।
प्रमेये यो ग्रहाभावः पक्षधर्मस्त्वसौ कथम् ॥ १६०४ ॥
जीवतश्च गृहाभावः पक्षधर्मोऽत्र कल्प्यते ।
तत्संवित्तिर्बहिर्भावं न चाबुद्ध्वोपजायते ॥ १६०५ ॥
गेहाभावस्तु यः शुद्धो विद्यमानत्ववर्जितः ।
स मृतेष्वपि दृष्टत्वाद्बहिर्वृत्तेर्न साधकः ॥ १६०६ ॥

pramāṇābhāvanirṇītacaitrābhāvaviśeṣitāt |
gehāccaitrabahirbhāvasiddhiryā tviha varṇitā || 1602 ||
tāmabhāvotthitāmanyāmarthāpattimudāharet |
pakṣadharmādyanaṅgatvādbhinnaiṣā'pyanumānataḥ || 1603 ||
bahirdeśaviśiṣṭe'rthe deśe vā tadviśeṣite |
prameye yo grahābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmastvasau katham || 1604 ||
jīvataśca gṛhābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmo'tra kalpyate |
tatsaṃvittirbahirbhāvaṃ na cābuddhvopajāyate || 1605 ||
gehābhāvastu yaḥ śuddho vidyamānatvavarjitaḥ |
sa mṛteṣvapi dṛṣṭatvādbahirvṛtterna sādhakaḥ || 1606 ||

“(7) The absence of caitra from the house having been cognised through negation, the cognition of the presence of caitra outside the house which is marked by his absence, has been cited; this is to be regarded as another kind of presumption, based upon negation.—[Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 8-9].—This (presumption) is different from inference, because the minor premiss (probans as residing in the minor term) and the other factors do not form part of it. When the object cognised, is either the man connected with the exterior (of the house), or the exterior connected with the man,—in either case, how could ‘absence in the house’ serve as the probans (residing in that subject)?—[ibid., 10-12].—What is regarded as the probans in this case is the ‘absence of the living man in the house’; and there can be no cognition of this absence without knowing his presence outside the house. [ibid., 19].—As for pure ‘absence in the house’,—apart from the idea of his being alive—such absence is found in the case of dead persons also, and hence cannot be a proof of his presence outside”.—[ibid., 21].—(1602-1606)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

The following Texts describe the Presumption based upon Negation:—[see verses 1602-1606 above]

The absence of Caitra has been cognised by the Negation—absence,—of Perception and other Means of Cognition;—the House is qualified by this ascertained absence;—i.e. the idea that ‘Caitra is not in the House’;—and the presence of Caitra,—if he is alive—is cognised as being outside of the said House;—this cognition, in the form ‘Caitra is outside the house’,—has been cited—in the Bhāṣya, by Śabarasvāmin; that is, only as an indication of the other kinds of Presumption; e.g. when Devadatta is alive, if he is not in the house, there is Presumption of him as being out of the house.

This is an example of Presumption based upon Negation.

Almost all Naiyāyikās have included Presumption under ‘Inference’. In refutation of this view, Kumārila adds—‘This is different from Inference, etc. etc.’—Inasmuch as the Probans, etc. do not enter into it as factors—as its causes—this must be different from Inference; just like Perception. Because the object of cognition in this case is either Caitra qualified by the place outside the house, or the place outside the house qualified by Caitra; in either case, how could the absence of Caitra, which resides elsewhere (inside the House) serve as the Probans? That is to say, it could never serve as the Probans.

Then again, if absence in the House were assumed as the Probans,—it could be so assumed only in one or the other of two ways—i.e. either as the absence of the living Devadatta, in the House, or absence in the House in general. In the former case, there would be this objection—that ‘the absence of the living man, etc. etc.’—‘there can be no cognition of this absence, etc. etc.—That is, the cognition of the living Devadatta—the certainty regarding it—would not be possible until his presence outside is definitely known.

What is meant by this is that the Probans in this case would be one that is ‘inadmissible’, and that if it is admissible, it is futile.

If the second alternative is accepted [i.e. absence in the House in general is the Probans’, the Probans would be Inconclusive; as even when Devadatta is dead, people recognise his absence in the House. This is what is shown in the words ‘as for pure absence in the House, etc., etc.—‘Vidyamānatva’ is being alive.—(1602-1606)

With the following Texts begin the refutation of the above view (regarding Presumption as a distinct Means of Cognition).

In the first place, the definition that has been provided is not a proper one. For instance, the definition provided is that ‘Presumption consists in the presuming of an imperceptible fact without which a perceived or heard of fact would not be possible’. In connection with this, the following points have to be considered:—Has the relation of that imperceptible fact with the perceived and heard of facts been perceived anywhere, or not? If it has been perceived, then the cognition in question becomes an Inference, as brought about by the perception of the said Relation.—If the Relation has not been perceived, then, in that case, the non-burning power of Fire might also be presumed, in the same way as its burning power is; because so far as being not related is concerned, both stand upon the same footing.—It might be argued that—“inasmuch as Fire has never been actually found to be associated with non-burning power, there can be no presumption of this latter”.—But in that case, there should be no presumption of the burning power also; because Fire has never been seen to be associated with that power. Thus it is only when the relation between two things is well known that, on seeing one of the two invariably concomitant members of that relation, there can be a presumption of the other relative;—and when this has been presumed,—it is only through the said Relation; and hence this presumption becomes included under ‘Inference’.

The examples also that have been cited are not right. These examples have been cited to show that through four Presumptions one cognises the Potency of something known through Perception and the other Means of Cognition.

The author points out the defect that is common to all these:—[see verse 1607 next]