Verse 1475-1477

Sanskrit text, Unicode transliteration and English translation by Ganganath Jha:

अभ्यस्तलक्षणानां च सम्यग्लिङ्गविनिश्चये ।
अनुमावृत्तिरन्या तु नानुमेत्यभिधीयते ॥ १४७५ ॥
अवस्थादेशकालानां भेदाद्भिन्नासु शक्तिषु ।
भावानामनुमानेन नातः सिद्धिः सुदुर्लभा ॥ १४७६ ॥
यत्नेनानुमितोऽप्यर्थः कुशलैरनुमातृभिः ।
नान्यथा साध्यते सोऽन्यैरभियुक्ततरैरपि ॥ १४७७ ॥

abhyastalakṣaṇānāṃ ca samyagliṅgaviniścaye |
anumāvṛttiranyā tu nānumetyabhidhīyate || 1475 ||
avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedādbhinnāsu śaktiṣu |
bhāvānāmanumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā || 1476 ||
yatnenānumito'pyarthaḥ kuśalairanumātṛbhiḥ |
nānyathā sādhyate so'nyairabhiyuktatarairapi || 1477 ||

As a matter of fact, inference proceeds only on the basis of things whose ‘indicative character’ has been properly ascertained by repeated experience; all else is regarded as ‘not inference so that even though the potencies of things vary according to the variations of condition, time and place, yet the cognition of things by means of inference is not unattainable.—And when a certain conclusion has been deduced, with great care from an inference,—it cannot be proved to be otherwise, even by cleverer persons.—(1475-1477)

 

Kamalaśīla’s commentary (tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā):

It has been argued (under 1470) that—“on account of the diversity of Condition, Place and Time, etc. etc.”

The answer to that is as follows:—[see verses 1475-1477 above]

It is only the well-ascertained Probans that is held to be truly indicative,—not one that is doubtful; e.g. when the presence of Smoke is only suspected, in regard to Vapour, it does not lead to a certain Cognition of the presence of Fire.

Question:—“How does the certainty of the Probans come about?”

Answer—By repeated experience:—as is found in persons well-versed in the science of gems,—in regard to gems. That is to say, persons who are conversant with the nature of the things concerned, do discern the real Smoke from Vapour: and when they proceed to act after discernment, they do actually find Fire.—Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail,—the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Probans,—even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time.—And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of well-discerned Probans,—it can never be made otherwise; e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the presence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise (i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.

It has been argued (in commentary on 1460, etc.) that—“Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc.,—and the Fire burning the Abhrapaṭala, etc. etc”.

But in all these cases, there is no proper Probans at all; as the ‘three features’ are not present. The mere fact of not being perceived cannot lead to the idea of the Probans being excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent; as has been thus declared—‘Exclusion from that where the Probandum is known to be absent cannot follow from mere non-perception.’ In fact, the reality of Invariable Concomitance follows only from the presence of the relationship either of essential sameness or of being the effect; as has been thus declared—‘Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance,—and this follows from Perception, not from Non-perception’; and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships—of essential sameness, or of being the effect—is present.—(1475-1477)